There are a number of disturbing trends that can be discerned, if one has the time, from rummaging through the data coming out of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. One is that out of the $89.4 billion growth in national income from the second quarter of this year to the third, $12.8 billion was growth of "subsidies". That does not refer to "cash for clunkers" and so forth, but money heading from the taxpayer into government enterprises (our guess mostly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - but really, who knows?). How that can be construed as income is bizarre enough, but it's not good news that 1/7 of third quarter growth comes from something so fishy.
But such accounting shenanigans could be dismissed as mere noise compared to some really big numbers - such as the jump in the profits of our corporate masters: $110.4 billion dollars. One might astutely note that this is actually more than the increase in national income, $21 billion more as a matter of fact. Or putting the whole matter another way, all (and then some) of the much touted 'recovery' is growth of corporate profits, and the rest of us will just have to make do with the scraps.
But the really bad news is something hidden (in the sense that it is not presented by itself - but has to be derived from two data sets) and insidious: the approaching excess of consumption of fixed private capital ($1525.5 billion) over fixed private investment ($1,712.6 billion). We say "approaching" because obviously the latter figure is larger than the former, but it has been falling at a rate of 21% over the year ending September 30 (and without a third quarter "recovery") and 4% the year before that.
Between bank lending contracting, the real estate market collapsing, and corporations being inclined to invest their winnings overseas, there isn't much prospect for anything other than continued decline in fixed private investment. We really can't say if the rate is going to accelerate or moderate but even if it continues at, say, a moderated 10%, the cross over would likely come in late 2010.
What this means in plain English is that at some point in the near future, the economy will reach a state where consumption of capital exceeds its formation, and there will be no prospect of any kind of economic growth ever, until growth in private investment materialises. It could be a long wait.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Saturday, December 19, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
On 18/12/09, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed seven banks: Rockbridge Commercial Bank of Atlanta, Georgia; Peoples First Community Bank of Panama City Florida; Citizens State Bank of New Baltimore, Michigan; New South FSB of Irondale, Alabama; Independent Bankers' Bank of Springfield, Illinois; Imperial Capital Bank of La Jolla, California; and First Federal Bank of California in Santa Monica, California. The total assets of the closed bank were $14,448,100,000, and total deposits were $11,157,130,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,827,420,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 64.57% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.66% (up slightly from last report's 57.48%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $56,384,590,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $544,460,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $370,346,650,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $313,962,060,000 (57.66% of the declared value).
* * *
This week's closures were definitely not typical, as there were a number of straight out liquidations; three, to be exact. One of those liquidations (Rockbridge) will be complete by Monday! We pity the customers whose outstanding checks will be bouncing next week. We suspect a bit of year-end housekeeping on the part of the FDIC, as they will be kicking back between the 24th and 28th of December. Further closures this year are doubtful due to the upcoming holiday; perhaps Santa Claus has made the banking system all better.
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas
5. Minnesota
6. Utah
7. Florida (up from #8)
8. Missouri
9. Oregon
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (38.89%, up from 36.65%)
2. Colorado, up from #4 (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53% up from 42.78%)
4. California, down from #2 (45.06% up from 42.28%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Georgia (54.64% up from 54.62%)
8. Utah (55.45%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.70%)
* * *
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $1,827,420,000. The value now stands at $39,559,990,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 64.57% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.66% (up slightly from last report's 57.48%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $56,384,590,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $544,460,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $370,346,650,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $313,962,060,000 (57.66% of the declared value).
* * *
This week's closures were definitely not typical, as there were a number of straight out liquidations; three, to be exact. One of those liquidations (Rockbridge) will be complete by Monday! We pity the customers whose outstanding checks will be bouncing next week. We suspect a bit of year-end housekeeping on the part of the FDIC, as they will be kicking back between the 24th and 28th of December. Further closures this year are doubtful due to the upcoming holiday; perhaps Santa Claus has made the banking system all better.
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas
5. Minnesota
6. Utah
7. Florida (up from #8)
8. Missouri
9. Oregon
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (38.89%, up from 36.65%)
2. Colorado, up from #4 (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53% up from 42.78%)
4. California, down from #2 (45.06% up from 42.28%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Georgia (54.64% up from 54.62%)
8. Utah (55.45%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.70%)
* * *
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $1,827,420,000. The value now stands at $39,559,990,000.
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Updated
This report is current as of 11 December. The report for this weekend's closures will follow.
Well, 158 FDIC press releases later, we've finished updating our information. We'll work on historical data (i.e. before the past two weeks) in the near future.
* * *
On 11/12/09, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: SolutionsBank, of Overland Park, KS; Valley Capital Bank, of Mesa AZ; and Republic Federal Bank, of Miami, FL. The total assets of the closed bank were $984,400,000, and total deposits were $815,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $257,160,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks were $558,140,000, or only 56.70% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.48% (unchanged from last report's revised recoverability of 57.48%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $54,557,170,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $530,012,680,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $359,189,520,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $304,632,350,000 (57.48% of the declared value).
* * *
The changes we made to our analysis (i.e. taking into account premiums/discounts which acquiring banks paid for failed banks' insured deposits) made a distinct difference. A difference of 0.08% - the difference between the revised recoverability (57.48%), and the unrevised (57.56%) - might not seem like much, but applied to the assets of all banks closed so far, the assets loose an additional $424 million in value. Isn't leverage a beautiful thing, dear Reader?
We don't have much to say about these three closures, however; the seem fairly average... which is probably a problem. We still feel in the FDIC is managing its closures to pick and choose its cost. A question occures to us as we write: does the FDIC pick their cost first, and then close the banks which fit within the cost they selected beforehand? Inquiring minds want to know.
* * *
Because of the revisions we made to our data, we are updating the Frugal Scotsman's Ten Nastiest Bank Closures To Date. Here are the Gruesome Tensome:
1. IndyMac (CA) - 22.99%
2. BankUnited FSB (FL) - 28.91%
3. First Bank of Idaho - 37.10%, revised down from 37.39%
4. Community Bank of Nevada - 39.10%
5. Franklin Bank (TX) - up from #10 at 39.94%, revised down from 41.18%
6. Sherman County Bank (NE) - new to list, 40.06%
7. Horizon Bank (MN) - up from #8, 40.39%, revised down from 40.98%
8. First Bank of Beverly Hills (CA) - down from #6, 40.39%
9. Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast (FL) - new to list, 40.60%
10. Century Bank FSB (FL) - down from #5, 40.72%, revised up from 39.42%
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas (up from #6)
5. Minnesota (down from #4)
6. Utah (down from #5)
7. Missouri
8. Florida (up from #9)
9. Oregon (down from #8)
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.65%, up from 36.13%)
2. California (42.28, revised down from 42.43%)
3. Michigan, up from #4 (42.78%, revised down from 43.18%)
4. Colorado down from #3 (42.80, revised up from 42.76%)
5. Nevada (49.81, revised down from 50.13%)
6. Ohio (50.84. revised down from 50.91%)
7. Georgia (54.62%, revised down from 54.75%)
8. Utah (55.45%. revised up from 55.39%)
9. Washington, up from #10 (56.18%)
10. North Carolina, new to list (56.70%)
* * *
Due to the revisions, the FDIC did not spend as much money as we thought previously (it's complicated, don't ask). The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $257,160,000, and also revised upward. The value stands at $41,387,410,000.
Well, 158 FDIC press releases later, we've finished updating our information. We'll work on historical data (i.e. before the past two weeks) in the near future.
* * *
On 11/12/09, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: SolutionsBank, of Overland Park, KS; Valley Capital Bank, of Mesa AZ; and Republic Federal Bank, of Miami, FL. The total assets of the closed bank were $984,400,000, and total deposits were $815,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $257,160,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks were $558,140,000, or only 56.70% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.48% (unchanged from last report's revised recoverability of 57.48%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $54,557,170,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $530,012,680,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $359,189,520,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $304,632,350,000 (57.48% of the declared value).
* * *
The changes we made to our analysis (i.e. taking into account premiums/discounts which acquiring banks paid for failed banks' insured deposits) made a distinct difference. A difference of 0.08% - the difference between the revised recoverability (57.48%), and the unrevised (57.56%) - might not seem like much, but applied to the assets of all banks closed so far, the assets loose an additional $424 million in value. Isn't leverage a beautiful thing, dear Reader?
We don't have much to say about these three closures, however; the seem fairly average... which is probably a problem. We still feel in the FDIC is managing its closures to pick and choose its cost. A question occures to us as we write: does the FDIC pick their cost first, and then close the banks which fit within the cost they selected beforehand? Inquiring minds want to know.
* * *
Because of the revisions we made to our data, we are updating the Frugal Scotsman's Ten Nastiest Bank Closures To Date. Here are the Gruesome Tensome:
1. IndyMac (CA) - 22.99%
2. BankUnited FSB (FL) - 28.91%
3. First Bank of Idaho - 37.10%, revised down from 37.39%
4. Community Bank of Nevada - 39.10%
5. Franklin Bank (TX) - up from #10 at 39.94%, revised down from 41.18%
6. Sherman County Bank (NE) - new to list, 40.06%
7. Horizon Bank (MN) - up from #8, 40.39%, revised down from 40.98%
8. First Bank of Beverly Hills (CA) - down from #6, 40.39%
9. Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast (FL) - new to list, 40.60%
10. Century Bank FSB (FL) - down from #5, 40.72%, revised up from 39.42%
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas (up from #6)
5. Minnesota (down from #4)
6. Utah (down from #5)
7. Missouri
8. Florida (up from #9)
9. Oregon (down from #8)
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.65%, up from 36.13%)
2. California (42.28, revised down from 42.43%)
3. Michigan, up from #4 (42.78%, revised down from 43.18%)
4. Colorado down from #3 (42.80, revised up from 42.76%)
5. Nevada (49.81, revised down from 50.13%)
6. Ohio (50.84. revised down from 50.91%)
7. Georgia (54.62%, revised down from 54.75%)
8. Utah (55.45%. revised up from 55.39%)
9. Washington, up from #10 (56.18%)
10. North Carolina, new to list (56.70%)
* * *
Due to the revisions, the FDIC did not spend as much money as we thought previously (it's complicated, don't ask). The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $257,160,000, and also revised upward. The value stands at $41,387,410,000.
Housing Price Report for December
Our North American Housing Price Index registered a 6.46% drop from November, which likely would have been much deeper if we had not seen a sharp uptick on the top of the housing market. The drop from May - when we started the Index - is now 15.86%, representing a massive fall in the North American housing markets, and likely correlated by a similar drop in the valuation of bank mortgage portfolios. On an annualised basis the Index suggests the market is down 27.18%, a truly staggering loss.
That 27.18% drop strongly suggests the stimulus effect of the US Government's tax credit has worn off. Record low rates for conventional mortgages seem to be little help as few applicants qualify for the new, stringent requirements. All in all, we declare that the housing crash appears to have resumed.
Given the huge shadow inventory of foreclosed houses, the impending wave of Alt-A defaults, high unemployment, and falling income across the board, there is essentially no hope the housing market will find 'a bottom' any time in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the 8.9% rise in housing starts reported by Forbes will only add to the pain of existing housing stock, as new - and difficult to move - houses come into the market and further drive down already distressed property.
We expect the bottom, when it comes, will be shockingly low. We boldly predict a real price decline somewhere in the neighbourhood of 90% on average, peak to trough. In some places, such as Las Vegas, we expect a decline of 100% as the whole urban field there becomes indefensible. Attractive urban centres will fare the best, but it will be grim consolation.
Price declines may be obfuscated by inflation, if that should arrive. Given the devastation banking elites would suffer in a true deflation, we suspect the 'powers-that-be' will attempt to engineer a burst of high inflation to save the banks. On the other hand, such efforts may be unsuccessful, as it would be exceedingly difficult to discern the optimum amount of money-printing. As powerful as banking elites are, they may be sacrificed on the altar of the Almighty Dollar.
That 27.18% drop strongly suggests the stimulus effect of the US Government's tax credit has worn off. Record low rates for conventional mortgages seem to be little help as few applicants qualify for the new, stringent requirements. All in all, we declare that the housing crash appears to have resumed.
Given the huge shadow inventory of foreclosed houses, the impending wave of Alt-A defaults, high unemployment, and falling income across the board, there is essentially no hope the housing market will find 'a bottom' any time in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the 8.9% rise in housing starts reported by Forbes will only add to the pain of existing housing stock, as new - and difficult to move - houses come into the market and further drive down already distressed property.
We expect the bottom, when it comes, will be shockingly low. We boldly predict a real price decline somewhere in the neighbourhood of 90% on average, peak to trough. In some places, such as Las Vegas, we expect a decline of 100% as the whole urban field there becomes indefensible. Attractive urban centres will fare the best, but it will be grim consolation.
Price declines may be obfuscated by inflation, if that should arrive. Given the devastation banking elites would suffer in a true deflation, we suspect the 'powers-that-be' will attempt to engineer a burst of high inflation to save the banks. On the other hand, such efforts may be unsuccessful, as it would be exceedingly difficult to discern the optimum amount of money-printing. As powerful as banking elites are, they may be sacrificed on the altar of the Almighty Dollar.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
No Silver Lining
A perverse meme is circulating in the news media and blogosphere that some good can come out of house price declines, mortgage defaults, and mortgage restructurings.
