Dmitry Orlov blogged an interesting piece entitled The Five Stages of Collapse. It's well worth a read if you can tolerate doomer porn. The best part is the five-stage model itself. His notion is that social collapse follows five progressive steps, and that although collapse may be arrested at any one of the stages, each stage leads to the next one - a progressive breakdown, if you will.
Happily for us civilised folks, collapse usually is arrested before it progresses very far. In wealthy, developed countries even if this Depression turns out to be a doozey, and the first of many more to come, odds are it won't take us very far down the path of social disintegration. We would like to justify this optimistic opinion using Mr. Orlov's own model.
Orlov's first stage is Financial Collapse: "Financial institutions become insolvent; savings are wiped out, and access to capital is lost." This is what most of the world (China excepted, perhaps having a reprieve for the moment due to its many bubbles) is experiencing at present.
We agree with Orlov that governmental policy is not favourable to arresting this stage, and what will come next is what he terms Commercial Collapse: "Money is devalued and/or becomes scarce, commodities are hoarded, import and retail chains break down, and widespread shortages of survival necessities become the norm."
If hyperinflation takes hold because unsupportable debts are monetised, then this scenario may very well play itself out as Orlov describes it.
On the other hand, if the USA and other rich economies maintain non-hyperinflating currencies, the combined result of unsupportable debts and misguided government policies will be catastrophic loss of household income. Goods may not become scarce, but the means to purchase them will.
In either case, whatever government may decide to do or not do about the situation, the people themselves can arrest Commercial Collapse by any number of actions to ensure the continuing flow of goods and services. The so-called informal economy of legal goods and services delivered 'under-the-table' already provides one template for a popular, self-organising market. Many civic organisations such as churches, clubs, co-ops and farmer's markets can operate as clearinghouses. Barter banks and scrip systems of 'bona fide' money can spring up where they do not already exist. Thus the solution to arresting Commercial Collapse absent highly-unlikely, successful government intervention, is for people to set themselves up very much in community, and to become a lot more creative than they are used to.
We suspect that enough people can rise to the occasion. Only a tiny vanguard of creative types is needed to successfully establish functional patterns of mostly-local commerce.
It should be noted that under this scenario, Commercial Collapse would be arrested at a level of affluence that is only a fraction of what most inhabitants of the World's developed countries are used to. It won't be an easy adjustment by any means. Two classes of persons are most vulnerable: the poorest members of society who lack work and social skills; and affluent members who derive their livelihoods from access to those institutions which are not likely to survive the Commercial Collapse.
Showing posts with label economic contraction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic contraction. Show all posts
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Unhappy US Economic Numbers
There are a number of disturbing trends that can be discerned, if one has the time, from rummaging through the data coming out of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. One is that out of the $89.4 billion growth in national income from the second quarter of this year to the third, $12.8 billion was growth of "subsidies". That does not refer to "cash for clunkers" and so forth, but money heading from the taxpayer into government enterprises (our guess mostly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - but really, who knows?). How that can be construed as income is bizarre enough, but it's not good news that 1/7 of third quarter growth comes from something so fishy.
But such accounting shenanigans could be dismissed as mere noise compared to some really big numbers - such as the jump in the profits of our corporate masters: $110.4 billion dollars. One might astutely note that this is actually more than the increase in national income, $21 billion more as a matter of fact. Or putting the whole matter another way, all (and then some) of the much touted 'recovery' is growth of corporate profits, and the rest of us will just have to make do with the scraps.
But the really bad news is something hidden (in the sense that it is not presented by itself - but has to be derived from two data sets) and insidious: the approaching excess of consumption of fixed private capital ($1525.5 billion) over fixed private investment ($1,712.6 billion). We say "approaching" because obviously the latter figure is larger than the former, but it has been falling at a rate of 21% over the year ending September 30 (and without a third quarter "recovery") and 4% the year before that.
Between bank lending contracting, the real estate market collapsing, and corporations being inclined to invest their winnings overseas, there isn't much prospect for anything other than continued decline in fixed private investment. We really can't say if the rate is going to accelerate or moderate but even if it continues at, say, a moderated 10%, the cross over would likely come in late 2010.
What this means in plain English is that at some point in the near future, the economy will reach a state where consumption of capital exceeds its formation, and there will be no prospect of any kind of economic growth ever, until growth in private investment materialises. It could be a long wait.
But such accounting shenanigans could be dismissed as mere noise compared to some really big numbers - such as the jump in the profits of our corporate masters: $110.4 billion dollars. One might astutely note that this is actually more than the increase in national income, $21 billion more as a matter of fact. Or putting the whole matter another way, all (and then some) of the much touted 'recovery' is growth of corporate profits, and the rest of us will just have to make do with the scraps.
But the really bad news is something hidden (in the sense that it is not presented by itself - but has to be derived from two data sets) and insidious: the approaching excess of consumption of fixed private capital ($1525.5 billion) over fixed private investment ($1,712.6 billion). We say "approaching" because obviously the latter figure is larger than the former, but it has been falling at a rate of 21% over the year ending September 30 (and without a third quarter "recovery") and 4% the year before that.
Between bank lending contracting, the real estate market collapsing, and corporations being inclined to invest their winnings overseas, there isn't much prospect for anything other than continued decline in fixed private investment. We really can't say if the rate is going to accelerate or moderate but even if it continues at, say, a moderated 10%, the cross over would likely come in late 2010.
What this means in plain English is that at some point in the near future, the economy will reach a state where consumption of capital exceeds its formation, and there will be no prospect of any kind of economic growth ever, until growth in private investment materialises. It could be a long wait.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
US Households: Unhappy Speculators
The economist Hyman Minsky divided financing techniques into three categories: Ponzi finance - where principal and interest on debt cannot be paid out of earnings but only ever more borrowing; Speculative finance - where interest on debt can be paid out of earnings but principal must be rolled over; and Hedge finance where both principal and interest on debt can be paid out of earnings.
From 1952 to 2007 the ratio of debt to income for US households rose from about .35 (hedge financing) to about 1.3 (speculative financing). Even two years into the Depression, the ratio has only declined a bit.
In times of economic contraction - especially when a major asset bubble bursts (i.e., housing), speculative financing units run into two significant problems. Routine debt service becomes more burdensome, and more critically, the ability to refinance becomes often impossibly difficult.
Consider the case of otherwise solvent households with exotic interest-only mortgages with impending punitive resets. The reset payments are unsupportable, and yet there is typically no way to roll the mortgage into a conventional mortgage as the value of the collateral is typically less than the mortgage balance. The underwater position also almost always prevents a sale to terminate the mortgage since that will require bringing too much money to the table.
Barring a sudden and extremely improbable surge in house values, these households will be ruined by the trap. Even many households with fixed rate mortgages will find those unsupportable in the face of income loss, and have no non-bankrupting exit strategy due to their underwater position. Another trap is facing households with sudden rate hikes on large credit card balances.
The distribution of the pain of the speculative unwind will not fall evenly on US households. A substantial number - perhaps 1/4 - have little to no debt and at least adequate resources. Another substantial number - also perhaps 1/4 - have no debt because of too-low income and too-few resources.
This puts the burden of the pain squarely on the roughly 1/2 who have substantial debts. We suspect that most of these households' net worth will be wiped out, creating ever more cascading failure throughout the economy. The end state will be a poorer USA, but one where debt revulsion is so strong, households will once again be Hedge financial units.
From 1952 to 2007 the ratio of debt to income for US households rose from about .35 (hedge financing) to about 1.3 (speculative financing). Even two years into the Depression, the ratio has only declined a bit.
