Commentary on the FDIC Bank Failure Report (12 March 2010)

New York City was the scene of much action this week, with the closures of LibertyPoint and Park Avenue Banks. It was also a very strange circumstance, as well, because LibertyPointe was closed on a Thursday, which is very much not how the FDIC likes to do business. The why is not exactly clear, since - as far as we can tell - LibertyPointe was actually not all that badly off. The worst bank this week was Old Southern Bank ($315 million in assets, $319 million in deposits. Oops.), and that bank managed to politely sit pretty (and insolvently) until Friday evening.

Additionally, LibertyPointe's recoverability was not all that bad: 87.93 cents on the dollar. That's actually the best recoverable value in our records! So go figure; there must have been something especially exciting going on at LibertyPointe for a mid-week closure, but unfortunately it is invisible to our financial analysis. Whatever was going on, though, we have the strong suspicion that the FDIC knew all about it, and had taken the traditional regulator stance toward fraud: do nothing.

Speaking of fraud, we notice a trend of recent weeks, regarding the recoverable value of the banks which the FDIC closes. Except for the closures on 6 January 2010, all have been sharply over the overall trendline of ~57%. This week alone was 86.78%, one of the best weeks we've seen, if not the best ever. This makes us wonder: is the FDIC targeting their end costs ever more closely? If so, that means the FDIC is not necessarily closing the worst of the banks, but rather the banks they can afford to close. Remember, Dear Reader, the FDIC will not be receiving any quarterly insurance payments for a little under two years now; they have no source of regular income. Whatever is in the coffers is pretty much what they have to work with, barring either A) tapping the Treasury credit line, and B) a special insurance assessment.

However, the first has been vicoferously written off as an "extreme emergency measure" by Chairwoman Sheila Bair (translation: Goldman Sachs needs pin-money), and the second is likely not politically palatable, considering that banks would prefer to hunker down and park their money in Treasury Bills. Even if the FDIC should decide to tap their Treasury credit line, they will still have to pay the interest on the funds thus extended. As many people are discovering in this Depression, it's pretty hard to pay off debt when one does not have any income.

Sure, the FDIC could levy special insurance assessments to pay the interest, but that is a one or two trick pony; if the FDIC should try to levy multiple special assessments, the banking system would likely rebel. Congress would apply pressure to the FDIC, and force it to back down; at the very extreme, Congress would attempt to force out Sheila Bair for someone more light-handed. The banks, after all, are tolerant of the FDIC, so long as it does not interfer excessively in their operations.

Bringing this back to our original comment, a constricted income is likely the driving force behind the targeted closure programme which we posit the FDIC is undertaking. Capital is presently scarse, and it will be two years until new, dependable income will resume; therefore, the FDIC has every impetus to conserve their resources as carefully as possible.

This, Dear Reader, brings us to fraud: if the FDIC is closing, not the worst banks in the United States, but rather those banks they think the can close with minimal outlays of precious capital, they are shirking their fundamental mission. They are not protecting depositors by closing the cheapest banks to close, but rather attempting to instill a false sense of health and solvency in depositors, to protect the truly horrible banks. By supporting the perception of solvency and deposit protection, the FDIC serves to shield insolvent banks (Citibank, anyone?) from sudden, disasterous outflows of capital.

Such a disastre can be seen in the capital flight from Greece, which - as of 23 February - amounted to 8 billion out of the 30 billion under management in private Greek banks (originial article here, subscription needed). 25% loss of a country's private capital base spells D-O-O-M for the banking system.

The FDIC-as-shield-for-banks, let us repeat, is fraud, if it is indeed the case. Innocent depositors are being duped into believing that their banks are in sound financial shape, since 'only a few banks are getting closed,' and 'the recovery is underway!', et cetera. We do not believe there is a recovery, nor do we see one in the future; the next leg down of the ongoing Depression, whenever it arrives, will likely take be a gut-punch to the FDIC. It's then that we expect bank runs to begin, and when the so-called insurance offered by the FDIC will be seen as the farse it really is.

FDIC Bank Failure Report

On 8/01/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rang in the New Year closing one bank: Horizon Bank of Bellingham, Washington.The assets of the closed bank were $1,300,000,000 and deposits were $1,100,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $539,100,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was only 43.15% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closure distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.63% (down slightly from last report's 57.66%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $56,923,690,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $545,760,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $371,446,650,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $314,522,960,000 (57.63% of the declared value).

* * *

It appears Santa Claus has not fixed the US banking system, after all. This week's closed bank was a particularly putrid affair and we consider it a bad omen for the rest of the year.