Charles Hugh Smith discusses Why a 35% Decline in Housing Values Would Be Good for the Nation. Smith, an otherwise competent commentator, does state the obvious: people have been spending too much on housing and to spend less on that will help households and consequently, the economy in other areas. However he neglects to mention the enormous economic catastrophe that will result from having a huge part of the US National balance sheet permanently wiped out. The US financial sector, as healthy economic agents, cannot survive the permanent impairment of mortgage assets that would result. Bank equity - which forms the basis of banks ability to lend, and even just hold deposits, would be wiped out.
As a matter of fact, it is already wiped out de facto - the FDIC and other regulators just keep banks going in the hopes that a recovery in housing prices will make most of the mortgages legitimate investments again. A further decline to lasting low prices will make that charade simply the legitimisation of a zombie banking system a la Japan.
In a Wall Street Journal editorial on 'walking away' masquerading as an article, the author states:
If "shedding debts" means defaulting (as the article seems to imply), then citizens as taxpayers will feel the suck of money coming out of their wallets as Uncle Sam through the FDIC has to make depositors whole. And, as mentioned above, having a walking-dead banking system is not going to help recovery.
On the whole, the intellectual basis of the perspective of this 'article' is entirely flawed. We suspect it is simply another in a long series of efforts by the Ministry of Truth to put a positive spin on the ongoing havoc caused by the Depression.
Not that this flawed intellectual notion doesn't get the support of some heavy guns. Nobel-prize winning Joseph Stiglitz is quoted in Bloomberg as saying a new kind of bankruptcy needs to be created to let mortgage holders write down their mortgage to a market level and keep it! Either Mr. Stiglitz knows better and is dissembling, or he is the one suffering from bankruptcy - intellectual bankruptcy.
There is a serious moral hazard issue here. Dysfunctional economic units must be allowed to suffer the consequences of poor decisions. Stiglitz's proposal is yet another bailout - this time a bailout for credulous, housing-bubble participants on the borrowing side.
We do not approve of bailouts for housing-bubble participants on the lending side, either. But two wrongs do not make a right. The more poor decision-makers are coddled through bailouts, the more society at large is harmed by resources being diverted to the thieving, hapless and stupid; and the less resources are available to be used by the Intelligent who were wise enough not to get involved in the housing bubble, and who are truly the World's only hope of economic progress.
Charles Hugh Smith discusses Why a 35% Decline in Housing Values Would Be Good for the Nation. Smith, an otherwise competent commentator, does state the obvious: people have been spending too much on housing and to spend less on that will help households and consequently, the economy in other areas. However he neglects to mention the enormous economic catastrophe that will result from having a huge part of the US National balance sheet permanently wiped out. The US financial sector, as healthy economic agents, cannot survive the permanent impairment of mortgage assets that would result. Bank equity - which forms the basis of banks ability to lend, and even just hold deposits, would be wiped out.
As a matter of fact, it is already wiped out de facto - the FDIC and other regulators just keep banks going in the hopes that a recovery in housing prices will make most of the mortgages legitimate investments again. A further decline to lasting low prices will make that charade simply the legitimisation of a zombie banking system a la Japan.
In a Wall Street Journal editorial on 'walking away' masquerading as an article, the author states:
People's increasing willingness to abandon their own piece of America illustrates a paradoxical change wrought by the housing bust: Even as it tarnishes the near-sacred image of home ownership, it might be clearing the way for an economic recovery.and:
Unfortunately, less money flowing out of the pockets of consumers as debtors means less money flowing into the pockets of citizens as creditors (e.g. the proverbial little old ladies who rely on savings income). It is a bogus calculus which could in any way construe the process as 'healing'.For the 4.8 million U.S. households that data provider LPS Applied Analytics estimates haven't paid their mortgages in at least three months, the added cash flow could amount to about $5 billion a month -- an injection that in the long term could be worth more than the tax breaks in the Obama administration's economic-stimulus package.
"It's a stealth stimulus," says Christopher Thornberg of Beacon Economics, a consulting firm specializing in real estate and the California economy. "The quicker these people shed their debts, the faster the economy is going to heal and move forward again."
If "shedding debts" means defaulting (as the article seems to imply), then citizens as taxpayers will feel the suck of money coming out of their wallets as Uncle Sam through the FDIC has to make depositors whole. And, as mentioned above, having a walking-dead banking system is not going to help recovery.
On the whole, the intellectual basis of the perspective of this 'article' is entirely flawed. We suspect it is simply another in a long series of efforts by the Ministry of Truth to put a positive spin on the ongoing havoc caused by the Depression.
Not that this flawed intellectual notion doesn't get the support of some heavy guns. Nobel-prize winning Joseph Stiglitz is quoted in Bloomberg as saying a new kind of bankruptcy needs to be created to let mortgage holders write down their mortgage to a market level and keep it! Either Mr. Stiglitz knows better and is dissembling, or he is the one suffering from bankruptcy - intellectual bankruptcy.
There is a serious moral hazard issue here. Dysfunctional economic units must be allowed to suffer the consequences of poor decisions. Stiglitz's proposal is yet another bailout - this time a bailout for credulous, housing-bubble participants on the borrowing side.
We do not approve of bailouts for housing-bubble participants on the lending side, either. But two wrongs do not make a right. The more poor decision-makers are coddled through bailouts, the more society at large is harmed by resources being diverted to the thieving, hapless and stupid; and the less resources are available to be used by the Intelligent who were wise enough not to get involved in the housing bubble, and who are truly the World's only hope of economic progress.
Sunday, December 13, 2009
The Curse of Reverse Banking
Banking is the great octane booster of the engines of economy. It can make many people feel rich. Albert deposits $100 in the First National Bank. Bertrand borrows $100 from the First National Bank and deposits the funds in the Second National Bank. Clyde borrows $100 from the Second National Bank ... and so on ad infinitum. Everyone has $100 in their bank accounts at the same time! There is a lot more spendable funds now than if Albert had just kept his $100 under the mattress. A whole lot more. Whee!
This sort of dementia has been going on for a couple hundred years and has reached a fevered pitch in the last ten or so. How could this go on so long without it all crashing down like the house of cards that it is? That is the marvel of economic growth. As long as the economy, and consequently income, keeps growing in the aggregate, there will be plenty of funds to keep all those plates spinning.
When banking goes into reverse though, it is deadly. Sufficient losses on loans cause banks to become unprofitable. Unprofitable banks have to pull the loss out of their equity and shrink lending, because loans cannot exceed a regulated ratio of bank equity. Roughly $10 of lending has to be cut for every $1 of losses. When lending is cut, borrowers have to pay back loans (if they can) instead of rolling them over. When they can't pay the loans back, the banks have further losses, and must restrict lending even more.
It gets worse. When borrowers have to pay back loans they have to cut other spending. If their income is falling, this causes their spending to fall disproportionately. One person's spending is another's income, so income tends to fall. When income falls, debt becomes harder to pay back, and many borrowers default, causing more loan losses for banks, and more restrictions on lending.
Around and around this destruction goes, and where it stops nobody knows. The entire World's economy is wildly indebted. Households, businesses, and governments have never been so in debt as they are now. What goes up, must come down. The bottom could be shockingly low.
This sort of dementia has been going on for a couple hundred years and has reached a fevered pitch in the last ten or so. How could this go on so long without it all crashing down like the house of cards that it is? That is the marvel of economic growth. As long as the economy, and consequently income, keeps growing in the aggregate, there will be plenty of funds to keep all those plates spinning.
When banking goes into reverse though, it is deadly. Sufficient losses on loans cause banks to become unprofitable. Unprofitable banks have to pull the loss out of their equity and shrink lending, because loans cannot exceed a regulated ratio of bank equity. Roughly $10 of lending has to be cut for every $1 of losses. When lending is cut, borrowers have to pay back loans (if they can) instead of rolling them over. When they can't pay the loans back, the banks have further losses, and must restrict lending even more.
It gets worse. When borrowers have to pay back loans they have to cut other spending. If their income is falling, this causes their spending to fall disproportionately. One person's spending is another's income, so income tends to fall. When income falls, debt becomes harder to pay back, and many borrowers default, causing more loan losses for banks, and more restrictions on lending.
Around and around this destruction goes, and where it stops nobody knows. The entire World's economy is wildly indebted. Households, businesses, and governments have never been so in debt as they are now. What goes up, must come down. The bottom could be shockingly low.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Changes to FDIC Report
We're going to be late on publishing the latest FDIC Bank Failure Report, because we need to again retool our data. It seems that the FDIC has been getting bidding wars started over the deposits of some of the banks it closes, as demonstrated by premiums which acquiring banks are willing to pay to get the failed bank's deposits.
We presume that the FDIC counts that premium against the outlay from the DIF, thus reducing the apparent cost-to-DIF. It seems overall these premiums amount to a fairly large chunk of change. We will be adding those premiums back into the total cost-to-DIF in our analysis, which will likely result in a more accurate picture of total recoverable value of the U.S. banking system.
We presume that the FDIC counts that premium against the outlay from the DIF, thus reducing the apparent cost-to-DIF. It seems overall these premiums amount to a fairly large chunk of change. We will be adding those premiums back into the total cost-to-DIF in our analysis, which will likely result in a more accurate picture of total recoverable value of the U.S. banking system.
US Households: Unhappy Speculators
The economist Hyman Minsky divided financing techniques into three categories: Ponzi finance - where principal and interest on debt cannot be paid out of earnings but only ever more borrowing; Speculative finance - where interest on debt can be paid out of earnings but principal must be rolled over; and Hedge finance where both principal and interest on debt can be paid out of earnings.
From 1952 to 2007 the ratio of debt to income for US households rose from about .35 (hedge financing) to about 1.3 (speculative financing). Even two years into the Depression, the ratio has only declined a bit.
In times of economic contraction - especially when a major asset bubble bursts (i.e., housing), speculative financing units run into two significant problems. Routine debt service becomes more burdensome, and more critically, the ability to refinance becomes often impossibly difficult.
Consider the case of otherwise solvent households with exotic interest-only mortgages with impending punitive resets. The reset payments are unsupportable, and yet there is typically no way to roll the mortgage into a conventional mortgage as the value of the collateral is typically less than the mortgage balance. The underwater position also almost always prevents a sale to terminate the mortgage since that will require bringing too much money to the table.
Barring a sudden and extremely improbable surge in house values, these households will be ruined by the trap. Even many households with fixed rate mortgages will find those unsupportable in the face of income loss, and have no non-bankrupting exit strategy due to their underwater position. Another trap is facing households with sudden rate hikes on large credit card balances.
The distribution of the pain of the speculative unwind will not fall evenly on US households. A substantial number - perhaps 1/4 - have little to no debt and at least adequate resources. Another substantial number - also perhaps 1/4 - have no debt because of too-low income and too-few resources.
This puts the burden of the pain squarely on the roughly 1/2 who have substantial debts. We suspect that most of these households' net worth will be wiped out, creating ever more cascading failure throughout the economy. The end state will be a poorer USA, but one where debt revulsion is so strong, households will once again be Hedge financial units.
From 1952 to 2007 the ratio of debt to income for US households rose from about .35 (hedge financing) to about 1.3 (speculative financing). Even two years into the Depression, the ratio has only declined a bit.
In times of economic contraction - especially when a major asset bubble bursts (i.e., housing), speculative financing units run into two significant problems. Routine debt service becomes more burdensome, and more critically, the ability to refinance becomes often impossibly difficult.
Consider the case of otherwise solvent households with exotic interest-only mortgages with impending punitive resets. The reset payments are unsupportable, and yet there is typically no way to roll the mortgage into a conventional mortgage as the value of the collateral is typically less than the mortgage balance. The underwater position also almost always prevents a sale to terminate the mortgage since that will require bringing too much money to the table.
Barring a sudden and extremely improbable surge in house values, these households will be ruined by the trap. Even many households with fixed rate mortgages will find those unsupportable in the face of income loss, and have no non-bankrupting exit strategy due to their underwater position. Another trap is facing households with sudden rate hikes on large credit card balances.
The distribution of the pain of the speculative unwind will not fall evenly on US households. A substantial number - perhaps 1/4 - have little to no debt and at least adequate resources. Another substantial number - also perhaps 1/4 - have no debt because of too-low income and too-few resources.
This puts the burden of the pain squarely on the roughly 1/2 who have substantial debts. We suspect that most of these households' net worth will be wiped out, creating ever more cascading failure throughout the economy. The end state will be a poorer USA, but one where debt revulsion is so strong, households will once again be Hedge financial units.
Friday, December 11, 2009
The Real Deal
A recent letter to SurvivalBlog.com shows that at least one person out there has his or her head screwed on mostly right. The conclusions, unfortunately as is typical on that site, run toward the 'get your guns' mentality. However, the honest and intelligent observations are worth quoting at length.
As for having a car, our addition would be that you may find yourself needing to set up a living situation that doesn't require you to own a car - either sharing a car with a relative or friend, or walking and/or using public transit.