In times of economic contraction - especially when a major asset bubble bursts (i.e., housing), speculative financing units run into two significant problems. Routine debt service becomes more burdensome, and more critically, the ability to refinance becomes often impossibly difficult.
Consider the case of otherwise solvent households with exotic interest-only mortgages with impending punitive resets. The reset payments are unsupportable, and yet there is typically no way to roll the mortgage into a conventional mortgage as the value of the collateral is typically less than the mortgage balance. The underwater position also almost always prevents a sale to terminate the mortgage since that will require bringing too much money to the table.
Barring a sudden and extremely improbable surge in house values, these households will be ruined by the trap. Even many households with fixed rate mortgages will find those unsupportable in the face of income loss, and have no non-bankrupting exit strategy due to their underwater position. Another trap is facing households with sudden rate hikes on large credit card balances.
The distribution of the pain of the speculative unwind will not fall evenly on US households. A substantial number - perhaps 1/4 - have little to no debt and at least adequate resources. Another substantial number - also perhaps 1/4 - have no debt because of too-low income and too-few resources.
This puts the burden of the pain squarely on the roughly 1/2 who have substantial debts. We suspect that most of these households' net worth will be wiped out, creating ever more cascading failure throughout the economy. The end state will be a poorer USA, but one where debt revulsion is so strong, households will once again be Hedge financial units.
Friday, December 11, 2009
The Real Deal
A recent letter to SurvivalBlog.com shows that at least one person out there has his or her head screwed on mostly right. The conclusions, unfortunately as is typical on that site, run toward the 'get your guns' mentality. However, the honest and intelligent observations are worth quoting at length.
As for having a car, our addition would be that you may find yourself needing to set up a living situation that doesn't require you to own a car - either sharing a car with a relative or friend, or walking and/or using public transit.
As these strategies for downward mobility become increasingly utilised, they will cause GDP to decline. Not only will demand for goods and services shrink, but the informal market (yard sales, thrift stores, eBay, etc.) will become flooded with cheap, liquidated stuff. We expect this strategy to be employed eventually by a majority of the population as the Depression runs its course and cascading failure undermines the economic system.
We find it a sad commentary on the state of 'the Press' that such an honest report can only be found in a 'fringe blog' and beyond that, as a letter. The Ministry of Truth does seem to have a lockdown on the situation. Telling information can be found, however, if you look for it. According to a recent Gallup poll, November year-over-year consumer spending is down 20%. This is a knock-your-socks-off, the-economy-is-in-a-Depression-folks number if there ever was one. The report qualifies its information as "self-reported" but even so, it seems a heck of lot more reliable to us than the bogus recovery spiel coming out of the Ministry of Truth.
Pathetically, the Gallup commentary states: "On a national level, the spending new normal suggests slower economic growth than otherwise might be expected in the years ahead." Let's take a look at 'economic growth' in the USA at present.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the growth rate is 2.8% in the third quarter of 2009. Consumer spending allegedly increased 2.9%. In order for the approximately -25% gleaned from Gallup data and the official +2.9% to reconcile, households would have to wildly increase their spending for housing (hard to do in the face of lower rents, skipped mortgage payments, and household formation gone into reverse), professional services (bankruptcy lawyers, anyone?), and so forth. Frankly, we don't think such a reconciliation is possible, and we smell a R-A-T.
The economy has taken a dramatic turn for the worse for many Americans. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe how it happened and who did it. While many individuals and households have had the financial resources and good fortune which will allow them to weather economic uncertainty, many will simply not be able to maintain their standard of living. Many two income households are now one income households and that income may have decreased due to companies cutting back on work hours. This situation has been occurring for many Americans for many many months, forcing people to assess what is important and downgrade their lifestyle. The time to make hard decisions has arrived, and will dramatically alter the lives of many for years.We have a few comments to make on these observations. First, in light of how little access to emergency funds American (among other) households have as mentioned in yesterday's post, deferring maintenance on houses and cars is a species of financial brinkmanship that will not only require "costlier repairs down the road," but quite possibly become the 'straw that breaks the camel's back' of the impaired household finances.People who relied on spouses to pay the bills are now paying the bills. Those who have relied on savings and unemployment benefits to maintain their standard of living are now faced with the reality that those resources are exhausted. Bills are not being paid. Healthcare premiums are not being paid. Automobile and household maintenance is being neglected which will create costlier repairs down the road. Simply put:
- You might have to stop making your car payment and save those payments up to buy a used car. The car you currently have financed will be repossessed.
- You might have to stop paying your mortgage and save those payments up to move into an apartment.
- You might have to give up your healthcare, your magazine subscription, your club membership, your vacation plans, your charitable donations, your cell phone, your internet access or home phone service, your lawn care service, your financial support that you provide to friends and family who are having financial problems themselves, and many more expenditures not listed here.
- You might have to contact an attorney to discuss bankruptcy.
- You might have to sell off your possessions and assets.
- You might have to move in with other families, friends, relatives, or shelters provided by the government or charitable organizations.
- You may come to realize that what you thought was valuable and important to you has no value or significance at all.
Basic human needs will become the biggest priority in your life after you shed the things that have merely brought comfort and convenience to you. You may be forced to downscale your lifestyle so dramatically that it will cause you to question your own intelligence and hindsight for not planning for such a life changing event.
As for having a car, our addition would be that you may find yourself needing to set up a living situation that doesn't require you to own a car - either sharing a car with a relative or friend, or walking and/or using public transit.
As these strategies for downward mobility become increasingly utilised, they will cause GDP to decline. Not only will demand for goods and services shrink, but the informal market (yard sales, thrift stores, eBay, etc.) will become flooded with cheap, liquidated stuff. We expect this strategy to be employed eventually by a majority of the population as the Depression runs its course and cascading failure undermines the economic system.
We find it a sad commentary on the state of 'the Press' that such an honest report can only be found in a 'fringe blog' and beyond that, as a letter. The Ministry of Truth does seem to have a lockdown on the situation. Telling information can be found, however, if you look for it. According to a recent Gallup poll, November year-over-year consumer spending is down 20%. This is a knock-your-socks-off, the-economy-is-in-a-Depression-folks number if there ever was one. The report qualifies its information as "self-reported" but even so, it seems a heck of lot more reliable to us than the bogus recovery spiel coming out of the Ministry of Truth.
Pathetically, the Gallup commentary states: "On a national level, the spending new normal suggests slower economic growth than otherwise might be expected in the years ahead." Let's take a look at 'economic growth' in the USA at present.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the growth rate is 2.8% in the third quarter of 2009. Consumer spending allegedly increased 2.9%. In order for the approximately -25% gleaned from Gallup data and the official +2.9% to reconcile, households would have to wildly increase their spending for housing (hard to do in the face of lower rents, skipped mortgage payments, and household formation gone into reverse), professional services (bankruptcy lawyers, anyone?), and so forth. Frankly, we don't think such a reconciliation is possible, and we smell a R-A-T.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Households at the Edge
According to a recent survey, many people would find it impossible to raise just $2000 in 30 days from any source - savings, credit, family, friends, etc. - in a pinch. The table below is extracted from the article, which is well worth reading.
The results are shocking to say the least, especially for the USA - supposedly the "richest country in the world." $2000 is not a lot of money when one aspires to a middle-class lifestyle; it could represent the cost of car repair, a home repair, a minor medical problem, and so forth.
These sorts of things crop up continually.
