This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed only one bank: Georgian Bank of Atlanta, Georgia. Total declared asset value of the closed bank was approximately $2,000,000,000, and total deposits were approximately $2,000,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $892,000,000. According to our methodology, the recoverable value of Georgian Bank was $1,108,000,000, or only 55.40% of the declared asset value.
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $45,704,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $478,389,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $320,552,620,000. This includes the assets and deposits of Washington Mutual, which can now be included in data analysis due to our new methodology. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $274,847,820,000, or 57.45% of the declared value.
***
This week's closure was below the national average of failed banks, but it is far from attractive. Such a low recoverable value is a sign of some serious problems within the U.S. banking system; problems which have not, by any stretch of the imagination, been worked out or 'TARPed' from existence.
Since there is a distinct likelihood that a good chunk of the banking system is overvalued to about this degree (e.g. 55% recoverability or so), we can only assume that the FDIC is purposefully dragging its feet on closing those banks which are in the worst shape. This would make sense, especially considering if approximately half of the entire banking system's assets are toxic waste!
Given that scenario, though, a serious problem arises: it means that the FDIC's exhaulted insurance is nothing but a Ponzi scheme. If indeed the banking system is that insolvent, or even approxmiately that insolvent, then the money paid out on FDIC closures is simply the money which has been recently paid in by banks for the deposit insurance. Perhaps the FDIC chooses which bank to close, not based on how insolvent or zombiod it is, but rather how much money is on hand to cover deposits...
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Utah
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Washington
10. Florida
We are replacing the losses-to-assets analysis by State, with a recoverable value analysis by State. However, we are still retooling our data, but we expect that we will be ready to provide this analysis with next week's closures.
Showing posts with label insolvency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insolvency. Show all posts
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Sunday, May 31, 2009
Lack of Bank Closures = Bad
As there have been no bank closures by the FDIC, we cannot provide an update of the Bank Closure Report this week. Instead, we will therefore take a moment to point out that it's a very bad thing indeed to see no bank closures this week.
During the Savings & Loan Crisis, the collapse of the S&L banks was greatly exacerbated by inaction on the parts of the regulators. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which was the Federal regulator of the S&L banks, was eventually rendered insolvent by its lack of proactive closings of insolvent institutions.
To put it bluntly, it looks that the FDIC is continuing to head toward a similar fate. According to our data, any bank closed by the FDIC at this point will be insolvent to the tune of 25% of total assets... and that number is rising, not falling. The insolvency in the U.S. banking system is pervasive and destructive, and the longer the FDIC does not aggressively cleanse the system, the worse the eventual implosion of the system will be.
As a public service, and in closing, we've developed an honest and realistic method of rating the nation's banks, called The Frugal Scotsman's Bank Rating System. It is a 1 to 5 scale, where 5 is the 'best,' and 1 as the worst. It goes as follows:
5: Salvageable.
4: Cross your fingers.
3: Pray hard.
2: The tellers are holding the doors for the regulators.
1: Your money is already gone.
During the Savings & Loan Crisis, the collapse of the S&L banks was greatly exacerbated by inaction on the parts of the regulators. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which was the Federal regulator of the S&L banks, was eventually rendered insolvent by its lack of proactive closings of insolvent institutions.
To put it bluntly, it looks that the FDIC is continuing to head toward a similar fate. According to our data, any bank closed by the FDIC at this point will be insolvent to the tune of 25% of total assets... and that number is rising, not falling. The insolvency in the U.S. banking system is pervasive and destructive, and the longer the FDIC does not aggressively cleanse the system, the worse the eventual implosion of the system will be.
As a public service, and in closing, we've developed an honest and realistic method of rating the nation's banks, called The Frugal Scotsman's Bank Rating System. It is a 1 to 5 scale, where 5 is the 'best,' and 1 as the worst. It goes as follows:
5: Salvageable.
4: Cross your fingers.
3: Pray hard.
2: The tellers are holding the doors for the regulators.
1: Your money is already gone.