As these strategies for downward mobility become increasingly utilised, they will cause GDP to decline. Not only will demand for goods and services shrink, but the informal market (yard sales, thrift stores, eBay, etc.) will become flooded with cheap, liquidated stuff. We expect this strategy to be employed eventually by a majority of the population as the Depression runs its course and cascading failure undermines the economic system.
We find it a sad commentary on the state of 'the Press' that such an honest report can only be found in a 'fringe blog' and beyond that, as a letter. The Ministry of Truth does seem to have a lockdown on the situation. Telling information can be found, however, if you look for it. According to a recent Gallup poll, November year-over-year consumer spending is down 20%. This is a knock-your-socks-off, the-economy-is-in-a-Depression-folks number if there ever was one. The report qualifies its information as "self-reported" but even so, it seems a heck of lot more reliable to us than the bogus recovery spiel coming out of the Ministry of Truth.
Pathetically, the Gallup commentary states: "On a national level, the spending new normal suggests slower economic growth than otherwise might be expected in the years ahead." Let's take a look at 'economic growth' in the USA at present.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the growth rate is 2.8% in the third quarter of 2009. Consumer spending allegedly increased 2.9%. In order for the approximately -25% gleaned from Gallup data and the official +2.9% to reconcile, households would have to wildly increase their spending for housing (hard to do in the face of lower rents, skipped mortgage payments, and household formation gone into reverse), professional services (bankruptcy lawyers, anyone?), and so forth. Frankly, we don't think such a reconciliation is possible, and we smell a R-A-T.
The economy has taken a dramatic turn for the worse for many Americans. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe how it happened and who did it. While many individuals and households have had the financial resources and good fortune which will allow them to weather economic uncertainty, many will simply not be able to maintain their standard of living. Many two income households are now one income households and that income may have decreased due to companies cutting back on work hours. This situation has been occurring for many Americans for many many months, forcing people to assess what is important and downgrade their lifestyle. The time to make hard decisions has arrived, and will dramatically alter the lives of many for years.We have a few comments to make on these observations. First, in light of how little access to emergency funds American (among other) households have as mentioned in yesterday's post, deferring maintenance on houses and cars is a species of financial brinkmanship that will not only require "costlier repairs down the road," but quite possibly become the 'straw that breaks the camel's back' of the impaired household finances.People who relied on spouses to pay the bills are now paying the bills. Those who have relied on savings and unemployment benefits to maintain their standard of living are now faced with the reality that those resources are exhausted. Bills are not being paid. Healthcare premiums are not being paid. Automobile and household maintenance is being neglected which will create costlier repairs down the road. Simply put:
- You might have to stop making your car payment and save those payments up to buy a used car. The car you currently have financed will be repossessed.
- You might have to stop paying your mortgage and save those payments up to move into an apartment.
- You might have to give up your healthcare, your magazine subscription, your club membership, your vacation plans, your charitable donations, your cell phone, your internet access or home phone service, your lawn care service, your financial support that you provide to friends and family who are having financial problems themselves, and many more expenditures not listed here.
- You might have to contact an attorney to discuss bankruptcy.
- You might have to sell off your possessions and assets.
- You might have to move in with other families, friends, relatives, or shelters provided by the government or charitable organizations.
- You may come to realize that what you thought was valuable and important to you has no value or significance at all.
Basic human needs will become the biggest priority in your life after you shed the things that have merely brought comfort and convenience to you. You may be forced to downscale your lifestyle so dramatically that it will cause you to question your own intelligence and hindsight for not planning for such a life changing event.
As for having a car, our addition would be that you may find yourself needing to set up a living situation that doesn't require you to own a car - either sharing a car with a relative or friend, or walking and/or using public transit.
As these strategies for downward mobility become increasingly utilised, they will cause GDP to decline. Not only will demand for goods and services shrink, but the informal market (yard sales, thrift stores, eBay, etc.) will become flooded with cheap, liquidated stuff. We expect this strategy to be employed eventually by a majority of the population as the Depression runs its course and cascading failure undermines the economic system.
We find it a sad commentary on the state of 'the Press' that such an honest report can only be found in a 'fringe blog' and beyond that, as a letter. The Ministry of Truth does seem to have a lockdown on the situation. Telling information can be found, however, if you look for it. According to a recent Gallup poll, November year-over-year consumer spending is down 20%. This is a knock-your-socks-off, the-economy-is-in-a-Depression-folks number if there ever was one. The report qualifies its information as "self-reported" but even so, it seems a heck of lot more reliable to us than the bogus recovery spiel coming out of the Ministry of Truth.
Pathetically, the Gallup commentary states: "On a national level, the spending new normal suggests slower economic growth than otherwise might be expected in the years ahead." Let's take a look at 'economic growth' in the USA at present.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the growth rate is 2.8% in the third quarter of 2009. Consumer spending allegedly increased 2.9%. In order for the approximately -25% gleaned from Gallup data and the official +2.9% to reconcile, households would have to wildly increase their spending for housing (hard to do in the face of lower rents, skipped mortgage payments, and household formation gone into reverse), professional services (bankruptcy lawyers, anyone?), and so forth. Frankly, we don't think such a reconciliation is possible, and we smell a R-A-T.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Households at the Edge
According to a recent survey, many people would find it impossible to raise just $2000 in 30 days from any source - savings, credit, family, friends, etc. - in a pinch. The table below is extracted from the article, which is well worth reading.
The results are shocking to say the least, especially for the USA - supposedly the "richest country in the world." $2000 is not a lot of money when one aspires to a middle-class lifestyle; it could represent the cost of car repair, a home repair, a minor medical problem, and so forth.
These sorts of things crop up continually.
Mexico is no great surprise, but the fact that the UK, Germany, and the USA (all supposed major economic powers) rate worse than Argentina - a country with serious issues in its struggle to remain prosperous and civilised - should be cause for concern. This survey, if accurate, indicates that not only are half of UK, German, and US households there essentially broke, but most of the other half is so frayed financially they are in no position to help out poorer friends and relations; or perhaps simply socially support networks have collapsed. In either case (and both could be true) the situation is terrible.
This is not the sort of economic information we would like to see near the beginning of this Depression - and yes, we are still early on in this thing. Faced with falling income and no standby resources to fall back on, it is clear that more and more supposedly 'middle class' households are going to sink into financial ruin merely from routine financial stresses.
Our advice to our readers is simple: make sure you are living well below your means; that your net worth is rising and not falling; that you have ample financial resources (savings, lines of credit, willing friends or family) to draw upon should the need arise. This is serious stuff - it may require you to drop many of the trappings of middle class life in order to prevent ruin.
There are ample horror stories out there about people who discovered 'middle class poverty' by not changing their spending habits in the face of income loss. Typically they expect "something is going to happen" to fix their deteriorating situation: a new job; selling the house; etc. But that "something" never happens.
More and more, what were for many once reasonable expectations - say, getting a full-time job - are going to be as likely as having a winning lottery ticket. In a nutshell, this is why getting through the Depression is going to be about survival. Don't delude yourself; ignore the blather on the telly; get real about what is happening.
The results are shocking to say the least, especially for the USA - supposedly the "richest country in the world." $2000 is not a lot of money when one aspires to a middle-class lifestyle; it could represent the cost of car repair, a home repair, a minor medical problem, and so forth.
These sorts of things crop up continually.
Mexico is no great surprise, but the fact that the UK, Germany, and the USA (all supposed major economic powers) rate worse than Argentina - a country with serious issues in its struggle to remain prosperous and civilised - should be cause for concern. This survey, if accurate, indicates that not only are half of UK, German, and US households there essentially broke, but most of the other half is so frayed financially they are in no position to help out poorer friends and relations; or perhaps simply socially support networks have collapsed. In either case (and both could be true) the situation is terrible.
This is not the sort of economic information we would like to see near the beginning of this Depression - and yes, we are still early on in this thing. Faced with falling income and no standby resources to fall back on, it is clear that more and more supposedly 'middle class' households are going to sink into financial ruin merely from routine financial stresses.
Our advice to our readers is simple: make sure you are living well below your means; that your net worth is rising and not falling; that you have ample financial resources (savings, lines of credit, willing friends or family) to draw upon should the need arise. This is serious stuff - it may require you to drop many of the trappings of middle class life in order to prevent ruin.
There are ample horror stories out there about people who discovered 'middle class poverty' by not changing their spending habits in the face of income loss. Typically they expect "something is going to happen" to fix their deteriorating situation: a new job; selling the house; etc. But that "something" never happens.
More and more, what were for many once reasonable expectations - say, getting a full-time job - are going to be as likely as having a winning lottery ticket. In a nutshell, this is why getting through the Depression is going to be about survival. Don't delude yourself; ignore the blather on the telly; get real about what is happening.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Insanely Late Edition
This past weekend, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed six banks: Buckhead Community Bank of Atlanta, Georgia; First Security Bank of Norcross, Georgia; Tattnall Bank of Reidsville, Georgia; AmTrust Bank of Cleveland, Ohio; Benchmark Bank of Aurora, Illinois; and Greater Atlantic Bank of Reston, Virginia. The total assets of the closed bank were $13,424,600,000, and total deposits were $9,368,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $2,386,400,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks were $6,981,900,000, or only 52.01% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.56% (down from last report's 57.70%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $53,886,900,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $529,028,280,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $358,374,220,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $304,487,320,000 (57.56% of the declared value).
* * *
As if to make up for the prior two weeks, the FDIC went to town. Following its usual pattern, it muted the failure of a moderately large regional bank - AmTrust - by closing it along with several smaller banks. AmTrust was a particularly sad case with a recoverable value according to our method of only 50% of assets. It had been on a death watch for over a year having received a cease-and-desist order from the Office of Thrift Supervision in the fall of 2008. One wonders how much extra the FDIC's dithering cost the Deposit Insurance Fund.
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri
8. Oregon
9. Florida
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.13%)
2. California (42.43%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Ohio (50.91%) - new to the list due to now having two closures
7. Georgia (54.75% up from 53.79%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
* * *
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $2,386,400,000. The value stands at $41,600,600,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks were $6,981,900,000, or only 52.01% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.56% (down from last report's 57.70%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $53,886,900,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $529,028,280,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $358,374,220,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $304,487,320,000 (57.56% of the declared value).
* * *
As if to make up for the prior two weeks, the FDIC went to town. Following its usual pattern, it muted the failure of a moderately large regional bank - AmTrust - by closing it along with several smaller banks. AmTrust was a particularly sad case with a recoverable value according to our method of only 50% of assets. It had been on a death watch for over a year having received a cease-and-desist order from the Office of Thrift Supervision in the fall of 2008. One wonders how much extra the FDIC's dithering cost the Deposit Insurance Fund.
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri
8. Oregon
9. Florida
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.13%)
2. California (42.43%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Ohio (50.91%) - new to the list due to now having two closures
7. Georgia (54.75% up from 53.79%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
* * *
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $2,386,400,000. The value stands at $41,600,600,000.
Monday, November 30, 2009
The Dubai Gambit
Although we just wrote about Dubai and its impressive level of debt - not to mention its impressive malinvestment of its resources - the Emirate has made a manoeuvre which we didn't even think of: declaring the debt of Dubai World not backed by government guarantee. From the BBC:
A thought arises from the move, which we give the same title as this post: the Dubai Gambit. We'll put it in the general terms for starters. A nation's Government spawns this enterprise (we'll use the U.S. term of Government-Sponsored Enterprise, or GSE, with apologies for such Amero-centrism), and lets it just toddle along, doing its thing. As a GSE, it would seem to investors that the GSE enjoys an implicit Government guarantee; the Government made it, so why wouldn't it keep it going if times were tough? So, investors cheerfully pile into the debt of this GSE, because from their perspective it's just as good of debt as sovereign debt.
But surprise! It doesn't say anything anywhere in the GSE's charter (or what have you) about a Government guarantee. That means the Government, at its fickle discretion, can either help out the GSE in times of trouble, or not. The average investor, being apparently rather dim-witted when it came to reading fine print, was speculating much harder than he or she thought; the money he or she plopped down for the GSE's debt might never come home from the front lines of the Free Market. It's a messy place, we hear, and casualties can be heavy.
Bad times come along, and the GSE gets into some serious trouble. Investors start thinking "Boy, I be sure glad that thar GSE's got some sort of gum'ment guarantee or some such. I's real smaaart," and patiently sit on the deck of their double-wide trailer waiting for the cheque from the Government to make them whole. Grandma Kettle's rocking chair creaks as she loads up the shotgun to take aim at a stray dog; the hole in the roof gets a little bigger; no Government cheque comes in.
That's because the Dubai Gambit was brought into play; the Government decided the GSE was not, in fact, going to enjoy a bailout. In the real world, this would probably happen when such a GSE was in such horrible shape, that the Government would have risked its own credit rating to support the malinvestment of the investors, and the GSE's own malinvestments. GSE debt goes from being 'as good as Government' to 'someone has to do something about this!' overnight, as the bonds go belly-up. Investors are left footing the bill for someone else's good time, and the Government comes out, theoretically, smelling like a rose, at least to the credit markets.