The Federal Reserve system laid a sulfurous egg this week too, announcing that bank consumer lending is declining at an 8 1/2 percent annual rate as of November. Revolving credit, primarily credit card lending is declining at a whopping annual rate of 18.5 percent! There is clearly no recovery in bank lending. We suspect that is in part due to the sorry state of household finances, but more so due to the utter insolvency of the banking system as a whole. The credit unions and banks out there that are still solvent enough to lend just cannot pick up the slack from the collapse of the system.

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas
5. Minnesota
6. Utah
7. Florida
8. Missouri
9. Oregon
10. Arizona

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (38.89%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.06%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Washington, up from #9 (50.62% down from 56.18%)
7. Ohio (50.84%)
8. Georgia (54.64%)
9. Utah (55.45%)
10. North Carolina (56.70%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $539,100,000. The value now stands at $39,020,890,000.

The Dubai Gambit

Although we just wrote about Dubai and its impressive level of debt - not to mention its impressive malinvestment of its resources - the Emirate has made a manoeuvre which we didn't even think of: declaring the debt of Dubai World not backed by government guarantee. From the BBC:

"[Creditors] think Dubai World is part of the government, which is not correct," said finance minister Abdulrahman al-Saleh. "Creditors need to take part of the responsibility for their decision to lend to the companies."

Clever, very clever; it seems to us that Dubai is looking to have its cake and eat it too, after a manner of speaking. They got their theme parks and little islands, and now the investors can go stick it wherever they'd prefer the pain. And if those investors attempt to foreclose on the assets of Dubai World, they just might run into the little problem that said parks and islands are property of the Dubai government, or perhaps the Abu Dhabi government; in other words, foreclosure is not happening, because we really don't think an UAE court would care to strip a sovereign government of its assets. Certainly not for foreigners, and the latest incident with the Swiss banning minarets will likely not help the situation.

A thought arises from the move, which we give the same title as this post: the Dubai Gambit. We'll put it in the general terms for starters. A nation's Government spawns this enterprise (we'll use the U.S. term of Government-Sponsored Enterprise, or GSE, with apologies for such Amero-centrism), and lets it just toddle along, doing its thing. As a GSE, it would seem to investors that the GSE enjoys an implicit Government guarantee; the Government made it, so why wouldn't it keep it going if times were tough? So, investors cheerfully pile into the debt of this GSE, because from their perspective it's just as good of debt as sovereign debt.

But surprise! It doesn't say anything anywhere in the GSE's charter (or what have you) about a Government guarantee. That means the Government, at its fickle discretion, can either help out the GSE in times of trouble, or not. The average investor, being apparently rather dim-witted when it came to reading fine print, was speculating much harder than he or she thought; the money he or she plopped down for the GSE's debt might never come home from the front lines of the Free Market. It's a messy place, we hear, and casualties can be heavy.

Bad times come along, and the GSE gets into some serious trouble. Investors start thinking "Boy, I be sure glad that thar GSE's got some sort of gum'ment guarantee or some such. I's real smaaart," and patiently sit on the deck of their double-wide trailer waiting for the cheque from the Government to make them whole. Grandma Kettle's rocking chair creaks as she loads up the shotgun to take aim at a stray dog; the hole in the roof gets a little bigger; no Government cheque comes in.

That's because the Dubai Gambit was brought into play; the Government decided the GSE was not, in fact, going to enjoy a bailout. In the real world, this would probably happen when such a GSE was in such horrible shape, that the Government would have risked its own credit rating to support the malinvestment of the investors, and the GSE's own malinvestments. GSE debt goes from being 'as good as Government' to 'someone has to do something about this!' overnight, as the bonds go belly-up. Investors are left footing the bill for someone else's good time, and the Government comes out, theoretically, smelling like a rose, at least to the credit markets.

As this meltdown of the GSE is underway, the Government finally steps in, but not in the way the investors were expected. Instead of providing a backstop for the full value of the GSE debt, the Government starts Agency X, with the explicit goal of winding down the GSE's debt. With a pre-packaged bankruptcy agreement - and a sufficiently... agreeable... court system - Agency X gets to cherry-pick the good assets of the GSE, and leave the GSE with all of its liabilities. Investors in the failed GSE would get Agency bonds worth pennies on the dollar of their original GSE debt, and the Government gets to have at least something for its efforts.