Mexico is no great surprise, but the fact that the UK, Germany, and the USA (all supposed major economic powers) rate worse than Argentina - a country with serious issues in its struggle to remain prosperous and civilised - should be cause for concern. This survey, if accurate, indicates that not only are half of UK, German, and US households there essentially broke, but most of the other half is so frayed financially they are in no position to help out poorer friends and relations; or perhaps simply socially support networks have collapsed. In either case (and both could be true) the situation is terrible.
This is not the sort of economic information we would like to see near the beginning of this Depression - and yes, we are still early on in this thing. Faced with falling income and no standby resources to fall back on, it is clear that more and more supposedly 'middle class' households are going to sink into financial ruin merely from routine financial stresses.
Our advice to our readers is simple: make sure you are living well below your means; that your net worth is rising and not falling; that you have ample financial resources (savings, lines of credit, willing friends or family) to draw upon should the need arise. This is serious stuff - it may require you to drop many of the trappings of middle class life in order to prevent ruin.
There are ample horror stories out there about people who discovered 'middle class poverty' by not changing their spending habits in the face of income loss. Typically they expect "something is going to happen" to fix their deteriorating situation: a new job; selling the house; etc. But that "something" never happens.
More and more, what were for many once reasonable expectations - say, getting a full-time job - are going to be as likely as having a winning lottery ticket. In a nutshell, this is why getting through the Depression is going to be about survival. Don't delude yourself; ignore the blather on the telly; get real about what is happening.
The results are shocking to say the least, especially for the USA - supposedly the "richest country in the world." $2000 is not a lot of money when one aspires to a middle-class lifestyle; it could represent the cost of car repair, a home repair, a minor medical problem, and so forth.
These sorts of things crop up continually.
Mexico is no great surprise, but the fact that the UK, Germany, and the USA (all supposed major economic powers) rate worse than Argentina - a country with serious issues in its struggle to remain prosperous and civilised - should be cause for concern. This survey, if accurate, indicates that not only are half of UK, German, and US households there essentially broke, but most of the other half is so frayed financially they are in no position to help out poorer friends and relations; or perhaps simply socially support networks have collapsed. In either case (and both could be true) the situation is terrible.
This is not the sort of economic information we would like to see near the beginning of this Depression - and yes, we are still early on in this thing. Faced with falling income and no standby resources to fall back on, it is clear that more and more supposedly 'middle class' households are going to sink into financial ruin merely from routine financial stresses.
Our advice to our readers is simple: make sure you are living well below your means; that your net worth is rising and not falling; that you have ample financial resources (savings, lines of credit, willing friends or family) to draw upon should the need arise. This is serious stuff - it may require you to drop many of the trappings of middle class life in order to prevent ruin.
There are ample horror stories out there about people who discovered 'middle class poverty' by not changing their spending habits in the face of income loss. Typically they expect "something is going to happen" to fix their deteriorating situation: a new job; selling the house; etc. But that "something" never happens.
More and more, what were for many once reasonable expectations - say, getting a full-time job - are going to be as likely as having a winning lottery ticket. In a nutshell, this is why getting through the Depression is going to be about survival. Don't delude yourself; ignore the blather on the telly; get real about what is happening.
Saturday, November 7, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed five banks: United Security Bank, of Sparta, GA; Home Federal Savings Bank, of Detroit, MI; Prosperan Bank, of Oakdale, MN; Gateway Bank of St. Louis, of St. Louis, MO; and United Commercial Bank, of San Francisco, CA. The total assets of the closed banks were $11,599,100,000, and total deposits were approximately $7,866,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,532,700,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was $6,333,600,000, or only 54.60% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.73% (down from last week's 57.81%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $50,490,500,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $511,961,580,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $346,067,320,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $295,576,820,000 (57.73% of the declared value).
***
The situation with United Commercial Bank (UCB) is an interesting one, as it marks a degree of cooperation previously unseen in the banking world. UCB, UCB of Hong Kong, and UCB-China in Shanghai were all closed by the FDIC's actions, in cooperation with the Hong Kong government and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Although it's a moment to wave the non-existent flag of international fellowship and all that, we would like to point out just how bad this looks to us.
The FDIC's actions show just how interconnected the financial systems of the World are, and how terribly difficult it is to find any sort of separation across national borders; this will make sorting failed banks like UCB very difficult, especially if non-US agencies are not quite as cooperative as they were this time. In addition, it's all well and good, as far as the average U.S. Citizen is concerned, that the FDIC took over banks in China; what happens if and when China starts taking over banks in the United States?
But leaving that aside, we have a loose prediction for the general trend of future, weekly FDIC closures: they will likely consist of a handful of minor community banks, and one large-ish bank. This week's format is a good example of what we're walking about, as the banks other than UCB were quite small indeed. Since we are fully convinced the FDIC is effectively out of money, this would suggest that the banks which the FDIC manages to scrape up the cash to close are the worst imaginable banks in the United States... leaving aside such cesspools as Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, et al.
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri (up from #8)
8. Oregon (down from #7)
9. Arizona
10. Colorado
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (42.37%, up from 40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%, up from 43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%, up from 53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
We're very pleased with how these two lists have shaped up; the movement from week to week is becoming very slight, so we're pretty confident this gives a relatively accurate idea of how badly off these various States and the banks within them are. Of course, our analysis only reflects those States which have had over two bank failures, so that leaves a good portion of the Union (and its... extensions) not reflected in our report.
Nevertheless, these five States - Georgia, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado, in no particular order - are likely to be among the worst-off, as they are represented in both the preceeding lists. We really can't say which of those is the king of the dung heap, as it were, because we still haven't figured out how to compare apples and oranges.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was $6,333,600,000, or only 54.60% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.73% (down from last week's 57.81%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $50,490,500,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $511,961,580,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $346,067,320,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $295,576,820,000 (57.73% of the declared value).
***
The situation with United Commercial Bank (UCB) is an interesting one, as it marks a degree of cooperation previously unseen in the banking world. UCB, UCB of Hong Kong, and UCB-China in Shanghai were all closed by the FDIC's actions, in cooperation with the Hong Kong government and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Although it's a moment to wave the non-existent flag of international fellowship and all that, we would like to point out just how bad this looks to us.
The FDIC's actions show just how interconnected the financial systems of the World are, and how terribly difficult it is to find any sort of separation across national borders; this will make sorting failed banks like UCB very difficult, especially if non-US agencies are not quite as cooperative as they were this time. In addition, it's all well and good, as far as the average U.S. Citizen is concerned, that the FDIC took over banks in China; what happens if and when China starts taking over banks in the United States?
But leaving that aside, we have a loose prediction for the general trend of future, weekly FDIC closures: they will likely consist of a handful of minor community banks, and one large-ish bank. This week's format is a good example of what we're walking about, as the banks other than UCB were quite small indeed. Since we are fully convinced the FDIC is effectively out of money, this would suggest that the banks which the FDIC manages to scrape up the cash to close are the worst imaginable banks in the United States... leaving aside such cesspools as Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, et al.
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri (up from #8)
8. Oregon (down from #7)
9. Arizona
10. Colorado
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (42.37%, up from 40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%, up from 43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%, up from 53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
We're very pleased with how these two lists have shaped up; the movement from week to week is becoming very slight, so we're pretty confident this gives a relatively accurate idea of how badly off these various States and the banks within them are. Of course, our analysis only reflects those States which have had over two bank failures, so that leaves a good portion of the Union (and its... extensions) not reflected in our report.
Nevertheless, these five States - Georgia, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado, in no particular order - are likely to be among the worst-off, as they are represented in both the preceeding lists. We really can't say which of those is the king of the dung heap, as it were, because we still haven't figured out how to compare apples and oranges.