As this meltdown of the GSE is underway, the Government finally steps in, but not in the way the investors were expected. Instead of providing a backstop for the full value of the GSE debt, the Government starts Agency X, with the explicit goal of winding down the GSE's debt. With a pre-packaged bankruptcy agreement - and a sufficiently... agreeable... court system - Agency X gets to cherry-pick the good assets of the GSE, and leave the GSE with all of its liabilities. Investors in the failed GSE would get Agency bonds worth pennies on the dollar of their original GSE debt, and the Government gets to have at least something for its efforts.
We fully expect Dubai to do this manoeuvre, or at least something like it. If it seems far-fetched to you, dear Reader, please consider the shenanigans surrounding the General Motors bankruptcy fiasco in the United States. The 'old' GM went into bankruptcy, gave its few good assets to the 'new' GM (owned by the U.S. Government, the Crown in Right of Canada, and a few other favoured parties), and then left its legacy of toxic waste dumps (or, 'factories,' as they are charmingly misnomered) and other such massive liabilities upone the shoulders of now wiped-out investors; the 'new' GM is in the clear. This, in civilised countries, is typically considered unlawful conveyance, but since the Federal Government was involved, such trivialities were easily brushed aside.
The Dubai Gambit is, at its core, entirely designed to have the Government - any Government - protect its credit rating at all costs. Dubai seems to be very much conscious of that factor, as why else would the Emirate have explicitly withdrew any implicit Government guarantee? Dubai World et al. is a mess financially, and it would probably bring down the Government if it tried to back the enterprise's debt for its full value. At pennies on the dollar, as it were, Dubai might be able to convince the UAE central bank, or Abu Dhabi, to bankroll a resolution of the fiasco; Dubai keeps its sovereign credit rating, the UAE and Abu Dhabi look like heroes, and investors in Dubai World don't feel quite as raped as they otherwise would have.
The question is, if Dubai makes this Gambit work, and to paraphrase Tom Lehrer, who's next?
"[Creditors] think Dubai World is part of the government, which is not correct," said finance minister Abdulrahman al-Saleh. "Creditors need to take part of the responsibility for their decision to lend to the companies."Clever, very clever; it seems to us that Dubai is looking to have its cake and eat it too, after a manner of speaking. They got their theme parks and little islands, and now the investors can go stick it wherever they'd prefer the pain. And if those investors attempt to foreclose on the assets of Dubai World, they just might run into the little problem that said parks and islands are property of the Dubai government, or perhaps the Abu Dhabi government; in other words, foreclosure is not happening, because we really don't think an UAE court would care to strip a sovereign government of its assets. Certainly not for foreigners, and the latest incident with the Swiss banning minarets will likely not help the situation.
A thought arises from the move, which we give the same title as this post: the Dubai Gambit. We'll put it in the general terms for starters. A nation's Government spawns this enterprise (we'll use the U.S. term of Government-Sponsored Enterprise, or GSE, with apologies for such Amero-centrism), and lets it just toddle along, doing its thing. As a GSE, it would seem to investors that the GSE enjoys an implicit Government guarantee; the Government made it, so why wouldn't it keep it going if times were tough? So, investors cheerfully pile into the debt of this GSE, because from their perspective it's just as good of debt as sovereign debt.
But surprise! It doesn't say anything anywhere in the GSE's charter (or what have you) about a Government guarantee. That means the Government, at its fickle discretion, can either help out the GSE in times of trouble, or not. The average investor, being apparently rather dim-witted when it came to reading fine print, was speculating much harder than he or she thought; the money he or she plopped down for the GSE's debt might never come home from the front lines of the Free Market. It's a messy place, we hear, and casualties can be heavy.
Bad times come along, and the GSE gets into some serious trouble. Investors start thinking "Boy, I be sure glad that thar GSE's got some sort of gum'ment guarantee or some such. I's real smaaart," and patiently sit on the deck of their double-wide trailer waiting for the cheque from the Government to make them whole. Grandma Kettle's rocking chair creaks as she loads up the shotgun to take aim at a stray dog; the hole in the roof gets a little bigger; no Government cheque comes in.
That's because the Dubai Gambit was brought into play; the Government decided the GSE was not, in fact, going to enjoy a bailout. In the real world, this would probably happen when such a GSE was in such horrible shape, that the Government would have risked its own credit rating to support the malinvestment of the investors, and the GSE's own malinvestments. GSE debt goes from being 'as good as Government' to 'someone has to do something about this!' overnight, as the bonds go belly-up. Investors are left footing the bill for someone else's good time, and the Government comes out, theoretically, smelling like a rose, at least to the credit markets.
As this meltdown of the GSE is underway, the Government finally steps in, but not in the way the investors were expected. Instead of providing a backstop for the full value of the GSE debt, the Government starts Agency X, with the explicit goal of winding down the GSE's debt. With a pre-packaged bankruptcy agreement - and a sufficiently... agreeable... court system - Agency X gets to cherry-pick the good assets of the GSE, and leave the GSE with all of its liabilities. Investors in the failed GSE would get Agency bonds worth pennies on the dollar of their original GSE debt, and the Government gets to have at least something for its efforts.
We fully expect Dubai to do this manoeuvre, or at least something like it. If it seems far-fetched to you, dear Reader, please consider the shenanigans surrounding the General Motors bankruptcy fiasco in the United States. The 'old' GM went into bankruptcy, gave its few good assets to the 'new' GM (owned by the U.S. Government, the Crown in Right of Canada, and a few other favoured parties), and then left its legacy of toxic waste dumps (or, 'factories,' as they are charmingly misnomered) and other such massive liabilities upone the shoulders of now wiped-out investors; the 'new' GM is in the clear. This, in civilised countries, is typically considered unlawful conveyance, but since the Federal Government was involved, such trivialities were easily brushed aside.
The Dubai Gambit is, at its core, entirely designed to have the Government - any Government - protect its credit rating at all costs. Dubai seems to be very much conscious of that factor, as why else would the Emirate have explicitly withdrew any implicit Government guarantee? Dubai World et al. is a mess financially, and it would probably bring down the Government if it tried to back the enterprise's debt for its full value. At pennies on the dollar, as it were, Dubai might be able to convince the UAE central bank, or Abu Dhabi, to bankroll a resolution of the fiasco; Dubai keeps its sovereign credit rating, the UAE and Abu Dhabi look like heroes, and investors in Dubai World don't feel quite as raped as they otherwise would have.
The question is, if Dubai makes this Gambit work, and to paraphrase Tom Lehrer, who's next?
Some changes to the Gazette
The noble experiment of this blog is now over a year old, and so we felt it time to do a little rearranging of the format. We found, as time went on, that managing four blogs was just too much effort, so we've dropped the Curmudgeon Report, the Silver Money Report, and Stylishly Cheap Living. The posts of these three old blogs will be rolled into the Archives of the Depression Gazette.
Simply put, a little freshening up. Have no fear, you can continue to expect the same quality commentary we've been cranking out over the past year!
Simply put, a little freshening up. Have no fear, you can continue to expect the same quality commentary we've been cranking out over the past year!
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Windfalls and the Collapse of Dubai
The post didn't come out right when first posted. Paragraphs have been corrected, with apologies.
* * *
It seems that the banking system of the United States got all better for the Thanksgiving holiday, because the FDIC did not close a single bank. Frankly, we wonder how the FDIC has managed to keep its reputation as high as it is, because this sort of politicisation is completely outrageous. As we understand it, the FDIC is tasked with protecting depositors of banks, not gauging the public mood for whether or not it should protect said depositors. This inaction is completely outrageous, in our humble opinion; we wish others were outraged, too. It does not make us feel confident that our banks aren't complete trash-heaps, and we wonder just how safe “[every] single penny of deposits” really is.
But at any rate, let us turn to world events. Dubai, we read, totters on the brink of default, and the rest of the world begins to panic about all the debt from the best skiing land the far side of the Rub' al Khali. Those little private islands aren't looking so hot as investments right about now, we'd hazard to guess; although, if we'd be permitted to moralise for a moment, they seem to us to be the logical conclusion of the insanity of suburban development. We honestly can think of nothing more ridiculously 'exclusive' than one's own, artificial island. The situation with Dubai is an interesting one, from a malinvestment point of view.
Let us be honest here: we fully expect anyone and everyone who invested in Dubai's madness will end up losing every single penny they ever invested. It will probably be a very fascinating blow-out to watch, but we'd like to take a look at how, exactly, this malinvestment probably came about. We are supporters of the notion of Peak Oil; i.e. the idea that the economically-extractable amount of oil in the world is finite, and will result in a permanent decrease in the availability of a potent energy source to fuel human economies. This is not a popular view, as we're sure you are aware; in fact, to even breath the words 'peak oil' in a sentence, and not immediately ridicule the concept as lunacy and defeatism, is to give suspect to one's character.
The popular discourse, as we understand it, is either permanently-increasing availability of cheap oil, or the latest stupidity called 'plateauing,' where oil reaches a level of production which can be maintained indefinitely. If it is taken as given that oil will never run out, then Dubai seems like a great investment, because the Emirate would forever become richer and richer; better invest now, before it gets even more expensive!
No one, it seems, stopped to question this notion of infinite oil before they leveraged themselves to the hilt to invest in Dubai. If, indeed, oil has peaked, which we believe it has, Dubai is probably going to be getting permanently poorer, at least in the long run. Hence, the grand malinvestment in Dubai, Dubai World, et al.
Dubai's madness – for really, what else could it be called, other than wilful insanity? – was facilitated by its endowment of oil. We'd like to present that oil as a windfall, for conceptual purposes; it was a one-time shot at something, granted by a quirk of geology and human development to the Emirate. They took that windfall and blew it on skiing in the desert and artificial islands shaped like palm trees; a grand gesture, we think, to the stupidity of humanity.
Norway, on the other hand, took their oil windfall and tried to use it for better purposes. As we understand it, they tried to use the vast wealth which came from the one-time exploitation of their oil to improve the quality of life for all Norwegians; something that Dubai has not done, and will never do. Quality of life in Norway will, we think, continue to be quite high, long after Dubai is perhaps consumed by sandstorms, or at least reduced to a ruin of its former self. The differences, we posit, between wise investment of a windfall, and a windfall-driven orgy of conspicuous consumption, will probably not be better evidenced than by these two nations.
The collapse of Dubai will likely serve as a model for future national collapses in the 2007 Depression. Those nations which have a windfall, and have already blown it, are probably going to go the way Dubai goes; namely, somewhere very dark and scary. It should serve as a stern warning to those nations which still have a windfall they're in the process of blowing, because it's not too late to change course. Smart investment of resource windfalls, such as oil, will be increasingly paramount in the future.
In this category, we're thinking of the resource-heavies of the world, and not the silly notion of BRIC which is presently flying around (Brasil, Russia, India, China); India and China, in our opinion, are going to blow out along the lines of Dubai. Instead, we'd like to present our pet notion of CARB: Canada, Australia, Russia, and Brasil. These four nations apparently enjoy fairly large resource endowments, which have not yet been economically exterminated; if husbanded, life in the 2007 Depression might not be quite so bad in CARB, as opposed to, say, Dubai.
The concept of CARB is one which we would prefer to address in a separate post, to avoid accusations of wind-baggery. Instead, and in closing, we'd like to point out the nation which has blown its resource windfall far more than Dubai could ever hope to accomplish.
Go on, guess. We dare you.
The New World was beyond a shot in the arm to the European economy, when it first began colonising the new continents; it was like speed, angel dust, crack, LSD, and crystal meth all rolled into one, injected directly into the brain. But before that granddaddy of all economic stimulus could be used for the benefit of European colonial powers, the United States came along and had the indecency to clam a vast swath of the New World for its own. From there, it proceeded to burn through the incredible, mind-boggling amount of wealth which was to be had, to build... umm... wait, we know this one. Oh yeah, suburbia, and the most expensive military the world has ever seen. Right, sorry.
Simply put, however bad Dubai will become, we will not be the least bit surprised if the U.S. ends up being far, far worse. It had a much bigger windfall, which it blew over about two hundred years and far too many pointless wars. The era of Warren Buffet's 'never bet against America,' we posit, is over. There is money to be made shorting the U.S. and investing elsewhere, not the other way around.
* * *
It seems that the banking system of the United States got all better for the Thanksgiving holiday, because the FDIC did not close a single bank. Frankly, we wonder how the FDIC has managed to keep its reputation as high as it is, because this sort of politicisation is completely outrageous. As we understand it, the FDIC is tasked with protecting depositors of banks, not gauging the public mood for whether or not it should protect said depositors. This inaction is completely outrageous, in our humble opinion; we wish others were outraged, too. It does not make us feel confident that our banks aren't complete trash-heaps, and we wonder just how safe “[every] single penny of deposits” really is.
But at any rate, let us turn to world events. Dubai, we read, totters on the brink of default, and the rest of the world begins to panic about all the debt from the best skiing land the far side of the Rub' al Khali. Those little private islands aren't looking so hot as investments right about now, we'd hazard to guess; although, if we'd be permitted to moralise for a moment, they seem to us to be the logical conclusion of the insanity of suburban development. We honestly can think of nothing more ridiculously 'exclusive' than one's own, artificial island. The situation with Dubai is an interesting one, from a malinvestment point of view.