We fully expect Dubai to do this manoeuvre, or at least something like it. If it seems far-fetched to you, dear Reader, please consider the shenanigans surrounding the General Motors bankruptcy fiasco in the United States. The 'old' GM went into bankruptcy, gave its few good assets to the 'new' GM (owned by the U.S. Government, the Crown in Right of Canada, and a few other favoured parties), and then left its legacy of toxic waste dumps (or, 'factories,' as they are charmingly misnomered) and other such massive liabilities upone the shoulders of now wiped-out investors; the 'new' GM is in the clear. This, in civilised countries, is typically considered unlawful conveyance, but since the Federal Government was involved, such trivialities were easily brushed aside.

The Dubai Gambit is, at its core, entirely designed to have the Government - any Government - protect its credit rating at all costs. Dubai seems to be very much conscious of that factor, as why else would the Emirate have explicitly withdrew any implicit Government guarantee? Dubai World et al. is a mess financially, and it would probably bring down the Government if it tried to back the enterprise's debt for its full value. At pennies on the dollar, as it were, Dubai might be able to convince the UAE central bank, or Abu Dhabi, to bankroll a resolution of the fiasco; Dubai keeps its sovereign credit rating, the UAE and Abu Dhabi look like heroes, and investors in Dubai World don't feel quite as raped as they otherwise would have.

The question is, if Dubai makes this Gambit work, and to paraphrase Tom Lehrer, who's next?

The Last "Normal" Holiday Season

As we prepare our purposefully irreverent meal for this day of thanksgiving - boiled oats and day-old biscuits - we would like to stop and make a fearless prediction which has been rolling around in our heads since about the middle of this year. We really don't have any hard data to back up our assertion; in fact, we're going to just put it right out there, that this is an intuition.

Simply put, we posit this will be the last holiday season that anyone in the United States, or elsewhere, can call normal. Note the call normal; last year saw the last holiday season which could be considered actually normal. This season, however, will be all about keeping up appearances; the show must go on, after all.

Take this Thanksgiving in the United States; 49 million Citizens are going hungry at the end of every month. Now, at last report in September, 28.4 million Citizens are on food stamps. Hmm, we sense a number problem here... but anyway, on top of that, half of all children in the U.S. will receive food aid, as well as 90% of African-American children.

Let that settle in your mind for a moment, dear Reader. Those numbers are not from Haiti or Zimbabwe, but rather the only so-called superpower in the world, the United States. Those are not good numbers to be seeing from an OECD nation; it makes us think about terms like 'third world' and 'failed state.'

This will be a failed Thanksgiving; people will max out what little credit they have remaining for the month in order to have a 'feast.' By that, we mean keep up appearances, as there are really very few people in the U.S. right now who can actually afford to have an extravagant meal, pay their bills, and have savings. Perhaps the 'recovery' propaganda has worked its magic, and most Citizens have moved into a Keynesian dreamland, where they spend now and have an economy later. We frankly think not; we posit most U.S. Citizens couldn't make a budget - and keep it - if their lives depended on it. For 49 million of those Citizens, their lives do depend on it, and they seem to prove unequal to the task.

After Thanksgiving will be the failed consumer orgy of Christmas; failed, because one cannot have an orgy if no one shows up. That's not to say that lights won't be strung and trees erected, because they will be... probably with more 'animal spirits' energy than ever. Under those trees, though, will tell the real tale. Show us an average Citizen who has lots of gifts, and we will show you someone who is nearing the end of their financial rope.

As we're writing, an ironic thought occurs to us: would it not be an expression of cosmic justice, if the attempt at summoning up a holiday shopping extravaganza is what finally topples the still-tottering U.S. economy? Think about it: maxing out credit cards for one last huzzah; blowing the savings on gifts for the kids, or Social Security cheques on the grandkids? Citizens of the United States are far too broke to enjoy the spendy, spendy ways to which they became accustomed; at this point, they should go limp, take their financial kicks to the stomach, and try to get things in order again. Instead, they will - and we mean will - go down, in vast numbers, and in flames.

Housing Price Report for November

Our result for the first six months of our North American Housing Price Index is a drop of 10.45%. This is a very serious drop, and has implication for more than just the house owners who need the value of their houses to say up. It also means that, on average: the housing collateral on bank balance sheets is impaired by around 10%; any and all securities of bundled mortgages have seen their value reduced by 10%; any house owners relying on the value of their house to keep up appearances have seen their appearances reduced by 10%.

Prices are showing some sign of improvement in the USA, which is to be expected thanks to the Federal Government's herculean efforts to prop up the industry.The 10% US Federal income tax credit has been extended, and all things being equal, this will tend to keep prices in the USA 10% higher than they otherwise would be. We'll be watching for a sudden fall when the program ends, if ever.