Labels:
bank failure,
fdic,
fslic,
insolvency,
savings and loan crisis
Saturday, May 30, 2009
Follow-Up on Loan Delinquency
The FDIC is reporting delinquent bank loans are 7.75% of all loans. While this is not yet as bad as mortgage delinquency which we discussed in yesterday's post, it is still capital-annihilating (since most of these deadbeat loans will have to be written off).
With their capital evaporating, banks must shrink lending. It is no wonder that so many businesses and individuals are seeing their credit lines cut or cancelled. As those who have the means to pay off said lines of credit race to do so, they will not be investing or spending money. This will have a dampening effect on economic activity, to say the least.
If the nationalised, yet insolvent Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae being ordered to expand their books to keep mortgage loans flowing were a precedent, we would anticipate an imminent, very large bank nationalisation instigated in order to have banks under political control and follow the directive to grow loans, no matter the ultimate cost. (The hurried, and ill-conceived TARP investments do little to give the Federal Government adequate policy leverage over the banks).
We think it wiser to let banks gradually expire. In the post peak-oil, resource-constricted world, there will likely be no further economic growth. In the aggregate, borrowing and lending will become much riskier propositions since loans will tend to impoverish, rather than enrich borrowers. There will always be room for lending to promising enterprises, but this will be a small niche.
It will be very shocking to witness much of the 20% or so of the US economy that is the banking and financial sector just go away. But there is no way around it. Like house building and automobile manufacturing, it is a sector whose preeminence has come and gone.
With their capital evaporating, banks must shrink lending. It is no wonder that so many businesses and individuals are seeing their credit lines cut or cancelled. As those who have the means to pay off said lines of credit race to do so, they will not be investing or spending money. This will have a dampening effect on economic activity, to say the least.
If the nationalised, yet insolvent Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae being ordered to expand their books to keep mortgage loans flowing were a precedent, we would anticipate an imminent, very large bank nationalisation instigated in order to have banks under political control and follow the directive to grow loans, no matter the ultimate cost. (The hurried, and ill-conceived TARP investments do little to give the Federal Government adequate policy leverage over the banks).
We think it wiser to let banks gradually expire. In the post peak-oil, resource-constricted world, there will likely be no further economic growth. In the aggregate, borrowing and lending will become much riskier propositions since loans will tend to impoverish, rather than enrich borrowers. There will always be room for lending to promising enterprises, but this will be a small niche.
It will be very shocking to witness much of the 20% or so of the US economy that is the banking and financial sector just go away. But there is no way around it. Like house building and automobile manufacturing, it is a sector whose preeminence has come and gone.
Labels:
bank,
credit,
delinquent,
fannie mae,
fdic,
federal government,
freddie mac,
insolvency,
loan,
nationalisation,
super-huge banks,
tarp,
united states
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Is the FDIC Inept, Panicked, or Corrupt?
We looked over the latest bank closures by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and we noted with some alarm how costly these closures were. Putting the cost to the FDIC in terms of losses/assets, the four closures (as of 25/04/09) were insolvent to the tune of 26% to 39% of assets! This level of insolvency is horrible, and marks an incredible deterioration of the health of the United States' banking system. Below is a chart of the losses/assets of all bank closures since December 2007 to April 25, 2009(the beginning of the Depression). We used the data from the FDIC's failed bank list to construct the graph.
Needless to say, the closures by the FDIC are not getting better; we suppose the bright side it that they're not getting worse, either.
Let's look at the hard data: Total assets of all FDIC-failed banks, December 2007 to April 25 2009, and including Washington Mutual (WaMu), in millions, is $388,388.03 - that's $388,388,030,000. The cost to the FDIC for these failures was $18,783.20, in millions. That's a losses/assets percentage of 4.84%; not bad, we suppose...
But WaMu didn't cost the FDIC anything, so let's throw out their assets ($307,000 in millions) from the equations. Revised total assets becomes a modest $81,388.08 in millions, while the cost to the FDIC stays $18,783.20. Sitting down, dear Reader? The losses/assets percentage on these numbers is a whopping 23.08%! On average, approximately a full quarter of every failed bank's assets are trash, and if the latest percentages continue to get higher, that number will be getting much, much worse.