Let us be honest here: we fully expect anyone and everyone who invested in Dubai's madness will end up losing every single penny they ever invested. It will probably be a very fascinating blow-out to watch, but we'd like to take a look at how, exactly, this malinvestment probably came about. We are supporters of the notion of Peak Oil; i.e. the idea that the economically-extractable amount of oil in the world is finite, and will result in a permanent decrease in the availability of a potent energy source to fuel human economies. This is not a popular view, as we're sure you are aware; in fact, to even breath the words 'peak oil' in a sentence, and not immediately ridicule the concept as lunacy and defeatism, is to give suspect to one's character.
The popular discourse, as we understand it, is either permanently-increasing availability of cheap oil, or the latest stupidity called 'plateauing,' where oil reaches a level of production which can be maintained indefinitely. If it is taken as given that oil will never run out, then Dubai seems like a great investment, because the Emirate would forever become richer and richer; better invest now, before it gets even more expensive!
No one, it seems, stopped to question this notion of infinite oil before they leveraged themselves to the hilt to invest in Dubai. If, indeed, oil has peaked, which we believe it has, Dubai is probably going to be getting permanently poorer, at least in the long run. Hence, the grand malinvestment in Dubai, Dubai World, et al.
Dubai's madness – for really, what else could it be called, other than wilful insanity? – was facilitated by its endowment of oil. We'd like to present that oil as a windfall, for conceptual purposes; it was a one-time shot at something, granted by a quirk of geology and human development to the Emirate. They took that windfall and blew it on skiing in the desert and artificial islands shaped like palm trees; a grand gesture, we think, to the stupidity of humanity.
Norway, on the other hand, took their oil windfall and tried to use it for better purposes. As we understand it, they tried to use the vast wealth which came from the one-time exploitation of their oil to improve the quality of life for all Norwegians; something that Dubai has not done, and will never do. Quality of life in Norway will, we think, continue to be quite high, long after Dubai is perhaps consumed by sandstorms, or at least reduced to a ruin of its former self. The differences, we posit, between wise investment of a windfall, and a windfall-driven orgy of conspicuous consumption, will probably not be better evidenced than by these two nations.
The collapse of Dubai will likely serve as a model for future national collapses in the 2007 Depression. Those nations which have a windfall, and have already blown it, are probably going to go the way Dubai goes; namely, somewhere very dark and scary. It should serve as a stern warning to those nations which still have a windfall they're in the process of blowing, because it's not too late to change course. Smart investment of resource windfalls, such as oil, will be increasingly paramount in the future.
In this category, we're thinking of the resource-heavies of the world, and not the silly notion of BRIC which is presently flying around (Brasil, Russia, India, China); India and China, in our opinion, are going to blow out along the lines of Dubai. Instead, we'd like to present our pet notion of CARB: Canada, Australia, Russia, and Brasil. These four nations apparently enjoy fairly large resource endowments, which have not yet been economically exterminated; if husbanded, life in the 2007 Depression might not be quite so bad in CARB, as opposed to, say, Dubai.
The concept of CARB is one which we would prefer to address in a separate post, to avoid accusations of wind-baggery. Instead, and in closing, we'd like to point out the nation which has blown its resource windfall far more than Dubai could ever hope to accomplish.
Go on, guess. We dare you.
The New World was beyond a shot in the arm to the European economy, when it first began colonising the new continents; it was like speed, angel dust, crack, LSD, and crystal meth all rolled into one, injected directly into the brain. But before that granddaddy of all economic stimulus could be used for the benefit of European colonial powers, the United States came along and had the indecency to clam a vast swath of the New World for its own. From there, it proceeded to burn through the incredible, mind-boggling amount of wealth which was to be had, to build... umm... wait, we know this one. Oh yeah, suburbia, and the most expensive military the world has ever seen. Right, sorry.
Simply put, however bad Dubai will become, we will not be the least bit surprised if the U.S. ends up being far, far worse. It had a much bigger windfall, which it blew over about two hundred years and far too many pointless wars. The era of Warren Buffet's 'never bet against America,' we posit, is over. There is money to be made shorting the U.S. and investing elsewhere, not the other way around.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
House Prices, Property Taxes, and Rent
Today we present a case study of a sleepy little town on the Pacific Coast of North America somewhere between Powell River and Portland. We have changed the name to Prosperity Harbour to protect the innocent. This town is fairly average; its heyday being some decades in the past.
Being an older place, the houses tend to be on the small side with plenty of cottages, each having less than 1000 square feet of floor space. As of today, the asking price on these little, older cottages ranges from $90,000 to $180,000. Prices have only sagged a bit since the onset of the Depression thanks to generous mortgage programmes from the Government.
Property taxes here are modest, averaging about 1% annually of the market value of the houses. Rents in Prosperity Harbour are low for a place on the West Coast. A typical two bedroom house rents for $600 per month.
The gross rental yields tend to range from 5 to 6%. After allowing 1% for taxes, 2.5% for maintenance, and .5% for insurance the net yield works out to only 1 to 2%.
Until recently, landlords were banking on appreciation to make up for the lack of yield. The last two years have been disappointing in that department, to say the least. Furthermore, there is no hope of raising rents or even maintaining them anytime in the foreseeable future. A great wave of rental construction completions has been hitting the market: luxury duplexes; low-income projects; warehouse district renovations; and everything in between - all begun at the peak of the recent housing mania. The major property management companies have even entered a price war as their efforts to whittle down their swelling rental listing portfolios become desperate. Even with asking rents down 1/3 or more from their peak two years ago, vacancies go begging.
Prosperity Harbor is not losing population. What is shrinking is the number of households. Or put differently, the increase in household formation - a fact of life in North America since the European settlement began - has gone into reverse, here as elsewhere. Unemployed and underemployed persons are doubling up and making do with more cramped conditions.
What hope is there for Prosperity Harbor's landlords? None. As long as incomes continue to fall, there will be less and less money available for rent. Property taxes will not fall. As assessed property values decline, rates will rise in order to maintain public expenditures. Even if a frenzy of cutting the public sector hits Prosperity Harbor's voters, it will only serve to shrink the incomes of the local public servants - furthering the vicious cycle of declining incomes.
In a word, Prosperity Harbor's landlords are f****d. This goes for the landlords who rent to themselves as well, a.k.a. homeowners. Housing here is a terrible, terrible investment and will be remain so until prices come in line to a sane multiple of rents - meaning those old cottages need to be selling for something like $9,000 to $18,000 - a mere one tenth the current prices!
Being an older place, the houses tend to be on the small side with plenty of cottages, each having less than 1000 square feet of floor space. As of today, the asking price on these little, older cottages ranges from $90,000 to $180,000. Prices have only sagged a bit since the onset of the Depression thanks to generous mortgage programmes from the Government.
Property taxes here are modest, averaging about 1% annually of the market value of the houses. Rents in Prosperity Harbour are low for a place on the West Coast. A typical two bedroom house rents for $600 per month.
The gross rental yields tend to range from 5 to 6%. After allowing 1% for taxes, 2.5% for maintenance, and .5% for insurance the net yield works out to only 1 to 2%.
Until recently, landlords were banking on appreciation to make up for the lack of yield. The last two years have been disappointing in that department, to say the least. Furthermore, there is no hope of raising rents or even maintaining them anytime in the foreseeable future. A great wave of rental construction completions has been hitting the market: luxury duplexes; low-income projects; warehouse district renovations; and everything in between - all begun at the peak of the recent housing mania. The major property management companies have even entered a price war as their efforts to whittle down their swelling rental listing portfolios become desperate. Even with asking rents down 1/3 or more from their peak two years ago, vacancies go begging.
Prosperity Harbor is not losing population. What is shrinking is the number of households. Or put differently, the increase in household formation - a fact of life in North America since the European settlement began - has gone into reverse, here as elsewhere. Unemployed and underemployed persons are doubling up and making do with more cramped conditions.
What hope is there for Prosperity Harbor's landlords? None. As long as incomes continue to fall, there will be less and less money available for rent. Property taxes will not fall. As assessed property values decline, rates will rise in order to maintain public expenditures. Even if a frenzy of cutting the public sector hits Prosperity Harbor's voters, it will only serve to shrink the incomes of the local public servants - furthering the vicious cycle of declining incomes.
In a word, Prosperity Harbor's landlords are f****d. This goes for the landlords who rent to themselves as well, a.k.a. homeowners. Housing here is a terrible, terrible investment and will be remain so until prices come in line to a sane multiple of rents - meaning those old cottages need to be selling for something like $9,000 to $18,000 - a mere one tenth the current prices!
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
The Last "Normal" Holiday Season
As we prepare our purposefully irreverent meal for this day of thanksgiving - boiled oats and day-old biscuits - we would like to stop and make a fearless prediction which has been rolling around in our heads since about the middle of this year. We really don't have any hard data to back up our assertion; in fact, we're going to just put it right out there, that this is an intuition.
Simply put, we posit this will be the last holiday season that anyone in the United States, or elsewhere, can call normal. Note the call normal; last year saw the last holiday season which could be considered actually normal. This season, however, will be all about keeping up appearances; the show must go on, after all.
Take this Thanksgiving in the United States; 49 million Citizens are going hungry at the end of every month. Now, at last report in September, 28.4 million Citizens are on food stamps. Hmm, we sense a number problem here... but anyway, on top of that, half of all children in the U.S. will receive food aid, as well as 90% of African-American children.
Let that settle in your mind for a moment, dear Reader. Those numbers are not from Haiti or Zimbabwe, but rather the only so-called superpower in the world, the United States. Those are not good numbers to be seeing from an OECD nation; it makes us think about terms like 'third world' and 'failed state.'
This will be a failed Thanksgiving; people will max out what little credit they have remaining for the month in order to have a 'feast.' By that, we mean keep up appearances, as there are really very few people in the U.S. right now who can actually afford to have an extravagant meal, pay their bills, and have savings. Perhaps the 'recovery' propaganda has worked its magic, and most Citizens have moved into a Keynesian dreamland, where they spend now and have an economy later. We frankly think not; we posit most U.S. Citizens couldn't make a budget - and keep it - if their lives depended on it. For 49 million of those Citizens, their lives do depend on it, and they seem to prove unequal to the task.
After Thanksgiving will be the failed consumer orgy of Christmas; failed, because one cannot have an orgy if no one shows up. That's not to say that lights won't be strung and trees erected, because they will be... probably with more 'animal spirits' energy than ever. Under those trees, though, will tell the real tale. Show us an average Citizen who has lots of gifts, and we will show you someone who is nearing the end of their financial rope.
As we're writing, an ironic thought occurs to us: would it not be an expression of cosmic justice, if the attempt at summoning up a holiday shopping extravaganza is what finally topples the still-tottering U.S. economy? Think about it: maxing out credit cards for one last huzzah; blowing the savings on gifts for the kids, or Social Security cheques on the grandkids? Citizens of the United States are far too broke to enjoy the spendy, spendy ways to which they became accustomed; at this point, they should go limp, take their financial kicks to the stomach, and try to get things in order again. Instead, they will - and we mean will - go down, in vast numbers, and in flames.
Simply put, we posit this will be the last holiday season that anyone in the United States, or elsewhere, can call normal. Note the call normal; last year saw the last holiday season which could be considered actually normal. This season, however, will be all about keeping up appearances; the show must go on, after all.
Take this Thanksgiving in the United States; 49 million Citizens are going hungry at the end of every month. Now, at last report in September, 28.4 million Citizens are on food stamps. Hmm, we sense a number problem here... but anyway, on top of that, half of all children in the U.S. will receive food aid, as well as 90% of African-American children.
Let that settle in your mind for a moment, dear Reader. Those numbers are not from Haiti or Zimbabwe, but rather the only so-called superpower in the world, the United States. Those are not good numbers to be seeing from an OECD nation; it makes us think about terms like 'third world' and 'failed state.'
This will be a failed Thanksgiving; people will max out what little credit they have remaining for the month in order to have a 'feast.' By that, we mean keep up appearances, as there are really very few people in the U.S. right now who can actually afford to have an extravagant meal, pay their bills, and have savings. Perhaps the 'recovery' propaganda has worked its magic, and most Citizens have moved into a Keynesian dreamland, where they spend now and have an economy later. We frankly think not; we posit most U.S. Citizens couldn't make a budget - and keep it - if their lives depended on it. For 49 million of those Citizens, their lives do depend on it, and they seem to prove unequal to the task.
After Thanksgiving will be the failed consumer orgy of Christmas; failed, because one cannot have an orgy if no one shows up. That's not to say that lights won't be strung and trees erected, because they will be... probably with more 'animal spirits' energy than ever. Under those trees, though, will tell the real tale. Show us an average Citizen who has lots of gifts, and we will show you someone who is nearing the end of their financial rope.