Saturday, October 31, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed nine banks, a record number in the 2007 Depression: Bank USA, N.A., of Phoenix, AZ; California National Bank, of Los Angeles, CA; San Diego National Bank, of San Diego, CA; Pacific National Bank, of San Francisco, CA; Park National Bank, of Chicago, IL; Community Bank of Lemont, of Lemont, IL; North Houston Bank, of Houston, TX; Madisonville State Bank, of Madisonville, TX; and Citizens National Bank, of Teague, TX. The total assets of the closed banks were $19,400,000,000, and total deposits were approximately $15,400,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $2,500,000,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $12,900,000,000, or only 66.49% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December 2007, which stands at 57.81% (up noticeably from last week's 57.46%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $48,957,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $500,362,480,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $338,201,020,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $289,243,220,000 (57.81% of the declared value).
***
A couple milestones to remember on this day, dear Reader: nine banks closed in one day, beating out the eight closed on February 7th of this year; and over a half-trillion dollars in bank assets passed through the FDIC's mangy paws! Let us pause in a moment of silence, to commemorate that $0.5 trillion, because this is probably the last time that quantity of dollars will seem like much money. The horror of that $0.5 trillion is that it was only worth about $0.2 trillion... ouch. Again, we think that's only going to get worse. If the U.S. banking system is anywhere near as insolvent as our methodology suggests it is, there are many, many more banks out there with thoroughly rotten balance sheets.
Speaking of rotten balance sheets, the acquiring bank for all nine failures was US Bank, of Minneapolis, MN. It looks like US Bank is on track to become what we'd like to call hyper-regional, because regional does not quite seem to cover a Midwest bank with 115 branches in California, and five in Texas. It seems to us that the animal spirits have possessed this bank, too, and they're 'positioning themselves for the recovery' with a vengeance. We're not sure what's in the water in US Bank's Minneapolis HQ, but it must be some impressively potent stuff. They see the same falling household incomes as we do, but our first though would not have been "that's great news, let's blow $13 billion!" We have to conclude that US Bank is putting their head on the block, because when - not if - the next market nosedive hits, they will probably find themselves extremely overreached. Then again, if they are reaching for 'too-big-to-fail' status, they are on exactly the right course.
Unfortunately, the FDIC did not provide a break-down of its cost-to-DIF for each individual bank (separate assets and deposits were provided, though). So, we will not be able to include this week's closures in our recoverability by State analysis, because the lack of detailed closure data would skew our analysis quite severely. As an aside, a cohort of ours contacted the FDIC, requesting the information, but the FDIC spokesperson said they didn't have the info on hand, and to file a Freedom of Information Act request for the same... Feel the love!
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #6)
5. Utah (down from #4)
6. Kansas (down from #5)
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Arizona (new to list)
10. Colorado (down from #9)
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are actually worth on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis. [Note: this week's closures are not reflected in this data, so it remains unchanged from last week].
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
So much for Florida; we have to rescind all our back-patting from last report, because Arizona has stolen the Sunshine State's lustre. We fully expect to see more of Florida, sometime in the future. Just don't ask us when, because we really don't know. This is, of course, influenced by the rather jittery movements of the FDIC's closures; they do not seem to be focusing on any one State in particular to try and clean up that State's banking system. If a concerted effort to get the U.S. banking system sound does develop, perhaps this problem will be alleviated. Additional data clarity could also come from the FDIC being forced to close banks more often than just weekly.
Arizona will probably end up being a pretty ugly case, in and of itself. In the long term we fully expect that State to be far worse off that Florida, but only by a question of degrees: Florida will be in ruins, but Arizona will be abandoned and in ruins. For the meanwhile, though, Florida's financial woes will probably come to the fore more so than any other State, because of the extremely-overvalued nature of the Florida banking system's assets.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $12,900,000,000, or only 66.49% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December 2007, which stands at 57.81% (up noticeably from last week's 57.46%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $48,957,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $500,362,480,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $338,201,020,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $289,243,220,000 (57.81% of the declared value).
***
A couple milestones to remember on this day, dear Reader: nine banks closed in one day, beating out the eight closed on February 7th of this year; and over a half-trillion dollars in bank assets passed through the FDIC's mangy paws! Let us pause in a moment of silence, to commemorate that $0.5 trillion, because this is probably the last time that quantity of dollars will seem like much money. The horror of that $0.5 trillion is that it was only worth about $0.2 trillion... ouch. Again, we think that's only going to get worse. If the U.S. banking system is anywhere near as insolvent as our methodology suggests it is, there are many, many more banks out there with thoroughly rotten balance sheets.
Speaking of rotten balance sheets, the acquiring bank for all nine failures was US Bank, of Minneapolis, MN. It looks like US Bank is on track to become what we'd like to call hyper-regional, because regional does not quite seem to cover a Midwest bank with 115 branches in California, and five in Texas. It seems to us that the animal spirits have possessed this bank, too, and they're 'positioning themselves for the recovery' with a vengeance. We're not sure what's in the water in US Bank's Minneapolis HQ, but it must be some impressively potent stuff. They see the same falling household incomes as we do, but our first though would not have been "that's great news, let's blow $13 billion!" We have to conclude that US Bank is putting their head on the block, because when - not if - the next market nosedive hits, they will probably find themselves extremely overreached. Then again, if they are reaching for 'too-big-to-fail' status, they are on exactly the right course.
Unfortunately, the FDIC did not provide a break-down of its cost-to-DIF for each individual bank (separate assets and deposits were provided, though). So, we will not be able to include this week's closures in our recoverability by State analysis, because the lack of detailed closure data would skew our analysis quite severely. As an aside, a cohort of ours contacted the FDIC, requesting the information, but the FDIC spokesperson said they didn't have the info on hand, and to file a Freedom of Information Act request for the same... Feel the love!
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #6)
5. Utah (down from #4)
6. Kansas (down from #5)
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Arizona (new to list)
10. Colorado (down from #9)
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are actually worth on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis. [Note: this week's closures are not reflected in this data, so it remains unchanged from last week].
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
So much for Florida; we have to rescind all our back-patting from last report, because Arizona has stolen the Sunshine State's lustre. We fully expect to see more of Florida, sometime in the future. Just don't ask us when, because we really don't know. This is, of course, influenced by the rather jittery movements of the FDIC's closures; they do not seem to be focusing on any one State in particular to try and clean up that State's banking system. If a concerted effort to get the U.S. banking system sound does develop, perhaps this problem will be alleviated. Additional data clarity could also come from the FDIC being forced to close banks more often than just weekly.
Arizona will probably end up being a pretty ugly case, in and of itself. In the long term we fully expect that State to be far worse off that Florida, but only by a question of degrees: Florida will be in ruins, but Arizona will be abandoned and in ruins. For the meanwhile, though, Florida's financial woes will probably come to the fore more so than any other State, because of the extremely-overvalued nature of the Florida banking system's assets.
Friday, October 30, 2009
A Clunker of an Economic Policy
Yesterday, the world was greeted by a much-trumpeted USA GDP report showing 'growth' has returned. Admittedly, the 'growth' was primarily the result of Federal Government stimulus, mainly in the form of the first time house-buyer credit, and the 'cash-for-clunkers' plan. These two giveaways really only pulled consumption forward as opposed to creating new demand. The collapse in auto sales after its programme ended proves the point.