Interestingly enough, though, we are seeing some weakness in the Canadian housing market. This strikes us as rather odd, as the credit available to Canadian Citizens is still growing at a respectable clip. Additionally, the Federal Government has a very direct hand in guaranteeing mortgages in Canada, whereas the U.S. Federal Government only proves a wishy-washy guarantee to bail out banks.

Frankly, it seems that the animal spirits are friskier in the United States than Canada, undoubtedly supported by the U.S. Federal Government's housing tax credit. It is also possible U.S. Citizenry is a bit more credulous of the 'recession is over' propaganda than are the Canadians; it's time for Americans to do their patriotic duty and spend, spend, spend!

The Big Bank Problem No One Talks About

Consumer credit in the USA is falling, falling, falling. Whatever numbers you pick, there's no massaging the data to make it look innocent. This all is well known, as is the concern that lack of consumer borrowing will be a drag on the consumer portion of the economy.

Something else about this situation seems to be slipping through the cracks of public awareness, however. Once upon a time, maybe twenty years ago, when lenders cared a lot more about credit quality, it was well known that subprime could never work as a profitable lending model. Too many companies had come and gone promising to be profitable lending to high-risk customers. Their seeming profitability was a trick of accounting legerdemain: a growing book makes loss ratios look lower than they actually are since ageing loans are more likely to sour than fresh ones.

In the huge, recent credit bubble when almost everyone (and sometimes their pets) were receiving credit offers, loan books were growing smartly and loss ratios were low. Now that credit is contracting, people who can pay back their loans tend to be doing so. And those who can't (but are not yet to the point of defaulting) are just trying to keep them rolling over. The net result is that the overall quality of bank's loan books is deteriorating rapidly.

Banks are becoming less solvent over time, not more so, in spite of their efforts to improve their condition. Banks efforts to reign in credit by jacking up interest rates and cutting credit lines will actually backfire because better borrowers will simply pay off their loans. Borrowers who accept the barrage of insults are in such poor condition financially they can only subject themselves to usury.

In conclusion, the end state of this process will likely be the Federal Government (having had to bail out the banks and then the FDIC over and over) holding consumer loan portfolios that have little to no value. Cost to taxpayer: something like two trillion dollars, and further debauchment of the Dollar. Banks will be kept in business to keep up appearances, and may even book a nominal profit.

July Credit Card Collapse Report

In last month's report, we expected to see rising charge-offs on bank's credit card receivables as more of their shrinking portfolios were dodgy. Sure enough, when the big banks reported their default rates last month, the results were impressive.

Bank of America - the USA's largest bank - reported a 12.5% default rate in May, up from 10.47% in April. This is a 19% increase in one month! The default rate is also perilously close to the interest earned on all credit card balances (according to the Federal Reserve at last report, 13.54% on all credit card accounts with balances nationally). Effectively, credit cards have become a money-losing operation for the Bank of America. We expect, over the coming months, that credit card defaults will destroy all the capital which the Bank of America allocated to its credit card operation - and then some. Other credit card lenders are suffering the same fate.

Speaking of the Federal Reserve, their most recent report on consumer credit shows a continuing and, to us, unsurprising decline in revolving loans. The drop in April was revised substantially upwards (as we predicted), now equivalent to a 28% annual rate of decline. The May preliminary data shows a moderating of the decline - which we consider to be highly suspicious. We expect next month's revisions to actually show an acceleration - as default induced charge-offs increase, and paydowns by still-solvent borrowers continue. Stay tuned...

June Credit Card Collapse Report

On June 5, the Federal Reserve released its monthly report on consumer credit. The first quarter drop in revolving credit was revised from 60.4 billion to 66 billion. The preliminary April data shows a 3.4 billion drop. So far this year the rate of decline is 7%, or 21% annualised. We expect as April data is revised, this rate will actually be considerably higher.

If the flow of credit is indeed the "life blood of the economy," as Mr. Obama states, then the USA has arterial sclerosis. Our opinion, of course, is entirely the opposite: the economy can be quite fine without consumer credit. The World got along fine for thousands of years without consumer credit and may again.

The flow of credit is only the life blood of banking profits. American households will of necessity become thrifty in the years ahead or face ruin. Banks will be increasingly cut off from the once fat profits of consumer lending. Their rump loan portfolios will soon turn into capital-annihilating loss generators.

It's a little known fact of lending that you can cover up dodgy portfolios by expanding quickly. Since loans sour as they age, if you keep a loan portfolio new (by always adding more and more accounts), your percentage of delinquent loans will seem low. If your growth stops, or even reverses, your deadbeats can't be hidden so neatly.