As we're writing, an ironic thought occurs to us: would it not be an expression of cosmic justice, if the attempt at summoning up a holiday shopping extravaganza is what finally topples the still-tottering U.S. economy? Think about it: maxing out credit cards for one last huzzah; blowing the savings on gifts for the kids, or Social Security cheques on the grandkids? Citizens of the United States are far too broke to enjoy the spendy, spendy ways to which they became accustomed; at this point, they should go limp, take their financial kicks to the stomach, and try to get things in order again. Instead, they will - and we mean will - go down, in vast numbers, and in flames.
Monday, November 23, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Super Late Edition
We're very late on this one; apologies. We saw the FDIC had closed only one bank on Friday evening, and thought "naw, they wouldn't close only one bank." Well, they did, and we forgot to write about it.
* * *
This past weekend, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed one bank: Commerce Bank of Southwestern Florida, Fort Myers, FL. The total assets of the closed bank were $79,700,000, and total deposits were approximately $76,700,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $23,600,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $53,100,000, or only 66.62% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.70% (unchanged from last week).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $51,500,500,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $515,603,680,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $349,005,920,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $297,505,320,000 (57.70% of the declared value).
* * *
We're not quite sure what the FDIC is thinking, but perhaps they don't either. Even so, it is interesting that Florida saw the only bank failure, despite the relative smallness of the closure. We really don't know what to say about that, because we're fairly confident the United States' banking system has not enjoyed the 'laying on of hands' over the past week. Sickness is still in the system, and it appears the FDIC would prefer to let the sickness spread.
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri
8. Oregon
9. Florida
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.13, up from 36.00%)
2. California (42.43%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
* * *
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $26,600,000. The value stands at $43,987,000.
* * *
This past weekend, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed one bank: Commerce Bank of Southwestern Florida, Fort Myers, FL. The total assets of the closed bank were $79,700,000, and total deposits were approximately $76,700,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $23,600,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $53,100,000, or only 66.62% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.70% (unchanged from last week).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $51,500,500,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $515,603,680,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $349,005,920,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $297,505,320,000 (57.70% of the declared value).
* * *
We're not quite sure what the FDIC is thinking, but perhaps they don't either. Even so, it is interesting that Florida saw the only bank failure, despite the relative smallness of the closure. We really don't know what to say about that, because we're fairly confident the United States' banking system has not enjoyed the 'laying on of hands' over the past week. Sickness is still in the system, and it appears the FDIC would prefer to let the sickness spread.
* * *
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri
8. Oregon
9. Florida
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.13, up from 36.00%)
2. California (42.43%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
* * *
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $26,600,000. The value stands at $43,987,000.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Housing Price Report for November
Our result for the first six months of our North American Housing Price Index is a drop of 10.45%. This is a very serious drop, and has implication for more than just the house owners who need the value of their houses to say up. It also means that, on average: the housing collateral on bank balance sheets is impaired by around 10%; any and all securities of bundled mortgages have seen their value reduced by 10%; any house owners relying on the value of their house to keep up appearances have seen their appearances reduced by 10%.
Prices are showing some sign of improvement in the USA, which is to be expected thanks to the Federal Government's herculean efforts to prop up the industry.The 10% US Federal income tax credit has been extended, and all things being equal, this will tend to keep prices in the USA 10% higher than they otherwise would be. We'll be watching for a sudden fall when the program ends, if ever.
Interestingly enough, though, we are seeing some weakness in the Canadian housing market. This strikes us as rather odd, as the credit available to Canadian Citizens is still growing at a respectable clip. Additionally, the Federal Government has a very direct hand in guaranteeing mortgages in Canada, whereas the U.S. Federal Government only proves a wishy-washy guarantee to bail out banks.
Frankly, it seems that the animal spirits are friskier in the United States than Canada, undoubtedly supported by the U.S. Federal Government's housing tax credit. It is also possible U.S. Citizenry is a bit more credulous of the 'recession is over' propaganda than are the Canadians; it's time for Americans to do their patriotic duty and spend, spend, spend!
Prices are showing some sign of improvement in the USA, which is to be expected thanks to the Federal Government's herculean efforts to prop up the industry.The 10% US Federal income tax credit has been extended, and all things being equal, this will tend to keep prices in the USA 10% higher than they otherwise would be. We'll be watching for a sudden fall when the program ends, if ever.
Interestingly enough, though, we are seeing some weakness in the Canadian housing market. This strikes us as rather odd, as the credit available to Canadian Citizens is still growing at a respectable clip. Additionally, the Federal Government has a very direct hand in guaranteeing mortgages in Canada, whereas the U.S. Federal Government only proves a wishy-washy guarantee to bail out banks.
Frankly, it seems that the animal spirits are friskier in the United States than Canada, undoubtedly supported by the U.S. Federal Government's housing tax credit. It is also possible U.S. Citizenry is a bit more credulous of the 'recession is over' propaganda than are the Canadians; it's time for Americans to do their patriotic duty and spend, spend, spend!
Saturday, November 14, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
This weekend, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: Century Bank, FSB of Sarasota, Florida; Orion Bank of Naples, Florida; and Pacific Coast National Bank of San Clemente, California. The total assets of the closed banks were $3,562,400,000, and total deposits were approximately $2,861,900,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $968,400,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was $1,875,500,000, or only 52.65% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.70% (down from last week's 57.73%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $51,476,900,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $515,523,980,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $348,929,220,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $297,452,320,000 (57.70% of the declared value).
***
The closures in Florida confirm our model of Florida as the state with the poorest quality assets. Century Bank had a recoverable value by our model of only 39.42% - the 5th worst so far in the Depression. In keeping with the spirit of poor quality of assets, we are introducing the Frugal Scotsman's Ten Nastiest Bank Closures To Date. We will be updating this list as newer, nastier closures occur. We are quite confident that this will be a regular feature, given the trend in place of deteriorating bank asset quality.
1. IndyMac (CA) - 22.99%
2. BankUnited FSB (FL) - 28.91%
3. First Bank of Idaho - 37.39%
4. Community Bank of Nevada - 39.10%
5. Century Bank FSB (FL) - 39.42%
6. First Bank of Beverly Hills (CA) - 40.39%
7. Bank of Clark County (WA) - 40.81%
8. Horizon Bank (MN) - 40.98%
9. Union Bank (AZ) - 41.13%
10. Franklin Bank (TX) - 41.18%
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri
8. Oregon
9. Florida (up from #11)
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.00, up from 32.44%)
2. California (42.43%, up from 42.37%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets its first adjustment now with a subtraction of 986,400,000. The value stands at 44,013,600. Forty-four weeks to go!
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was $1,875,500,000, or only 52.65% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.70% (down from last week's 57.73%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $51,476,900,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $515,523,980,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $348,929,220,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $297,452,320,000 (57.70% of the declared value).
***
The closures in Florida confirm our model of Florida as the state with the poorest quality assets. Century Bank had a recoverable value by our model of only 39.42% - the 5th worst so far in the Depression. In keeping with the spirit of poor quality of assets, we are introducing the Frugal Scotsman's Ten Nastiest Bank Closures To Date. We will be updating this list as newer, nastier closures occur. We are quite confident that this will be a regular feature, given the trend in place of deteriorating bank asset quality.
1. IndyMac (CA) - 22.99%
2. BankUnited FSB (FL) - 28.91%
3. First Bank of Idaho - 37.39%
4. Community Bank of Nevada - 39.10%
5. Century Bank FSB (FL) - 39.42%
6. First Bank of Beverly Hills (CA) - 40.39%
7. Bank of Clark County (WA) - 40.81%
8. Horizon Bank (MN) - 40.98%
9. Union Bank (AZ) - 41.13%
10. Franklin Bank (TX) - 41.18%
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri
8. Oregon
9. Florida (up from #11)
10. Arizona
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (36.00, up from 32.44%)
2. California (42.43%, up from 42.37%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets its first adjustment now with a subtraction of 986,400,000. The value stands at 44,013,600. Forty-four weeks to go!
The Big Bank Problem No One Talks About
Consumer credit in the USA is falling, falling, falling. Whatever numbers you pick, there's no massaging the data to make it look innocent. This all is well known, as is the concern that lack of consumer borrowing will be a drag on the consumer portion of the economy.
Something else about this situation seems to be slipping through the cracks of public awareness, however. Once upon a time, maybe twenty years ago, when lenders cared a lot more about credit quality, it was well known that subprime could never work as a profitable lending model. Too many companies had come and gone promising to be profitable lending to high-risk customers. Their seeming profitability was a trick of accounting legerdemain: a growing book makes loss ratios look lower than they actually are since ageing loans are more likely to sour than fresh ones.
In the huge, recent credit bubble when almost everyone (and sometimes their pets) were receiving credit offers, loan books were growing smartly and loss ratios were low. Now that credit is contracting, people who can pay back their loans tend to be doing so. And those who can't (but are not yet to the point of defaulting) are just trying to keep them rolling over. The net result is that the overall quality of bank's loan books is deteriorating rapidly.
Banks are becoming less solvent over time, not more so, in spite of their efforts to improve their condition. Banks efforts to reign in credit by jacking up interest rates and cutting credit lines will actually backfire because better borrowers will simply pay off their loans. Borrowers who accept the barrage of insults are in such poor condition financially they can only subject themselves to usury.
In conclusion, the end state of this process will likely be the Federal Government (having had to bail out the banks and then the FDIC over and over) holding consumer loan portfolios that have little to no value. Cost to taxpayer: something like two trillion dollars, and further debauchment of the Dollar. Banks will be kept in business to keep up appearances, and may even book a nominal profit.
Something else about this situation seems to be slipping through the cracks of public awareness, however. Once upon a time, maybe twenty years ago, when lenders cared a lot more about credit quality, it was well known that subprime could never work as a profitable lending model. Too many companies had come and gone promising to be profitable lending to high-risk customers. Their seeming profitability was a trick of accounting legerdemain: a growing book makes loss ratios look lower than they actually are since ageing loans are more likely to sour than fresh ones.
In the huge, recent credit bubble when almost everyone (and sometimes their pets) were receiving credit offers, loan books were growing smartly and loss ratios were low. Now that credit is contracting, people who can pay back their loans tend to be doing so. And those who can't (but are not yet to the point of defaulting) are just trying to keep them rolling over. The net result is that the overall quality of bank's loan books is deteriorating rapidly.
Banks are becoming less solvent over time, not more so, in spite of their efforts to improve their condition. Banks efforts to reign in credit by jacking up interest rates and cutting credit lines will actually backfire because better borrowers will simply pay off their loans. Borrowers who accept the barrage of insults are in such poor condition financially they can only subject themselves to usury.
In conclusion, the end state of this process will likely be the Federal Government (having had to bail out the banks and then the FDIC over and over) holding consumer loan portfolios that have little to no value. Cost to taxpayer: something like two trillion dollars, and further debauchment of the Dollar. Banks will be kept in business to keep up appearances, and may even book a nominal profit.
Friday, November 13, 2009
FDIC Prepayment Approved
The Board of Directors of the FDIC has approved the three-year prepayment of deposit insurance premiums. According to the FDIC's press release, the prepayment will amount to about $45 billion, to be collected between now and December 30th, 2009. A quote from the press release:
To translate: the DIF's present balance is more or less zero, and the $45 billion is going to be shovelled out the door very quickly indeed. If the FDIC's bank closures cost around $1 billion per week, we fully expect this prepayment will be burned through in about 45 weeks or so. At that point, the FDIC will have its bank against the wall: it will have no further regular income from assessments until 2013, and 'special assessments' will become quickly onerous to a failing banking system. When that happens, the FDIC will have to either tap its lines of credit, or look for a direct bailout from the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury.
But at any rate, we're pleased to introduce the Cash Burn-Through Meter; you will find it on the left, at the top of the menus. We will start the Meter at $45 billion, and with every week's closures we will subtract that value from the total prepayment. When it reaches zero we will buy a bottle of champagne.
The pre-payment allows the FDIC to strengthen the cash position of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)... While the prepayment will immediately improve the FDIC's liquidity, it will not have an impact on the fund balance.
To translate: the DIF's present balance is more or less zero, and the $45 billion is going to be shovelled out the door very quickly indeed. If the FDIC's bank closures cost around $1 billion per week, we fully expect this prepayment will be burned through in about 45 weeks or so. At that point, the FDIC will have its bank against the wall: it will have no further regular income from assessments until 2013, and 'special assessments' will become quickly onerous to a failing banking system. When that happens, the FDIC will have to either tap its lines of credit, or look for a direct bailout from the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury.
But at any rate, we're pleased to introduce the Cash Burn-Through Meter; you will find it on the left, at the top of the menus. We will start the Meter at $45 billion, and with every week's closures we will subtract that value from the total prepayment. When it reaches zero we will buy a bottle of champagne.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
The Unexpected Weakness of the Recovery
Our title today comes from a phrase ripped out of context from a recent Wall Street Journal article. The article itself is not important, but the assumption of the phrase was just too rich for us to pass by uncommented upon.
As discussed copiously elsewhere, a propaganda campaign of gargantuan proportions has been unleashed upon the world's populace. The term perception management sums it up nicely. The basic idea is that if people are confident, they will consume. If people will consume, there will be 'work' to do. It is an effort to restore society and the economy to the defined norm of 'the way things were until about two years ago.' Whatever an individual sees or experiences to the contrary (especially unemployment and homelessness), is to be disregarded in favour of the consumerist paradigm.