More disturbingly, having the economy increasingly dependent on debt-funded, government stimulus is not a sound policy. Let us illustrate by analogy. Suppose Mr. Miller was down on his luck. Mr. Baker next door has a brilliant idea: "I have an unused credit line down at the Bank. Suppose I max it out and use the funds to buy flour from Mr. Miller. I need to buy flour anyhow. I'll just stock up and then gradually use it up." Mr. Miller is, naturally, delighted when the order for a tonne of flour comes in. He even needs to hire an assistant, Jack, and now Mr. Miller can order that new mill stone he'd been hankering after. GDP is now growing again!
Only here's the fly in the ointment: as Mr. Baker starts buying less flour as he draws down his stock, Mr. Miller's sales are lower than ever! Jack gets laid off and ends up moving into his parents' basement. Jack's former landlord is unable to find a new tenant and starts baking his own bread to economise. Mr Miller also reluctantly cancels the order for the new mill stone. Mr. Mason, faced with no prospects of further business, sells his home and joins a monastery. Mr. Baker is faced with falling sales, and now a hefty interest payment on that line of credit. GDP is falling again, and even worse than before!
A debt-binge set up the world economy for the 2007 Depression. The attempt to keep the debt party going will end in tears. Mark our words! [cue spooky music]
More disturbingly, having the economy increasingly dependent on debt-funded, government stimulus is not a sound policy. Let us illustrate by analogy. Suppose Mr. Miller was down on his luck. Mr. Baker next door has a brilliant idea: "I have an unused credit line down at the Bank. Suppose I max it out and use the funds to buy flour from Mr. Miller. I need to buy flour anyhow. I'll just stock up and then gradually use it up." Mr. Miller is, naturally, delighted when the order for a tonne of flour comes in. He even needs to hire an assistant, Jack, and now Mr. Miller can order that new mill stone he'd been hankering after. GDP is now growing again!
Only here's the fly in the ointment: as Mr. Baker starts buying less flour as he draws down his stock, Mr. Miller's sales are lower than ever! Jack gets laid off and ends up moving into his parents' basement. Jack's former landlord is unable to find a new tenant and starts baking his own bread to economise. Mr Miller also reluctantly cancels the order for the new mill stone. Mr. Mason, faced with no prospects of further business, sells his home and joins a monastery. Mr. Baker is faced with falling sales, and now a hefty interest payment on that line of credit. GDP is falling again, and even worse than before!
A debt-binge set up the world economy for the 2007 Depression. The attempt to keep the debt party going will end in tears. Mark our words! [cue spooky music]
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Housing Price Report for October
Our result for the first five months of our North American Housing Price Index is a drop of 11.64%. As previously mentioned, we attempted to make an adjustment to not skew the data by the 'higher end' of the market. Because of recent strength in the 'lower end' of the market, the overall index is showing signs of stability.
Is this a sign of the 'bottom' in the housing market? We think not. Sales have been boosted by the much-trumpeted 10% US Federal income tax credit. Just as auto sales 'crashed' after the cash-for-clunkers plan was suspended, so too will housing sales wilt as the tax credit is wound down.
Is this a sign of the 'bottom' in the housing market? We think not. Sales have been boosted by the much-trumpeted 10% US Federal income tax credit. Just as auto sales 'crashed' after the cash-for-clunkers plan was suspended, so too will housing sales wilt as the tax credit is wound down.
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Economic Stress Report for October 2009
Once again we've gathered sufficient data to provide an update on the Economic Stress Report. According to our analysis method, the following are the top ten States on our list of economically stressed states. We present them here in order of highest to lowest severity:
1. South Dakota
2. Vermont
3. Ohio
4. Arizona
5. Kansas
6. Nevada (new to list)
7. New Hampshire (new to list)
8. Connecticut (new to list)
9. West Virginia (down from #8)
10. Indiana
The big, pleasant surprise for us in this report is that the top five states are unchanged from last report. New additions to the second decile are: Nevada (up from #11 of last report); New Hampshire and Connecticut (both not even on the 'watch list' of last report!). Falling out of the second decile are Montana (down to #11); Washington (down to #12); and New York (down to #13).
The consistency of the top states gives us hope our methodology is fairly sound as more data pours in. That several of these states are on our list should be no surprise to anyone - Ohio, Arizona, Nevada, and Indiana. Perhaps more remarkable is that the famous basket-case of California is missing. We don't think the absence of the Golden State in our stress measure is in any way a positive reflection on California's economy. Rather, we believe that worse conditions lie elsewhere under the radar of widespread public attention.
1. South Dakota
2. Vermont
3. Ohio
4. Arizona
5. Kansas
6. Nevada (new to list)
7. New Hampshire (new to list)
8. Connecticut (new to list)
9. West Virginia (down from #8)
10. Indiana
The big, pleasant surprise for us in this report is that the top five states are unchanged from last report. New additions to the second decile are: Nevada (up from #11 of last report); New Hampshire and Connecticut (both not even on the 'watch list' of last report!). Falling out of the second decile are Montana (down to #11); Washington (down to #12); and New York (down to #13).
The consistency of the top states gives us hope our methodology is fairly sound as more data pours in. That several of these states are on our list should be no surprise to anyone - Ohio, Arizona, Nevada, and Indiana. Perhaps more remarkable is that the famous basket-case of California is missing. We don't think the absence of the Golden State in our stress measure is in any way a positive reflection on California's economy. Rather, we believe that worse conditions lie elsewhere under the radar of widespread public attention.
Monday, September 14, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
Last week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: Corus Bank (Chicago, Illinois); Brickwell Community Bank (Woodbury, Minnesota); and Venture Bank (Lacy, Washington). Total assets of the closed banks were $8,042,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $2,020,000,000. The percentage of FDIC loss out of total assets is 25.12%.
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $471,296,780,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $38,783,800,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 8.23%, up from 7.87% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $164,296,780,000, and total cost is $38,783,800,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.61% up from 23.53% as of last report.
The situation with Corus Bank requires additional examination. The acquiring institution, MB Financial Bank, agreed to take ownership of $3 billion (out of $7 billion) of ex-Corus assets, leaving $4 billion in the capable hands of the FDIC. The raw losses-to-assets ration is 24.29%; however, taking MB Financial's actions into account, and the extimated cost-to-DIF of $1.7 billion, the actual losses-to-assets stands at an whopping 42.50%. Because of the severity of this different, we're going to be looking closer at past closures, as it is entirely possible that closures have been altogether worse than we previously thought.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Illinois
4. Utah
5. Kansas
6. Minnesota
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Washington
10. Florida
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. Iowa - 36.68%
8. West Virginia - 36.52%
9. Nevada - 35.56%
10. Arizona - 34.45%
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $471,296,780,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $38,783,800,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 8.23%, up from 7.87% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $164,296,780,000, and total cost is $38,783,800,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.61% up from 23.53% as of last report.
The situation with Corus Bank requires additional examination. The acquiring institution, MB Financial Bank, agreed to take ownership of $3 billion (out of $7 billion) of ex-Corus assets, leaving $4 billion in the capable hands of the FDIC. The raw losses-to-assets ration is 24.29%; however, taking MB Financial's actions into account, and the extimated cost-to-DIF of $1.7 billion, the actual losses-to-assets stands at an whopping 42.50%. Because of the severity of this different, we're going to be looking closer at past closures, as it is entirely possible that closures have been altogether worse than we previously thought.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Illinois
4. Utah
5. Kansas
6. Minnesota
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Washington
10. Florida
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. Iowa - 36.68%
8. West Virginia - 36.52%
9. Nevada - 35.56%
10. Arizona - 34.45%
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
The Worst-Off Places
Based on our proprietary stress index and the ongoing parade of bank failures, we are coming to the conclusion that the worst off states in the USA are (insert drum-roll, please) Arizona and Nevada. Both of these States are in the top ten of bank-failures-to-population, and losses-to-assets; additionally, unreleased data from our stress index shows that both States have moved into the top ten of stressed states. Further evidence includes the above-national-average unemployment rate in Nevada and house foreclosure rates in both states.