The result of that phenomenon as it applies to the current situation is that bank losses on their consumer credit book should begin to really mushroom over the next few months. Don't buy the media announcement of 'unexpected' increases in credit card delinquencies. The banks know its coming, but you read it here first.

Follow-Up on Loan Delinquency

The FDIC is reporting delinquent bank loans are 7.75% of all loans. While this is not yet as bad as mortgage delinquency which we discussed in yesterday's post, it is still capital-annihilating (since most of these deadbeat loans will have to be written off).

With their capital evaporating, banks must shrink lending. It is no wonder that so many businesses and individuals are seeing their credit lines cut or cancelled. As those who have the means to pay off said lines of credit race to do so, they will not be investing or spending money. This will have a dampening effect on economic activity, to say the least.

If the nationalised, yet insolvent Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae being ordered to expand their books to keep mortgage loans flowing were a precedent, we would anticipate an imminent, very large bank nationalisation instigated in order to have banks under political control and follow the directive to grow loans, no matter the ultimate cost. (The hurried, and ill-conceived TARP investments do little to give the Federal Government adequate policy leverage over the banks).

We think it wiser to let banks gradually expire. In the post peak-oil, resource-constricted world, there will likely be no further economic growth. In the aggregate, borrowing and lending will become much riskier propositions since loans will tend to impoverish, rather than enrich borrowers. There will always be room for lending to promising enterprises, but this will be a small niche.

It will be very shocking to witness much of the 20% or so of the US economy that is the banking and financial sector just go away. But there is no way around it. Like house building and automobile manufacturing, it is a sector whose preeminence has come and gone.

Credit Card Collapse Report

With today's post we are introducing what we expect to be a recurring report on consumer credit in the USA.

On May 7, the Federal Reserve issued its monthly report on consumer credit. Going beyond the massaged, 'seasonally adjusted' figures, there are some impressive numbers. Apparently in the first quarter of 2009, revolving credit balances - mostly credit cards - fell $60.4 billion, approximately 6%.

This means that not only are people not taking on additional credit card debt, they are paying it off at a rapid rate. If this should continue as a trend, and there are at least two reasons to expect that it will, it will have a serious dampening effect on consumer and business spending.

The first reason to expect the credit card paydown to continue is that credit card issuers are cutting credit lines right and left. Even good customers who have always paid on time are finding letters in the mail informing them their lines have been reduced or their accounts closed altogether.

The second reason is the debtors themselves are feeling less inclined to be debtors. When one's income is declining or even just less certain, all debts become onerous.

It should also be mentioned that part of the decline in debt outstanding is due to writeoffs by lending institutions. These writeoffs also erode the lenders' capacity to issue new loans.

Bank Losses Growing

This weekend the FDIC took three more U.S. Banks into receivership. The losses absorbed by the FDIC were rather striking. Out of total assets of the three banks of $4,444,500,000 there was a total $1,437,500,000 in expected cost to the FDIC. Added to the FDIC losses are the losses born by stockholders and uninsured creditors of the banks. The total losses are thus well over 1/3 of the value of the assets.

The loss level of FDIC losses to total assets from all 57 U.S. bank failures since the Depression started stands at 5.16%, up from 4.84% last week. Excluding the costless WaMu operation, the level stands at 23.56%, up from 23.08%.

It is impossible to know how much worse the failed banks and not-yet-failed banks are than the survivors. Or indeed, what percent of banks will fail. Nevertheless, we will make a few 'back of the envelope' calculations.

Suppose 10% of the banking industry is slated for liquidation. This would constitute about one and a half trillion dollars of assets. If the FDIC can contain losses to the 5% level that would be 75 billion dollars - a lot of money, but manageable given its substantial credit lines from the U.S. Treasury. If losses are closer to the 25% level, that would be 375 billion, or a good chunk of those credit lines. Substantially more than 25% losses, or more than 10% of the industry doomed means the FDIC will need larger credit lines.

The subject of FDIC credit lines raises an interesting question. How is that money to be paid back? Formally, that means raising the (already high) premiums the FDIC charges banks for deposit insurance. The consequences will include lower savings rates, more bank fees (ouch!), and higher interest costs for borrowing. These effects will aggravate the Depression due to less income from savings, and from the greater disincentive to borrow.

As the Depression grinds on, we will continue reporting the FDIC loss statistics and their possible significance.

Laying the Groundwork for Recovery

As the Depression takes its destructive course, many institutions will fail to deliver what they have promised. By institutions we mean everything from individual enterprises to government itself, and even abstract institutions such as "the American Way of Life," or the stories people tell themselves about how life is supposed to go.