Almost everything you read or hear will be attempting to reinforce the notion that the recent (and thankfully over) financial and economic crisis was just a bump in the road to ever greater prosperity.
Whether there is a vast conspiracy orchestrated by the Ministry of Truth, or whether it is merely the unconscious coordination of wishful thinking is immaterial. This informational miasma is deadly and if one wants to make it through the Depression without being too battered, one had best learn to recognise the disinformation, not get sucked in, and think straight instead.
The unhappy reality is the Depression is still on and it is going to get worse - a lot worse. Incomes are still falling. It doesn't matter that stocks are recovering or house prices in Australia are hitting new highs. In terms of purchasing power, aggregate incomes are going to be falling for a long time and everyone had better get used to that fact. Tragically, the more the truth is evaded (whether deliberately or otherwise), the worse off everyone will be.
As discussed copiously elsewhere, a propaganda campaign of gargantuan proportions has been unleashed upon the world's populace. The term perception management sums it up nicely. The basic idea is that if people are confident, they will consume. If people will consume, there will be 'work' to do. It is an effort to restore society and the economy to the defined norm of 'the way things were until about two years ago.' Whatever an individual sees or experiences to the contrary (especially unemployment and homelessness), is to be disregarded in favour of the consumerist paradigm.
Almost everything you read or hear will be attempting to reinforce the notion that the recent (and thankfully over) financial and economic crisis was just a bump in the road to ever greater prosperity.
Whether there is a vast conspiracy orchestrated by the Ministry of Truth, or whether it is merely the unconscious coordination of wishful thinking is immaterial. This informational miasma is deadly and if one wants to make it through the Depression without being too battered, one had best learn to recognise the disinformation, not get sucked in, and think straight instead.
The unhappy reality is the Depression is still on and it is going to get worse - a lot worse. Incomes are still falling. It doesn't matter that stocks are recovering or house prices in Australia are hitting new highs. In terms of purchasing power, aggregate incomes are going to be falling for a long time and everyone had better get used to that fact. Tragically, the more the truth is evaded (whether deliberately or otherwise), the worse off everyone will be.
Saturday, November 7, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed five banks: United Security Bank, of Sparta, GA; Home Federal Savings Bank, of Detroit, MI; Prosperan Bank, of Oakdale, MN; Gateway Bank of St. Louis, of St. Louis, MO; and United Commercial Bank, of San Francisco, CA. The total assets of the closed banks were $11,599,100,000, and total deposits were approximately $7,866,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,532,700,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was $6,333,600,000, or only 54.60% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.73% (down from last week's 57.81%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $50,490,500,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $511,961,580,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $346,067,320,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $295,576,820,000 (57.73% of the declared value).
***
The situation with United Commercial Bank (UCB) is an interesting one, as it marks a degree of cooperation previously unseen in the banking world. UCB, UCB of Hong Kong, and UCB-China in Shanghai were all closed by the FDIC's actions, in cooperation with the Hong Kong government and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Although it's a moment to wave the non-existent flag of international fellowship and all that, we would like to point out just how bad this looks to us.
The FDIC's actions show just how interconnected the financial systems of the World are, and how terribly difficult it is to find any sort of separation across national borders; this will make sorting failed banks like UCB very difficult, especially if non-US agencies are not quite as cooperative as they were this time. In addition, it's all well and good, as far as the average U.S. Citizen is concerned, that the FDIC took over banks in China; what happens if and when China starts taking over banks in the United States?
But leaving that aside, we have a loose prediction for the general trend of future, weekly FDIC closures: they will likely consist of a handful of minor community banks, and one large-ish bank. This week's format is a good example of what we're walking about, as the banks other than UCB were quite small indeed. Since we are fully convinced the FDIC is effectively out of money, this would suggest that the banks which the FDIC manages to scrape up the cash to close are the worst imaginable banks in the United States... leaving aside such cesspools as Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, et al.
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri (up from #8)
8. Oregon (down from #7)
9. Arizona
10. Colorado
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (42.37%, up from 40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%, up from 43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%, up from 53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
We're very pleased with how these two lists have shaped up; the movement from week to week is becoming very slight, so we're pretty confident this gives a relatively accurate idea of how badly off these various States and the banks within them are. Of course, our analysis only reflects those States which have had over two bank failures, so that leaves a good portion of the Union (and its... extensions) not reflected in our report.
Nevertheless, these five States - Georgia, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado, in no particular order - are likely to be among the worst-off, as they are represented in both the preceeding lists. We really can't say which of those is the king of the dung heap, as it were, because we still haven't figured out how to compare apples and oranges.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was $6,333,600,000, or only 54.60% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.73% (down from last week's 57.81%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $50,490,500,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $511,961,580,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $346,067,320,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $295,576,820,000 (57.73% of the declared value).
***
The situation with United Commercial Bank (UCB) is an interesting one, as it marks a degree of cooperation previously unseen in the banking world. UCB, UCB of Hong Kong, and UCB-China in Shanghai were all closed by the FDIC's actions, in cooperation with the Hong Kong government and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Although it's a moment to wave the non-existent flag of international fellowship and all that, we would like to point out just how bad this looks to us.
The FDIC's actions show just how interconnected the financial systems of the World are, and how terribly difficult it is to find any sort of separation across national borders; this will make sorting failed banks like UCB very difficult, especially if non-US agencies are not quite as cooperative as they were this time. In addition, it's all well and good, as far as the average U.S. Citizen is concerned, that the FDIC took over banks in China; what happens if and when China starts taking over banks in the United States?
But leaving that aside, we have a loose prediction for the general trend of future, weekly FDIC closures: they will likely consist of a handful of minor community banks, and one large-ish bank. This week's format is a good example of what we're walking about, as the banks other than UCB were quite small indeed. Since we are fully convinced the FDIC is effectively out of money, this would suggest that the banks which the FDIC manages to scrape up the cash to close are the worst imaginable banks in the United States... leaving aside such cesspools as Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, et al.
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Missouri (up from #8)
8. Oregon (down from #7)
9. Arizona
10. Colorado
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (42.37%, up from 40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.18%, up from 43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.79%, up from 53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
We're very pleased with how these two lists have shaped up; the movement from week to week is becoming very slight, so we're pretty confident this gives a relatively accurate idea of how badly off these various States and the banks within them are. Of course, our analysis only reflects those States which have had over two bank failures, so that leaves a good portion of the Union (and its... extensions) not reflected in our report.
Nevertheless, these five States - Georgia, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado, in no particular order - are likely to be among the worst-off, as they are represented in both the preceeding lists. We really can't say which of those is the king of the dung heap, as it were, because we still haven't figured out how to compare apples and oranges.
Saturday, October 31, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed nine banks, a record number in the 2007 Depression: Bank USA, N.A., of Phoenix, AZ; California National Bank, of Los Angeles, CA; San Diego National Bank, of San Diego, CA; Pacific National Bank, of San Francisco, CA; Park National Bank, of Chicago, IL; Community Bank of Lemont, of Lemont, IL; North Houston Bank, of Houston, TX; Madisonville State Bank, of Madisonville, TX; and Citizens National Bank, of Teague, TX. The total assets of the closed banks were $19,400,000,000, and total deposits were approximately $15,400,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $2,500,000,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $12,900,000,000, or only 66.49% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December 2007, which stands at 57.81% (up noticeably from last week's 57.46%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $48,957,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $500,362,480,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $338,201,020,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $289,243,220,000 (57.81% of the declared value).
***
A couple milestones to remember on this day, dear Reader: nine banks closed in one day, beating out the eight closed on February 7th of this year; and over a half-trillion dollars in bank assets passed through the FDIC's mangy paws! Let us pause in a moment of silence, to commemorate that $0.5 trillion, because this is probably the last time that quantity of dollars will seem like much money. The horror of that $0.5 trillion is that it was only worth about $0.2 trillion... ouch. Again, we think that's only going to get worse. If the U.S. banking system is anywhere near as insolvent as our methodology suggests it is, there are many, many more banks out there with thoroughly rotten balance sheets.
Speaking of rotten balance sheets, the acquiring bank for all nine failures was US Bank, of Minneapolis, MN. It looks like US Bank is on track to become what we'd like to call hyper-regional, because regional does not quite seem to cover a Midwest bank with 115 branches in California, and five in Texas. It seems to us that the animal spirits have possessed this bank, too, and they're 'positioning themselves for the recovery' with a vengeance. We're not sure what's in the water in US Bank's Minneapolis HQ, but it must be some impressively potent stuff. They see the same falling household incomes as we do, but our first though would not have been "that's great news, let's blow $13 billion!" We have to conclude that US Bank is putting their head on the block, because when - not if - the next market nosedive hits, they will probably find themselves extremely overreached. Then again, if they are reaching for 'too-big-to-fail' status, they are on exactly the right course.
Unfortunately, the FDIC did not provide a break-down of its cost-to-DIF for each individual bank (separate assets and deposits were provided, though). So, we will not be able to include this week's closures in our recoverability by State analysis, because the lack of detailed closure data would skew our analysis quite severely. As an aside, a cohort of ours contacted the FDIC, requesting the information, but the FDIC spokesperson said they didn't have the info on hand, and to file a Freedom of Information Act request for the same... Feel the love!
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #6)
5. Utah (down from #4)
6. Kansas (down from #5)
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Arizona (new to list)
10. Colorado (down from #9)
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are actually worth on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis. [Note: this week's closures are not reflected in this data, so it remains unchanged from last week].
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
So much for Florida; we have to rescind all our back-patting from last report, because Arizona has stolen the Sunshine State's lustre. We fully expect to see more of Florida, sometime in the future. Just don't ask us when, because we really don't know. This is, of course, influenced by the rather jittery movements of the FDIC's closures; they do not seem to be focusing on any one State in particular to try and clean up that State's banking system. If a concerted effort to get the U.S. banking system sound does develop, perhaps this problem will be alleviated. Additional data clarity could also come from the FDIC being forced to close banks more often than just weekly.
Arizona will probably end up being a pretty ugly case, in and of itself. In the long term we fully expect that State to be far worse off that Florida, but only by a question of degrees: Florida will be in ruins, but Arizona will be abandoned and in ruins. For the meanwhile, though, Florida's financial woes will probably come to the fore more so than any other State, because of the extremely-overvalued nature of the Florida banking system's assets.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $12,900,000,000, or only 66.49% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December 2007, which stands at 57.81% (up noticeably from last week's 57.46%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $48,957,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $500,362,480,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $338,201,020,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $289,243,220,000 (57.81% of the declared value).
***
A couple milestones to remember on this day, dear Reader: nine banks closed in one day, beating out the eight closed on February 7th of this year; and over a half-trillion dollars in bank assets passed through the FDIC's mangy paws! Let us pause in a moment of silence, to commemorate that $0.5 trillion, because this is probably the last time that quantity of dollars will seem like much money. The horror of that $0.5 trillion is that it was only worth about $0.2 trillion... ouch. Again, we think that's only going to get worse. If the U.S. banking system is anywhere near as insolvent as our methodology suggests it is, there are many, many more banks out there with thoroughly rotten balance sheets.
Speaking of rotten balance sheets, the acquiring bank for all nine failures was US Bank, of Minneapolis, MN. It looks like US Bank is on track to become what we'd like to call hyper-regional, because regional does not quite seem to cover a Midwest bank with 115 branches in California, and five in Texas. It seems to us that the animal spirits have possessed this bank, too, and they're 'positioning themselves for the recovery' with a vengeance. We're not sure what's in the water in US Bank's Minneapolis HQ, but it must be some impressively potent stuff. They see the same falling household incomes as we do, but our first though would not have been "that's great news, let's blow $13 billion!" We have to conclude that US Bank is putting their head on the block, because when - not if - the next market nosedive hits, they will probably find themselves extremely overreached. Then again, if they are reaching for 'too-big-to-fail' status, they are on exactly the right course.
Unfortunately, the FDIC did not provide a break-down of its cost-to-DIF for each individual bank (separate assets and deposits were provided, though). So, we will not be able to include this week's closures in our recoverability by State analysis, because the lack of detailed closure data would skew our analysis quite severely. As an aside, a cohort of ours contacted the FDIC, requesting the information, but the FDIC spokesperson said they didn't have the info on hand, and to file a Freedom of Information Act request for the same... Feel the love!
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #6)
5. Utah (down from #4)
6. Kansas (down from #5)
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Arizona (new to list)
10. Colorado (down from #9)
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are actually worth on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis. [Note: this week's closures are not reflected in this data, so it remains unchanged from last week].
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.74%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
So much for Florida; we have to rescind all our back-patting from last report, because Arizona has stolen the Sunshine State's lustre. We fully expect to see more of Florida, sometime in the future. Just don't ask us when, because we really don't know. This is, of course, influenced by the rather jittery movements of the FDIC's closures; they do not seem to be focusing on any one State in particular to try and clean up that State's banking system. If a concerted effort to get the U.S. banking system sound does develop, perhaps this problem will be alleviated. Additional data clarity could also come from the FDIC being forced to close banks more often than just weekly.