We suggest the acuteness of distress in these two states is a telling commentary on the nature of the present Depression. This Depression is not just about economics, but habitability itself - that is, the very appropriateness of a place for human habitation.
These two, desert states are the quintessence of artifice. They are full of cities that have no business being there and only exist because developers wanted to make a fast buck. Now the easy credit bubble which drove the process of unsustainable colonisation has popped, these states are entering a tailspin faster and harder than the rest of the Union. We posit that the drying-up-and-blowing-away process will be much shorter and more catastrophic than the aforementioned colonisation.
Generally speaking, people appear to have forgotten that Arizona and Nevada are predominantly deserts; indeed, they seem sublimely convinced that those states are somehow permanently sustainable. This can easily be contrasted with, say, Michigan, another severely distressed state, which has an enviable natural endowment - the Great Lakes, ample rainfall, fertile farmland, vast forests.
Simply put, however bleak the future might be, Michigan's population has one. The same can not be said for Arizona and Nevada. As the Federal highway, water, and electric systems upon which these two states are utterly dependent decline, the capacity of these two states to support human population will diminish and the dream of the Desert Paradise in the American Southwest will expire.
We suggest, as part of Depression preparedness, our readers ask themselves how habitable is it where they live? How would you get around without cars and highways? Where is the nearest source of fresh water? of electrical power? In the deserts, how would you manage without air conditioning? In colder climes, what if it cost four times as much to heat your house during winter?
What answers you might derive, dear Reader, informs whether or not any given area will be able to support people. This includes both basic foodways, as well as the economic systems necessary to facilitate their interaction in the larger economy. We feel the national (and global) economy will not have sufficient 'fat,' if you will, to support places which, in the end, contribute nothing of any value or importance.
We suggest the acuteness of distress in these two states is a telling commentary on the nature of the present Depression. This Depression is not just about economics, but habitability itself - that is, the very appropriateness of a place for human habitation.
These two, desert states are the quintessence of artifice. They are full of cities that have no business being there and only exist because developers wanted to make a fast buck. Now the easy credit bubble which drove the process of unsustainable colonisation has popped, these states are entering a tailspin faster and harder than the rest of the Union. We posit that the drying-up-and-blowing-away process will be much shorter and more catastrophic than the aforementioned colonisation.
Generally speaking, people appear to have forgotten that Arizona and Nevada are predominantly deserts; indeed, they seem sublimely convinced that those states are somehow permanently sustainable. This can easily be contrasted with, say, Michigan, another severely distressed state, which has an enviable natural endowment - the Great Lakes, ample rainfall, fertile farmland, vast forests.
Simply put, however bleak the future might be, Michigan's population has one. The same can not be said for Arizona and Nevada. As the Federal highway, water, and electric systems upon which these two states are utterly dependent decline, the capacity of these two states to support human population will diminish and the dream of the Desert Paradise in the American Southwest will expire.
We suggest, as part of Depression preparedness, our readers ask themselves how habitable is it where they live? How would you get around without cars and highways? Where is the nearest source of fresh water? of electrical power? In the deserts, how would you manage without air conditioning? In colder climes, what if it cost four times as much to heat your house during winter?
What answers you might derive, dear Reader, informs whether or not any given area will be able to support people. This includes both basic foodways, as well as the economic systems necessary to facilitate their interaction in the larger economy. We feel the national (and global) economy will not have sufficient 'fat,' if you will, to support places which, in the end, contribute nothing of any value or importance.
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Unbelievably Extra-Late Edition
Last week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed five banks: First Bank of Kansas City (Kansas City, Missouri); InBank (Oak Forest, Illinois); Vantus Bank (Sioux City, Iowa); Platinum Community Bank (Rolling Meadows, Illinois); and First State Bank (Flagstaff, Arizona). Total assets of the closed banks were $1,136,600,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $401,300,000. The percentage of FDIC loss out of total assets is 35.31%.
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $463,254,780,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $36,763,800,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 7.94%, up from 7.87% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $156,254,780,000, and total cost is $36,763,800,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.53% up from 23.44% as of last report.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Illinois
4. Utah
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Colorado
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. Iowa - 36.68%
8. West Virginia - 36.52%
9. Nevada - 35.56%
10. Arizona - 34.45%
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $463,254,780,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $36,763,800,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 7.94%, up from 7.87% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $156,254,780,000, and total cost is $36,763,800,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.53% up from 23.44% as of last report.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Illinois
4. Utah
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Colorado
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. Iowa - 36.68%
8. West Virginia - 36.52%
9. Nevada - 35.56%
10. Arizona - 34.45%
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
This past week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: Bradford Bank (Baltimore, Maryland); Mainstreet Bank (Forest Lake, Minnesota); and Affinity Bank (Ventura, California). Total assets of the closed banks were $1,911,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $446,000,000. The percentage of FDIC loss out of total assets is 23.34%.
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $462,118,180,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $36,362,500,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 7.87%, up from 7.80% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $155,118,180,000, and total cost is $36,362,500,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.44% unchanged from 23.44% as of last report.
These loss ratios have been so constant lately, we are wondering if the FDIC isn't just making up the numbers.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Utah
4. Illinois
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Colorado
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. West Virginia - 36.52%
8. Nevada - 35.56%
9. South Dakota - 33.90%
10. Washington - 32.39%
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $462,118,180,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $36,362,500,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 7.87%, up from 7.80% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $155,118,180,000, and total cost is $36,362,500,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.44% unchanged from 23.44% as of last report.
These loss ratios have been so constant lately, we are wondering if the FDIC isn't just making up the numbers.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Utah
4. Illinois
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Colorado
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. West Virginia - 36.52%
8. Nevada - 35.56%
9. South Dakota - 33.90%
10. Washington - 32.39%
Friday, August 28, 2009
Economic Stress Report for August 2009
Once again we've gathered sufficient data to provide an update on the Economic Stress Report. According to our analysis method, the following are the top ten States on our list of economically stressed states. We present them here in order of highest to lowest severity:
South Dakota
Vermont
Ohio
Arizona
Kansas
Montana
Washington
West Virginia
New York
Indiana
Of those States on our watch list, the following have suffered bank closures - another sign of economic stress - since December 2007:
South Dakota (1 closure)
Ohio (1 closure)
Arizona (2 closures)
Kansas (3 closures)
Washington (2 closures)
West Virginia (1 closure)
New York (1 closure)
The past month or so saw two big surprises for us: first was the very rapid fall of Maryland from stressed to 'troubled.' We're not completely convinced that Maryland's situation has suddenly improved for some reason, The State is still on our watch list, but it is no longer stressed, according to our analysis. Even so, we suspect that things will be getting quite a bit worse in Maryland, especially when the Federal Government is forced to commence personnel cutbacks (whenever than might occur), or when large numbers of bank failures finally take place.
The second surprise was Vermont's meteoric rise to runner-up basket case of the Union. We can only assume that Vermonters were somehow heavily over-extended, which quickly came back to haunt the economy in general, but that's just hand-waving. Frankly, we're not exactly sure why Vermont is apparently in such bad shape, so if any of you, Dear Readers, have thoughts, please share.
At this point we're hopping onto our old horse and ranting about South Dakota, still the worst-off State in the Union, according to our analysis. Simply put, we suspect that some political shenanigans are going down to prevent South Dakota from suffering the effects of its zomboid banking system. We have some thoughts on that, which we'll touch on in a future post, but suffice it to say that South Dakota should have had so many bank closures by now, it's not even funny.