This will be more or less disillusioning for everyone. But it will be a necessary component of what must follow: a reorganising of life - from day-to-day activities, to aims and ambitions - along new lines. Those new lines will be what promotes getting along in the world.

Of course, it could be said the life is constantly being reorganised - in good times and bad. But in the aftermath of a Depression, like a War, much is destroyed and much needs to be rebuilt, often in a hurry. Many will find themselves with careers and finances in tatters. Or, at the extreme, homeless and hungry. These people will need a new method of securing financial well-being.

Will discredited institutions manage to reinvent themselves to stay relevant? Or will they get the hook, being yanked from the stage of society babbling and gesticulating? Will new political parties form? New companies and even states? Or will people turn inwards to themselves, their friends and families for support, identity, and focus?

We put this in the interrogative simply because we do not care to prognosticate. These are very chaotic times and events could go any number of ways. Nevertheless, we are certain that the social landscape will be greatly altered, and in recognition of the new lies the path to recovery.

By the way, in using the term recovery, we mean neither getting back to the way things were nor getting the economy growing again. We simply mean the finding of a new norms after the old ones have finished breaking down. For example, this could mean anything from learning to get along without credit because it is no longer available, to choosing to live without it. Another example would be the creation of public transportation, perhaps ad hoc with informal taxi and bus services started by individuals, or perhaps by for-profit companies.

People will do what they need to do to get along in the world. It always happens that way, and it is a fascinating process to observe. Keep this in mind as so much falls apart around you in the coming months.

Unemployment versus Contraction

We were reviewing the statistics at Shadowstats - a service that reports relatively honest economic data for the USA - and noticed a 19% unemployment rate (ouch!) and a 4% rate of GDP contraction (bad, but not that bad). Two points immediately leapt up: one, there is a fairly wide divergence; and two, this is divergence in an opposite direction from the Great Depression.

The divergence points to the chronic unemployment and underemployment that exists in the US. Even at the peak of the economy in 2000, approximately 12% of the workforce was redundant. If GDP is to contract in this Depression as much as in the Great Depression (50%), and unless there is to be 60% or more unemployment, more currently employed workers are going to have to take reduced hours or rates of pay.

The nation is faced with a highly problematic scenario. At some point in the not-too-distant future, the Federal Government will have exhausted its borrowing power to maintain welfare payments and its own operations. We have discussed in prior posts how both welfare payments and government salaries will have to be cut. We expect these to be cut through price inflation.

Many private sector organisations will be facing the task of whether to cast redundant workers into a fraying social safety net, or 'sharing the pain' by cutting hours accross the workforce. Self-employed persons will be facing involuntary 'part-time' status. Price inflation will also deliver pay cuts to the private sector.

The course the nation takes to adjust the population to lower economic output will have a decisive impact on how orderly the adjustment is. The more desperately 'turf' is defended and groups attempt to clutch onto their income, the greater the polarisation of income and the potential for social disruption. If there is a consensus to 'share the pain' - even if through inelegant methods such as inflation and higher taxes on the remaining productive elements - there is less potential for acute stife. Unfortunately, the more coercively the pain-sharing is achieved, the more long-term harm is done to the economy: inflation distorts investment decisions, and taxation inhibits productivity.

Clearly, the nation is still sufficiently affluent to handle some economic abuse - but there is a limit to how much. We are not optimistic that there is any collective will to institute a sounder basis for economic development. Alert individuals, on the other hand, will find even in a less benign environment adequate possibilities of prosperity.

Savings are Good

Newsweek had a blather-filled piece which got our attention the other day. The very idea that savers should not be saving, because the economy needs rescuing, is very confusing to us. If the economy is tanking, as we believe it is, is it not prudent to save as much as possible? Why should savers sacrifice their financial well-being on the altar of preserving appearances?

This is part of a disturbing trend which we've been watching develop: the propensity of the mainstream to blame savers for the economic woes of the world. 'Savers are ruining everything!' the press seems to whine, apparently forgetting that savers – as the backbone for the credit industry – have every right to stop investing, if their money isn't being well-treated.

It has been stated by others, but we will add our voice: one cannot become rich by overspending one's income. If one wishes to live comfortably in one's 'golden' years, for example, one must prudently prepare for such an eventuality. Savings, in their many forms (from certificates of deposits to gold bars), are the vehicle for this... or for starting a new business, or taking on an apartment building, et cetera, et cetera.

