US Households: Unhappy Speculators

The economist Hyman Minsky divided financing techniques into three categories: Ponzi finance - where principal and interest on debt cannot be paid out of earnings but only ever more borrowing; Speculative finance - where interest on debt can be paid out of earnings but principal must be rolled over; and Hedge finance where both principal and interest on debt can be paid out of earnings.

From 1952 to 2007 the ratio of debt to income for US households rose from about .35 (hedge financing) to about 1.3 (speculative financing). Even two years into the Depression, the ratio has only declined a bit.

In times of economic contraction - especially when a major asset bubble bursts (i.e., housing), speculative financing units run into two significant problems. Routine debt service becomes more burdensome, and more critically, the ability to refinance becomes often impossibly difficult.

Consider the case of otherwise solvent households with exotic interest-only mortgages with impending punitive resets. The reset payments are unsupportable, and yet there is typically no way to roll the mortgage into a conventional mortgage as the value of the collateral is typically less than the mortgage balance. The underwater position also almost always prevents a sale to terminate the mortgage since that will require bringing too much money to the table.

Barring a sudden and extremely improbable surge in house values, these households will be ruined by the trap. Even many households with fixed rate mortgages will find those unsupportable in the face of income loss, and have no non-bankrupting exit strategy due to their underwater position. Another trap is facing households with sudden rate hikes on large credit card balances.

The distribution of the pain of the speculative unwind will not fall evenly on US households. A substantial number - perhaps 1/4 - have little to no debt and at least adequate resources. Another substantial number - also perhaps 1/4 - have no debt because of too-low income and too-few resources.

This puts the burden of the pain squarely on the roughly 1/2 who have substantial debts. We suspect that most of these households' net worth will be wiped out, creating ever more cascading failure throughout the economy. The end state will be a poorer USA, but one where debt revulsion is so strong, households will once again be Hedge financial units.

A Brief Lesson in Debt

Hyman Minsky (1919-1996) was a rather obscure economist who came up with an excellent theory of debt which seems especially appropriate to current events. In brief, he divided borrowers into three categories: the hedge borrower, who can make loan payments easily out of income and extinguish the principal; the speculative borrower who can make interest payments more or less easily out of income, but cannot repay the principal except by rolling over the debt; and finally the Ponzi borrower whose income does not cover even the interest on debts, and therefore needs an ever expanding supply of credit to service loan payments.

A clear example of the hedge borrower is the homeowner who takes on a traditional fixed mortgage, the payments of which are a fairly small part of his or her income. An example of the speculative borrower is the house buyer who takes out the interest-only mortgage hoping to sell the house at a profit. The ponzi mortgage borrower takes out the reverse amortisation mortgage, hoping the house will appreciate fast enough that he or she can refinance at a higher amount.

In the housing bubble bust of the last two years or so, most of the borrowers in the Ponzi category have already lost their houses. Most of the borrowers in the speculative category are 'underwater', and many have 'walked away'. An increasing number of mortgages in the hedge category are going delinquent due to falling incomes and rising unemployment. It is not pretty, and the situation will probably get worse. We expect, on the other side of this Depression, that hardly anyone will ever want to buy a house with a mortgage again.

Of course Minsky's model applies not only to mortgage borrowers, but to the banks that lend to them. Banks are completely dependent on continuously rolling over their entire debt structure. This is why they are the first to feel the strain of a credit crisis.

As things are currently unfolding, central banks and governments are stepping up to fund banks who need their debts rolled over. Banks are not as generous to their borrowers, and are mostly calling in risky loans, and mostly not expanding safe loans. This is hurting a great many businesses who rely on speculative finance, and will cause a great many to go under. We suspect a lot of individual borrowers who are getting their credit cards cancelled will also be forced into bankruptcy.

If the Depression continues to unfold along these lines, most speculative finance units (as Minsky would call them) will be euthanised. Exceptions will be made for banks, insurance companies, and public utilities. The consequences will be very dramatic: tens of millions of failed businesses and hundreds of millions, if not billions of downwardly mobile citizens.

We doubt this this process can be arrested until it is spent. If you are a borrower and you cannot pay your debts out of your income (and these days incomes are not so reliable), you will need to liquidate assets or default. The end result is that you will become poorer. So-called 'rescue plans' will be of little help. If you are able to service your debts - congratulations! - you will be fortunate enough to experience the down-not-so-much that is the new up.