Moving on, Ohio continues to hold third place for another month, so we take this as a sign that the State is in bad shape. Presumably the collapse of the American car industry continues to hit the State hard, and we expect that this condition will continue to worsen (perhaps by the eventual failure of Ford, or the re-failure of Chrysler or General Motors). Whatever the case, though, we feel it is a sign that Ohio is experiencing a relatively stable rate of economic contraction, as evidenced by its stable place as #3.
As a final note, we're very pleased to see that an increasing number of those States on our top ten list have suffered bank failures. This we take to be a good sign, perhaps indicating that our stress analysis will have a strong correlation with future bank failures. Time will tell, at any rate; the next report can likely be expected around the end of September.
South Dakota
Vermont
Ohio
Arizona
Kansas
Montana
Washington
West Virginia
New York
Indiana
Of those States on our watch list, the following have suffered bank closures - another sign of economic stress - since December 2007:
South Dakota (1 closure)
Ohio (1 closure)
Arizona (2 closures)
Kansas (3 closures)
Washington (2 closures)
West Virginia (1 closure)
New York (1 closure)
The past month or so saw two big surprises for us: first was the very rapid fall of Maryland from stressed to 'troubled.' We're not completely convinced that Maryland's situation has suddenly improved for some reason, The State is still on our watch list, but it is no longer stressed, according to our analysis. Even so, we suspect that things will be getting quite a bit worse in Maryland, especially when the Federal Government is forced to commence personnel cutbacks (whenever than might occur), or when large numbers of bank failures finally take place.
The second surprise was Vermont's meteoric rise to runner-up basket case of the Union. We can only assume that Vermonters were somehow heavily over-extended, which quickly came back to haunt the economy in general, but that's just hand-waving. Frankly, we're not exactly sure why Vermont is apparently in such bad shape, so if any of you, Dear Readers, have thoughts, please share.
At this point we're hopping onto our old horse and ranting about South Dakota, still the worst-off State in the Union, according to our analysis. Simply put, we suspect that some political shenanigans are going down to prevent South Dakota from suffering the effects of its zomboid banking system. We have some thoughts on that, which we'll touch on in a future post, but suffice it to say that South Dakota should have had so many bank closures by now, it's not even funny.
Moving on, Ohio continues to hold third place for another month, so we take this as a sign that the State is in bad shape. Presumably the collapse of the American car industry continues to hit the State hard, and we expect that this condition will continue to worsen (perhaps by the eventual failure of Ford, or the re-failure of Chrysler or General Motors). Whatever the case, though, we feel it is a sign that Ohio is experiencing a relatively stable rate of economic contraction, as evidenced by its stable place as #3.
As a final note, we're very pleased to see that an increasing number of those States on our top ten list have suffered bank failures. This we take to be a good sign, perhaps indicating that our stress analysis will have a strong correlation with future bank failures. Time will tell, at any rate; the next report can likely be expected around the end of September.
Sunday, August 23, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Extra-Late Edition
Last week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed four banks: ebank (Atlanta, Georgia); First Coweta (Newnan, Georgia); CapitalSouth Bank (Birmingham, Alabama); and Guaranty Bank (Austin, Texas). Total assets of the closed banks were $13,927,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $3,262,000,000. The percentage of FDIC loss out of total assets is 23.42%.
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $460,207,180,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $35,916,500,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 7.80%, up from 7.32% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $153,207,180,000, and total cost is $35,916,500,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.44% down from 23.45% as of last report.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Utah
4. Illinois
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Colorado
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. West Virginia - 36.52%
8. Nevada - 35.56%
9. Maryland - 35.00%
10. South Dakota - 33.90%
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $460,207,180,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $35,916,500,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 7.80%, up from 7.32% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $153,207,180,000, and total cost is $35,916,500,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 23.44% down from 23.45% as of last report.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Nevada
2. Georgia
3. Utah
4. Illinois
5. Kansas
6. Oregon
7. Minnesota
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Colorado
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Pennsylvania - 50.75%
2. Utah - 40.32%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 37.62%
7. West Virginia - 36.52%
8. Nevada - 35.56%
9. Maryland - 35.00%
10. South Dakota - 33.90%
Monday, July 27, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Extra-Late Edition
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed seven banks: Waterford Village Bank (Clarence, NY); Security Bank of Bibb County (Macon, GA); Security Bank of Houston County (Perry, GA); Security Bank of Jones County (Gray, GA); Security Bank of Gwinnett County (Suwanee, GA); Security Bank of North Metro (Woodstock, GA); and Security Bank of Fulton (Alpharetta, GA). Total assets of the closed banks were $2,852,400,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $812,600,000. The percentage of FDIC loss out of total assets is 28.49%.
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $416,001,080,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $27,883,000,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 6.70%, up from 6.55% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $109,001,080,000, and total cost is $27,883,000,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 25.58% up from 25.50% as of last report.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Utah
4. Kansas
5. Illinois
6. Minnesota
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Colorado
10. California
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Utah - 40.32%
2. New Jersey - 40.13%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 38.11%
7. West Virginia - 36.52%
8. Maryland - 35.00%
9. South Dakota - 33.90%
10. Minnesota - 33.01%
This closure brings the total assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $416,001,080,000, with cost-to-FDIC brought to $27,883,000,000 - this includes the assets of Washington Mutual, whose closing offered no cost to the FDIC. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets presently stands at 6.70%, up from 6.55% as of last report.
Upon elimination of WaMu's assets from the analysis, total assets are $109,001,080,000, and total cost is $27,883,000,000. The percentage of FDIC losses to total assets now stands at 25.58% up from 25.50% as of last report.
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population, and the ten most afflicted states are:
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Utah
4. Kansas
5. Illinois
6. Minnesota
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Colorado
10. California
On the basis of the total losses-to-assets ratio in each state, the worst are as follows:
1. Utah - 40.32%
2. New Jersey - 40.13%
3. Idaho - 39.11%
4. Michigan - 39.03%
5. Wyoming - 38.57%
6. Florida - 38.11%
7. West Virginia - 36.52%
8. Maryland - 35.00%
9. South Dakota - 33.90%
10. Minnesota - 33.01%
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Economic Stress Report
We've just gathered sufficient data to provide an update on the Economic Stress Report we introduced last month. According to our analysis method, the following States are on our watch list. We present them here in order of highest to lowest severity:
South Dakota
Ohio
Kansas
Arizona
Washington
New York
Maryland
Florida
Alabama
Connecticut
Of those States on our watch list, the following have suffered bank closures - another sign of economic stress - since December 2007:
South Dakota (1 closure)
Kansas (3 closures)
Washington (2 closures)
Maryland (1 closures)
Florida (5 closures)
With this information, we've updated our predictions from our last post:
One: the list has seen some reshuffling since our last post, but the star of the show is still South Dakota. We take this opportunity to do our happy victory dance: the State, as we predicted it would, recently suffered its first bank closure of the 2007 Depression. However, we strongly suspect that many, many more closures are in store for the State. When that will happen is anyone's guess, but we can't think of one good reason why South Dakota won't be seriously hit by both bank closures and general economic distress. Using Florida as the benchmark, South Dakota should have seen around twenty bank closures already.
Two: we still expect that Maryland is going to be hit hard by both unemployment and bank closures. Again using Florida as a benchmark, Maryland should have experienced about five bank closures. Considering the State's mere placement on our analysis, we would be very surprised indeed if at least something bad doesn't happen. The safety net of Government spending can only last so long; when both the Federal and State Governments are finally forced to curtail their spending, Maryland is going down hard and fast.