If memory serves, John D. Rockefeller once stated that, if one wished to be rich, one must save half of one's income. He, as the world's first billionaire – and those were silver dollars back then – is a high authority on such matters. He did not say to spend 150% of one's income; rather, he was living proof that the prudent savings of one's income was a road to financial success. So rich was he, that his descendants still live upon the vast wealth he accumulated.

So... who should one listen to: a writer for Newsweek, or the first billionaire? We know who we'd choose. Mr. Rockefeller may have been a bit... off... but he prospered in good times and bad.

Another Sign for the Bottom

We like to keep ahead of popular trends in society. For instance, a few years ago the typical American citizen was a debt-addicted consumer: they borrowed, borrowed, borrowed, so he or she could spend, spend, spend. We saw that, and tried to go the other direction: keep debt within easily-manageable amounts.

Fast forwards to today, and people are fretting about their McMansion, their big-screen plasma TV, and their automobiles; all were bought with credit, and all are pretty expensive when one doesn't have a job. The average 'consumers' are only just beginning to realise just how unsustainable their lifestyle once was.

However, it's going to take a quite awhile to obliterate unsustainable 'common knowledge.' 'Common knowledge' holds that everyone can own their own home, their own car, and live in the suburban paradise. 'Everyone' knows that one should pay for as much as possible with credit; it's so much more convenient that way.

We are on the fringe when we write this, but we feel it is true: consumerism is dead; the 'every family in their own home' fantasy is dead; there will be no chicken in every pot and car in every garage. Buying a house with no-or-little money down is a bygone memory, no matter what any bank may say or advertise.

Frankly, we know we're a Cassandra, screaming the bleak truth toward disbelieving ears. However, if one day, you should read on the front page of USA Today that, not only is buying a home with credit is a terrible idea, owning a home is a terrible idea, the worst is over. Simply put, when what we write today becomes the mainstream knowledge of the future, the bottom of the 2007 Depression has been found. When that happens... buy stocks! Buy apartment buildings! Buy everything that can generate a profit! Buy, buy, buy!

Increase in Savings Rate Explained

Fortune Magazine just published an article bemoaning the lack of consumer spending and (what is to the author) a paradox of increasing savings rates. Mr. Colvin, the author, apparently does not get out much, because anyone with eyes to see can tell you why savings rates are increasing.

People are 'saving' only because they are paying off their debts. They are not paying off their debts because they want to, but because they can no longer refinance their debts with home equity loans, low-rate promotional cash advances, or even just plain juggling their balances between credit lines. Banks are relentlessly cutting lending. Credit lines are cut and new loans are harder to get. In order to pay off their debts, people must cut their spending on whatever they would have bought if they didn't have to pay off their debts. Consumption declines, 'savings' increases, end of story.

The dimness represented here by Mr. Colvin and other writers in the leading financial publications is disconcerting. If the investing class continues to be as misinformed in the Depression as it was during the Mania beforehand, recovery will be very far off indeed.

Are Big Banks Committing Suicide?

We were chatting with a friend the other day, who holds a middling commercial loan from a major bank. He's a very good client of this major bank, and he has been with this bank for quite some time. He told us this bank was going to charge him a fee equal to about 5% of the value of his loan. Apparently, this 'fee' was do to an error on the bank's part, but they were going to charge him, anyway!

Another friend has held a line of credit from another major bank for over a decade. Just recently his interest rate on his card's balance was doubled to 20%. He, too, had been a good client, and always paid his bills on time.

Earlier we wrote about Citigroup backing mortgage cram-downs, and how we felt there was something fishy about the whole thing. Then we saw articles like this one from Bloomberg, or human-interest pieces like this from WiseBread.com... and we really started to wonder. Are these major banks actually queuing up on a roof, waiting for the opportune moment to jump to their death?

Lending is the bread and butter of these major banks. They are alienating their borrowers, but they can't make money without lending... so they must have something else up their sleeve. Personally, we think it's our beloved Synthetic CDOs. Bear with us for a moment, dear Reader.

With AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Big Three on the government dole, their collapse has been pushed off into the future. That means the SCDOs won't be triggered by the deaths of those companies. However, SCDOs typically have money center banks as a default trigger on the trillions waiting offshore.

The management of these major banks know they can't kill the car companies... but they can destroy their own banks. Then, the SCDO dollars will flow bank into the United States. Where to, you wonder? Well, with the big banks presumably shut down, where else can the money go but into the pockets of the management? We would wager the managers have set up private investment vehicles which have taken the benefit of the SCDO payout off of the banks' books. Think of it as the ultimate golden parachute.