The horrifying insolvency of these FDIC-failed banks begs the question in our post's title: is the FDIC inept, panicked, or corrupt? Bear with us as we ponder each in turn.
All jokes about the Government aside, it is quite possible that the FDIC's leadership is indeed inept. Many other policy-makers in the U.S. Government are showing themselves to be very inept, so we can't rule out the FDIC. However, we don't feel the FDIC is necessarily inept in the classic sense; we posit the FDIC is instead following in the footsteps of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Simply put, the FSLIC sat on its hands at the beginning of the Savings and Loan Crisis, hoping that the situation with the thrifts would solve itself. Instead, the situation deteriorated and the FSLIC itself went insolvent, and its mission was absorbed by the FDIC. We would be hardly surprised of the FDIC is likewise hoping that the banks will heal themselves. Perhaps by sitting on its hands, the FDIC is rendering itself insolvent, and therefore dooming its mission to be absorbed by a bigger Government agency... oh, perhaps the Federal Reserve.
Instead of inept, let us assume that the FDIC is, instead in a panic. The leadership knows that the greater part of the U.S. banking system is horrifyingly insolvent. They also know that the FDIC insurance fund is completely unable to absorb the losses incurred from fast and hard failures of all the insolvent banks in the U.S. (i.e. most of them). So, instead of having a proactive plan for dealing with the major problems within the banking system, the FDIC instead is reactively lurching from one super-insolvent bank to another with no cohesive plan of attack - or, indeed, of how to pay for all the damage. This panic is only allowing the problems in the banking system to fester, thereby creating even bigger problems down the road. Those could come sooner than anyone might imagine...
Finally, let's assume that the FDIC is corrupt. In this situation, the FDIC's actions are planned and carefully implemented. They are starting with the smallest banks in the nation, and slowly forcing mergers into larger ones, selling off the good assets to the bigger banks and holding the bad assets on its books. As the banking crisis continues, the FDIC will work its way up the food chain, successively cleaning out the banks, until the only remaining banks are the nineteen (or so) super-huge money-centre banks. At this point, the best assets in the U.S. will be in the hands of quasi-private banks, while the worst will be on the books of the Federal Government. Simply put, all losses will be paid for by the American Citizenry, while all potential profits will accrue to the super-huge banks.
Frankly, we can see aspects of all three possibilities at work; any and all combinations thereof would not surprise us. The big question in our mind is, which one is dominant?
Needless to say, the closures by the FDIC are not getting better; we suppose the bright side it that they're not getting worse, either.Let's look at the hard data: Total assets of all FDIC-failed banks, December 2007 to April 25 2009, and including Washington Mutual (WaMu), in millions, is $388,388.03 - that's $388,388,030,000. The cost to the FDIC for these failures was $18,783.20, in millions. That's a losses/assets percentage of 4.84%; not bad, we suppose...
But WaMu didn't cost the FDIC anything, so let's throw out their assets ($307,000 in millions) from the equations. Revised total assets becomes a modest $81,388.08 in millions, while the cost to the FDIC stays $18,783.20. Sitting down, dear Reader? The losses/assets percentage on these numbers is a whopping 23.08%! On average, approximately a full quarter of every failed bank's assets are trash, and if the latest percentages continue to get higher, that number will be getting much, much worse.
The horrifying insolvency of these FDIC-failed banks begs the question in our post's title: is the FDIC inept, panicked, or corrupt? Bear with us as we ponder each in turn.
All jokes about the Government aside, it is quite possible that the FDIC's leadership is indeed inept. Many other policy-makers in the U.S. Government are showing themselves to be very inept, so we can't rule out the FDIC. However, we don't feel the FDIC is necessarily inept in the classic sense; we posit the FDIC is instead following in the footsteps of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Simply put, the FSLIC sat on its hands at the beginning of the Savings and Loan Crisis, hoping that the situation with the thrifts would solve itself. Instead, the situation deteriorated and the FSLIC itself went insolvent, and its mission was absorbed by the FDIC. We would be hardly surprised of the FDIC is likewise hoping that the banks will heal themselves. Perhaps by sitting on its hands, the FDIC is rendering itself insolvent, and therefore dooming its mission to be absorbed by a bigger Government agency... oh, perhaps the Federal Reserve.