It seems we might be able to provide updates approximately monthly, but the duration might be longer or shorter, depending on how our data accumulation progresses.
South Dakota
Ohio
Kansas
Arizona
Washington
New York
Maryland
Florida
Alabama
Connecticut
Of those States on our watch list, the following have suffered bank closures - another sign of economic stress - since December 2007:
South Dakota (1 closure)
Kansas (3 closures)
Washington (2 closures)
Maryland (1 closures)
Florida (5 closures)
With this information, we've updated our predictions from our last post:
One: the list has seen some reshuffling since our last post, but the star of the show is still South Dakota. We take this opportunity to do our happy victory dance: the State, as we predicted it would, recently suffered its first bank closure of the 2007 Depression. However, we strongly suspect that many, many more closures are in store for the State. When that will happen is anyone's guess, but we can't think of one good reason why South Dakota won't be seriously hit by both bank closures and general economic distress. Using Florida as the benchmark, South Dakota should have seen around twenty bank closures already.
Two: we still expect that Maryland is going to be hit hard by both unemployment and bank closures. Again using Florida as a benchmark, Maryland should have experienced about five bank closures. Considering the State's mere placement on our analysis, we would be very surprised indeed if at least something bad doesn't happen. The safety net of Government spending can only last so long; when both the Federal and State Governments are finally forced to curtail their spending, Maryland is going down hard and fast.
It seems we might be able to provide updates approximately monthly, but the duration might be longer or shorter, depending on how our data accumulation progresses.
Friday, July 17, 2009
Commercial Credit Collapse
Commercial credit is the money businesses borrow to fund their operations on a short term basis. Large corporations use the commercial paper market and bank loans. Smaller companies use loans from banks and finance companies. In the USA, the availability of commercial credit is contracting violently across the board. In our opinion, this portends an acceleration of the Depression, as employers find it more difficult to fund any sort of expansion - or even maintain their operations.
The commercial paper market has shrunk by 28 percent in the last three months according to this Bloomberg report. The entire market has shrunk by over half since its peak two years ago.
Bank lending is also falling. Since the beginning of the year, commercial and industrial loans of commercial banks have fallen by about 7% according to Federal Reserve Bank data.
Finally, lending by finance companies is also collapsing. According to data from the Federal Reserve Bank, business lending by finance companies had fallen about 6% from the beginning of the year to April. This figure will get substantially worse with the imminent demise of CIT, a large finance company.
Taken as a whole, a picture of severe credit contraction emerges. Both lenders and borrowers are losing en masse the capacity to lend or borrow due to deteriorating finances. Even sound borrowers may have little reason to borrow under the current circumstances and would just pay off loans as they come due. In any case, the result will be continued economic contraction.
The commercial paper market has shrunk by 28 percent in the last three months according to this Bloomberg report. The entire market has shrunk by over half since its peak two years ago.
Bank lending is also falling. Since the beginning of the year, commercial and industrial loans of commercial banks have fallen by about 7% according to Federal Reserve Bank data.
Finally, lending by finance companies is also collapsing. According to data from the Federal Reserve Bank, business lending by finance companies had fallen about 6% from the beginning of the year to April. This figure will get substantially worse with the imminent demise of CIT, a large finance company.
Taken as a whole, a picture of severe credit contraction emerges. Both lenders and borrowers are losing en masse the capacity to lend or borrow due to deteriorating finances. Even sound borrowers may have little reason to borrow under the current circumstances and would just pay off loans as they come due. In any case, the result will be continued economic contraction.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
A Depression Trajectory
As a sort of follow-up to yesterday's post, we will muse a bit on how much world GDP decline to expect to this Depression.
One assumption that we are making is that over the next twenty years or so, fossil fuels will become too expensive to use very much as... well, fuel. The world is not going to run out of oil, gas, or high quality coal - but their fuel use will mostly be limited to its highest ends (i.e., not for mass private cars, heat, or electricity). In the post-fuel hydrocarbon era, much of the remaining supply will be used for non-fuel uses such as fertiliser, plastics, and specialty chemicals.
Its a rather uncertain thing modelling collapse, but it is not unreasonable to say that hydrocarbon production may decline 90% or so in the next 20 years. That may seem outrageous, but many people like ourselves who make a study of this matter are arriving at similar conclusions. Consider this recent post at The Oil Drum. It's a bit technical, but Figure 3 is worth a thousand words.
As every schoolchild knows, or at least ought to know, the industrial economy grows or shrinks with the supply of fuel. If fuel production declines 90%, the economy will fall by a similar amount. There will be efficiency, nuclear power, solar power, hydropower, and many other ways to mitigate the loss of energy available to society - hopefully enough to keep things civilised. And once Civilisation has weaned itself off fossil fuel, economic growth just may well resume from a new, low base and at a slower rate.
We believe an energy-intensive economy such as the USA's will experience roughly a 90% decline over the next 20 years. At the end of the Depression, per-capita income is likely to be in the neighborhood of $5,000 a year in current dollars.
We suggest the Reader consider what life might be like for them on such an income, or a bit more or less - depending on their skill level. Also to consider what sort of means they would have to produce any income in a world where most people can afford very little beyond the basics of food and shelter.
It will be very difficult to hope that investment capital will produce much income. Which industries will even survive this depression? Virtually all bonds are sure to default, including government ones - either directly or through inflation. Successful investors will likely be the active, hands-on sort.
To earn income will require being involved with a surviving industry, such as agriculture. Otherwise you will need to become entrepreneurial, and hard-working. Though challenging, the changes ahead are manageable - as long as you keep a positive outlook.
One assumption that we are making is that over the next twenty years or so, fossil fuels will become too expensive to use very much as... well, fuel. The world is not going to run out of oil, gas, or high quality coal - but their fuel use will mostly be limited to its highest ends (i.e., not for mass private cars, heat, or electricity). In the post-fuel hydrocarbon era, much of the remaining supply will be used for non-fuel uses such as fertiliser, plastics, and specialty chemicals.
Its a rather uncertain thing modelling collapse, but it is not unreasonable to say that hydrocarbon production may decline 90% or so in the next 20 years. That may seem outrageous, but many people like ourselves who make a study of this matter are arriving at similar conclusions. Consider this recent post at The Oil Drum. It's a bit technical, but Figure 3 is worth a thousand words.
As every schoolchild knows, or at least ought to know, the industrial economy grows or shrinks with the supply of fuel. If fuel production declines 90%, the economy will fall by a similar amount. There will be efficiency, nuclear power, solar power, hydropower, and many other ways to mitigate the loss of energy available to society - hopefully enough to keep things civilised. And once Civilisation has weaned itself off fossil fuel, economic growth just may well resume from a new, low base and at a slower rate.
We believe an energy-intensive economy such as the USA's will experience roughly a 90% decline over the next 20 years. At the end of the Depression, per-capita income is likely to be in the neighborhood of $5,000 a year in current dollars.
We suggest the Reader consider what life might be like for them on such an income, or a bit more or less - depending on their skill level. Also to consider what sort of means they would have to produce any income in a world where most people can afford very little beyond the basics of food and shelter.
It will be very difficult to hope that investment capital will produce much income. Which industries will even survive this depression? Virtually all bonds are sure to default, including government ones - either directly or through inflation. Successful investors will likely be the active, hands-on sort.
To earn income will require being involved with a surviving industry, such as agriculture. Otherwise you will need to become entrepreneurial, and hard-working. Though challenging, the changes ahead are manageable - as long as you keep a positive outlook.
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