Caution versus Confidence

Sometimes caution is a virtue. When things are going from bad to worse, one does not want to embark on boondoggles. Resources need to be conserved for redeployment in better times.

One of the functions of money historically is its use as a store of value. When prices are low enough that the desire for a good deal overcomes the fear of loss, money is pulled out of hoarding. In 1933, US President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order "forbidding the Hoarding of Gold Coin, Gold Bullion, and Gold Certificates." Evidently, Mr. Roosevelt decided that by forcing money out of hoarding, the same happy result would occur as if the money had come out of hoarding voluntarily.

We believe this was a critical error of judgment, and a factor which prevented the cure of some critical failings in the US (and indeed world) economic systems which caused the 1929-1939 Depression. We agree with the Austrian school of economics theory that excessive credit expansions are the primary cause of depressions. The excesses of these expansions are worked out primarily by a dissolving of the banking system and a subsequent reboot, so to speak. The policies of the Hoover, Roosevelt, Bush II, and now Obama administrations (and their international counterparts) did not allow the liquidation of the banking system. On the contrary, the popular solution to the depressionary stress is rescue of the failed banking system and further expansion of credit.

Classically, metallic money has acted as a brake upon credit expansion. In the Great Depression of 1929-1939 this brake became an inconvenience and was discarded. Since then, the world economy has been riding a runaway train of credit expansion. Sooner or later (and we vote for sooner), it will come off the tracks when spurious 'investments' do not produce intended yields.

Is the 2007 Depression then 'the big one'? It will be if world leaders decide to void the world's paper money supply of what little store-of-value-ness it has left. Zero percent interest rates and debt monetisation (both in progress) are a good start in that direction. Seeing their money become nothing other than something to spend, the world's citizens will dutifully spend away and the greatest crack-up boom ever will ensue, followed by the inevitable hyperinflationary catastrophe.

We would like to hope some other scenario is possible, but it seems less likely by the day.

Signs of Nonfunctional Markets

Free markets are supposed to be very efficient. The general law of supply and demand states that if people want something, the market will provide at the proper cost. This 'cost' includes, at the very least: the cost of the raw materials required; the cost of manufacturing; the cost of delivery to market. Profit usually sneaks in there somewhere, but profit itself is a type of cost. It should suffice to say that the cost of a desired item is typically reflective of the cost to make another, similar/identical item.

When the cost of an item goes below its replacement cost, any number of things may be happening: the market for the item may be saturated, and people don't want to buy anymore; the item might have been so utterly hideous that no one would pay money for it. Most pertinent to our article, though, is when people line up to buy the item, but there is none to be had at the market's price.

A good example of this is in the silver and gold markets. Presently, physical bullion commands a fairly respectable premium over the official market price. Those premiums represent a disconnect, and a rather serious one at that. Healthy demand exists for physical bullion -- perhaps even more than ever -- but that is a demand that cannot be filled based on the official market price. In essence, two markets have developed: the official and the real-world. This is a sign of a serious market break-down, one which will likely have some serious, lasting repercussions.

More than just the bullion markets have been effected, though. One can see a similar situation developing in the oil and natural gas market. The Federal Reserve's zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) is another good example of breakdown. No normal human being can borrow money even remotely close to the Fed's target rate of zero... but yet there it is. This is a disconnect of credit: the official market says no interest, the real-world market has other ideas. Further government intervention and manipulation in markets will result in similar breakdowns, especially as the 2007 Depression progresses.

Did We Say 2008? Hahahahaha...

It's now official, folks: according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the United States is in a recession... which started in December 2007. Actually, the recession is really a depression, but that's a detail; the illusion that things are just 'slow' has been eradicated, a year into the problem. Whatever the case, we wish the Depression a happy first birthday!

It is customary to name a depression after the year in which it started, so officially the United States is in the 2007 Depression. We resist the temptation to retcon our previous posts to fit the present circumstances, but we will use 2007 Depression from now on. It is the way this depression will be remembered in the history books, and who are we to argue with history?

Now that the economic situation is 'official,' let's look at what this may mean. One thing we feel is certain: fear is going to be much stronger than before. As an example, news has broken that credit card companies are thinking of cutting $2 trillion in consumer credit. Although we aren't convinced the banks will actually do this, it's a sign of increased tension and fear.

Fear will also help drive President-elect Barack Obama's sweeping social programmes with neck-snapping speed. In the manner of President Franklin Roosevelt before him, we believe Mr. Obama will be coming out swinging... and one doesn't want to be in his way. We fear his new policies, like Roosevelt's inept and destructive New Deal, will only serve to worsen and prolong the 2007 Depression.