Instead of inept, let us assume that the FDIC is, instead in a panic. The leadership knows that the greater part of the U.S. banking system is horrifyingly insolvent. They also know that the FDIC insurance fund is completely unable to absorb the losses incurred from fast and hard failures of all the insolvent banks in the U.S. (i.e. most of them). So, instead of having a proactive plan for dealing with the major problems within the banking system, the FDIC instead is reactively lurching from one super-insolvent bank to another with no cohesive plan of attack - or, indeed, of how to pay for all the damage. This panic is only allowing the problems in the banking system to fester, thereby creating even bigger problems down the road. Those could come sooner than anyone might imagine...
Finally, let's assume that the FDIC is corrupt. In this situation, the FDIC's actions are planned and carefully implemented. They are starting with the smallest banks in the nation, and slowly forcing mergers into larger ones, selling off the good assets to the bigger banks and holding the bad assets on its books. As the banking crisis continues, the FDIC will work its way up the food chain, successively cleaning out the banks, until the only remaining banks are the nineteen (or so) super-huge money-centre banks. At this point, the best assets in the U.S. will be in the hands of quasi-private banks, while the worst will be on the books of the Federal Government. Simply put, all losses will be paid for by the American Citizenry, while all potential profits will accrue to the super-huge banks.
Frankly, we can see aspects of all three possibilities at work; any and all combinations thereof would not surprise us. The big question in our mind is, which one is dominant?
Friday, December 12, 2008
Clueless Leadership
Today we learned a 'Pension Relief' bill whizzed through the U.S. Congress, passing both houses unanimously. Among the many popular items, was one in particular that caught our eye: easing the requirement that Corporate Defined-Benefit Pensions be fully funded. This comes just two years after the Federal Government toughened enforcement to protect workers and the Government Pension Insurance Fund.
No one likes to lose money, but pretending one didn't lose it doesn't help the situation. If a pension fund had terrible losses in the stock market this year, the employer should put more money in to ensure there will be enough to pay the retirees. If it can't cough up the bucks, then the benefits need to be cut. One can't go on paying out as if nothing happened.
This sort of thinking is not the exception these days. For another example, banks are being allowed to shuffle more of their impaired investments into the 'marked to make-believe' category of valuation to avoid writing it down to actual market values. The most extreme examples are to be found in the 'horror stories' of people who loose their income and yet continue spending on their credit cards all the way to bankruptcy and homelessness.
If any economic unit - be it household, business, or nation - is to emerge from the 2007 Depression not ruined, it must begin by fully acknowledging the painful losses that have already happened, and accept the possibility of further losses ahead. Only then can there be a truly appropriate response - which typically involves austerity and hard work. The glaring lack of leadership from elected representatives and regulators on this point is certain to have destructive consequences, namely: more insolvency, more income loss, and (as long as governments can pretend they have resources) more bailouts.
No one likes to lose money, but pretending one didn't lose it doesn't help the situation. If a pension fund had terrible losses in the stock market this year, the employer should put more money in to ensure there will be enough to pay the retirees. If it can't cough up the bucks, then the benefits need to be cut. One can't go on paying out as if nothing happened.
This sort of thinking is not the exception these days. For another example, banks are being allowed to shuffle more of their impaired investments into the 'marked to make-believe' category of valuation to avoid writing it down to actual market values. The most extreme examples are to be found in the 'horror stories' of people who loose their income and yet continue spending on their credit cards all the way to bankruptcy and homelessness.
If any economic unit - be it household, business, or nation - is to emerge from the 2007 Depression not ruined, it must begin by fully acknowledging the painful losses that have already happened, and accept the possibility of further losses ahead. Only then can there be a truly appropriate response - which typically involves austerity and hard work. The glaring lack of leadership from elected representatives and regulators on this point is certain to have destructive consequences, namely: more insolvency, more income loss, and (as long as governments can pretend they have resources) more bailouts.
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