Arizona will probably end up being a pretty ugly case, in and of itself. In the long term we fully expect that State to be far worse off that Florida, but only by a question of degrees: Florida will be in ruins, but Arizona will be abandoned and in ruins. For the meanwhile, though, Florida's financial woes will probably come to the fore more so than any other State, because of the extremely-overvalued nature of the Florida banking system's assets.
Friday, October 30, 2009
A Clunker of an Economic Policy
Yesterday, the world was greeted by a much-trumpeted USA GDP report showing 'growth' has returned. Admittedly, the 'growth' was primarily the result of Federal Government stimulus, mainly in the form of the first time house-buyer credit, and the 'cash-for-clunkers' plan. These two giveaways really only pulled consumption forward as opposed to creating new demand. The collapse in auto sales after its programme ended proves the point.
More disturbingly, having the economy increasingly dependent on debt-funded, government stimulus is not a sound policy. Let us illustrate by analogy. Suppose Mr. Miller was down on his luck. Mr. Baker next door has a brilliant idea: "I have an unused credit line down at the Bank. Suppose I max it out and use the funds to buy flour from Mr. Miller. I need to buy flour anyhow. I'll just stock up and then gradually use it up." Mr. Miller is, naturally, delighted when the order for a tonne of flour comes in. He even needs to hire an assistant, Jack, and now Mr. Miller can order that new mill stone he'd been hankering after. GDP is now growing again!
Only here's the fly in the ointment: as Mr. Baker starts buying less flour as he draws down his stock, Mr. Miller's sales are lower than ever! Jack gets laid off and ends up moving into his parents' basement. Jack's former landlord is unable to find a new tenant and starts baking his own bread to economise. Mr Miller also reluctantly cancels the order for the new mill stone. Mr. Mason, faced with no prospects of further business, sells his home and joins a monastery. Mr. Baker is faced with falling sales, and now a hefty interest payment on that line of credit. GDP is falling again, and even worse than before!
A debt-binge set up the world economy for the 2007 Depression. The attempt to keep the debt party going will end in tears. Mark our words! [cue spooky music]
More disturbingly, having the economy increasingly dependent on debt-funded, government stimulus is not a sound policy. Let us illustrate by analogy. Suppose Mr. Miller was down on his luck. Mr. Baker next door has a brilliant idea: "I have an unused credit line down at the Bank. Suppose I max it out and use the funds to buy flour from Mr. Miller. I need to buy flour anyhow. I'll just stock up and then gradually use it up." Mr. Miller is, naturally, delighted when the order for a tonne of flour comes in. He even needs to hire an assistant, Jack, and now Mr. Miller can order that new mill stone he'd been hankering after. GDP is now growing again!
Only here's the fly in the ointment: as Mr. Baker starts buying less flour as he draws down his stock, Mr. Miller's sales are lower than ever! Jack gets laid off and ends up moving into his parents' basement. Jack's former landlord is unable to find a new tenant and starts baking his own bread to economise. Mr Miller also reluctantly cancels the order for the new mill stone. Mr. Mason, faced with no prospects of further business, sells his home and joins a monastery. Mr. Baker is faced with falling sales, and now a hefty interest payment on that line of credit. GDP is falling again, and even worse than before!
A debt-binge set up the world economy for the 2007 Depression. The attempt to keep the debt party going will end in tears. Mark our words! [cue spooky music]
Thursday, October 29, 2009
FDIC Bank Failure Report - Impossibly Late Edition
Apologies to all, but it's been a busy week. We're wrapping up our summer efforts, and save a few last projects we will soon have more time to devote to this blog.
***
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed seven banks: Partners Bank, of Naples, FL; American United Bank, of Lawrenceville, GA; Hillcrest Bank Florida, of Naples, FL; Flagship National Bank, of Bradenton, FL; Bank of Elmwood, of Racine, WI; Riverview Community Bank, of Otsego, MN; and First Dupage Bank, of Westmont, IL. The total assets of the closed banks were $1,163,900,000, and total deposits were approximately $1,032,100,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $356,700,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $675,400,000, or only 58.03% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closure slightly above the cumulative recoverability since December, which stands at 57.46% (essentially unchanged from last week's 57.45%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $46,457,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $480,962,480,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $322,801,020,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $276,343,220,000 (57.46% of the declared value).
***
First off, we welcome Wisconsin to the 2007 Depression; the Land of Cheese has enjoyed the scent of its first - of many - bank failures. Additionally, we pat ourselves on the back, because at long last Florida is receiving the attention we predicted it would (see the commentary at the end of our piece). We called it almost a month ago, so please pardon us while we feel terribly smart. At any rate, Florida is in for a very, very painful time, have no doubt; the whole State's banking system is a morass of ultimate financial doom. We don't know if this is the beginning of that pain, or just a blip, but we're quite confident that Florida is going to see vast numbers of banks falling dead in their tracks from toxic mortgages, et cetera.
We noticed a surprising trend with this week's closures: a large percentage (95.27%) of the assets of all closed banks were successfully sold off, either outright or under a loss-share agreement between the FDIC and the acquiring institution. We don't have much back data (we'll work on that), so this might be a fluke of the week... but we wonder if the Federal Government's calling the recession over is actually working. Call us crazy, but we're just not feeling the love on this one. If the 'great recession' were actually over, we would expect to see that in improving quality of bank's assets. They have definitely not improved.
However, is seems that acquiring institutions feel the economy will be improving in the future, so they're happy to snap up most of the assets of the failed banks, no matter how toxic. The frisky animal spirits have possessed them at last, so they put on their war paint, do a victory dance, and march off to position themselves for the 'great recovery.' Apparently these acquiring institutions have forgotten they are akin to wolves; wolves can only consume fresh meat, and it seems these predators haven't noticed their prey is rotten. We don't know when the nasty effects of bad assets will start to bother the predator banks, but when the effects start it will be exciting. If acquiring institutions start to be closed by the FDIC, expect the U.S. to take the mother of all nosedives.
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #6)
5. Utah (down from #4)
6. Kansas (down from #5)
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Colorado
10. Florida (new to list)
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are actually worth on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.74%, down from 53.76%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
Well, shucks, more back-patting for us: Florida is now officially on both lists. We fully expect the State to ratchet up to the #1 spot on closures-to-population, and stay firmly in the lead on the recoverable value scale. The collapse of Florida's finances will likely be coupled with the final catastrophic implosion of the vast majority of well-off senior citizens' own finances. Why? We suspect that most of the elderly retirees in Florida have a big portion of their wealth in over-valued real estate, and when the State's real estate bubble pops and that value goes down, down, down, those seniors are not going to have much to fall back on. Social Security will not be enough to support them in the style to which they've become accustomed, and they will be forced out of their homes and into the homes of their children.
That's, of course, making the rash assumption that their children still have homes of their own. If the Baby Boomers have taken the hit at around the same time, the United States is going to see a large indigent population of elderly and Baby Boomers, whinging about how it isn't fair. No one in power will be listening, we suspect; the ear of the Federal Government is firmly owned by banks. Indeed, at that point the Government might not have any money at all to throw around - at least, no money that can actually buy anything.
The question rattling around in our mind is this: is Florida the first domino in a really big economic catastrophe? Or will it be another California, and simply be a bigger sag in the overarching, slow-motion collapse of the U.S. economy? We really don't know, but we could certainly see it either way. We'll be pondering that thought for a later blog post.
***
This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed seven banks: Partners Bank, of Naples, FL; American United Bank, of Lawrenceville, GA; Hillcrest Bank Florida, of Naples, FL; Flagship National Bank, of Bradenton, FL; Bank of Elmwood, of Racine, WI; Riverview Community Bank, of Otsego, MN; and First Dupage Bank, of Westmont, IL. The total assets of the closed banks were $1,163,900,000, and total deposits were approximately $1,032,100,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $356,700,000.
According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was $675,400,000, or only 58.03% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closure slightly above the cumulative recoverability since December, which stands at 57.46% (essentially unchanged from last week's 57.45%).
Cumulative cost-to-FDIC was brought to $46,457,800,000. This closure brings the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $480,962,480,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $322,801,020,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $276,343,220,000 (57.46% of the declared value).
***
First off, we welcome Wisconsin to the 2007 Depression; the Land of Cheese has enjoyed the scent of its first - of many - bank failures. Additionally, we pat ourselves on the back, because at long last Florida is receiving the attention we predicted it would (see the commentary at the end of our piece). We called it almost a month ago, so please pardon us while we feel terribly smart. At any rate, Florida is in for a very, very painful time, have no doubt; the whole State's banking system is a morass of ultimate financial doom. We don't know if this is the beginning of that pain, or just a blip, but we're quite confident that Florida is going to see vast numbers of banks falling dead in their tracks from toxic mortgages, et cetera.
We noticed a surprising trend with this week's closures: a large percentage (95.27%) of the assets of all closed banks were successfully sold off, either outright or under a loss-share agreement between the FDIC and the acquiring institution. We don't have much back data (we'll work on that), so this might be a fluke of the week... but we wonder if the Federal Government's calling the recession over is actually working. Call us crazy, but we're just not feeling the love on this one. If the 'great recession' were actually over, we would expect to see that in improving quality of bank's assets. They have definitely not improved.
However, is seems that acquiring institutions feel the economy will be improving in the future, so they're happy to snap up most of the assets of the failed banks, no matter how toxic. The frisky animal spirits have possessed them at last, so they put on their war paint, do a victory dance, and march off to position themselves for the 'great recovery.' Apparently these acquiring institutions have forgotten they are akin to wolves; wolves can only consume fresh meat, and it seems these predators haven't noticed their prey is rotten. We don't know when the nasty effects of bad assets will start to bother the predator banks, but when the effects start it will be exciting. If acquiring institutions start to be closed by the FDIC, expect the U.S. to take the mother of all nosedives.
***
On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in the State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.
1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #6)
5. Utah (down from #4)
6. Kansas (down from #5)
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Colorado
10. Florida (new to list)
The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are actually worth on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.
1. Florida (32.44%)
2. California (40.11%)
3. Colorado (42.76%)
4. Michigan (43.07%)
5. Nevada (50.13%)
6. Georgia (53.74%, down from 53.76%)
7. Utah (55.39%)
8. Arizona (56.08%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.7%)
***
Well, shucks, more back-patting for us: Florida is now officially on both lists. We fully expect the State to ratchet up to the #1 spot on closures-to-population, and stay firmly in the lead on the recoverable value scale. The collapse of Florida's finances will likely be coupled with the final catastrophic implosion of the vast majority of well-off senior citizens' own finances. Why? We suspect that most of the elderly retirees in Florida have a big portion of their wealth in over-valued real estate, and when the State's real estate bubble pops and that value goes down, down, down, those seniors are not going to have much to fall back on. Social Security will not be enough to support them in the style to which they've become accustomed, and they will be forced out of their homes and into the homes of their children.
That's, of course, making the rash assumption that their children still have homes of their own. If the Baby Boomers have taken the hit at around the same time, the United States is going to see a large indigent population of elderly and Baby Boomers, whinging about how it isn't fair. No one in power will be listening, we suspect; the ear of the Federal Government is firmly owned by banks. Indeed, at that point the Government might not have any money at all to throw around - at least, no money that can actually buy anything.
The question rattling around in our mind is this: is Florida the first domino in a really big economic catastrophe? Or will it be another California, and simply be a bigger sag in the overarching, slow-motion collapse of the U.S. economy? We really don't know, but we could certainly see it either way. We'll be pondering that thought for a later blog post.
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Housing Price Report for October
Our result for the first five months of our North American Housing Price Index is a drop of 11.64%. As previously mentioned, we attempted to make an adjustment to not skew the data by the 'higher end' of the market. Because of recent strength in the 'lower end' of the market, the overall index is showing signs of stability.
Is this a sign of the 'bottom' in the housing market? We think not. Sales have been boosted by the much-trumpeted 10% US Federal income tax credit. Just as auto sales 'crashed' after the cash-for-clunkers plan was suspended, so too will housing sales wilt as the tax credit is wound down.
Is this a sign of the 'bottom' in the housing market? We think not. Sales have been boosted by the much-trumpeted 10% US Federal income tax credit. Just as auto sales 'crashed' after the cash-for-clunkers plan was suspended, so too will housing sales wilt as the tax credit is wound down.
Saturday, October 10, 2009
October Credit Card Collapse Report
It has been a while since we provided an update to the story of the great credit-card pay-down. According to Federal Reserve data on US household revolving debt, consumer revolving loan (mostly credit cards) balances have declined 9.17% from year-end 2008 through August. This represents an annual rate of - 14%.
Given the high credit card delinquency rates lenders are suffering (5% at last report), much of this balance decline can probably be chalked up to charge-offs. This implies households are not (contrary to popular opinion) actually paying down their debts to any great degree. In the aggregate, non-defaulting households are actually only gradually reducing their debt level. Since we have direct knowledge that at least some people really are paying down their debts furiously, this means others are getting in deeper.
The tenacity of the credit card balances could offer alternate interpretations. It is possible that household finances are in OK shape, and that people are confident about their prospects for the future. On the other hand, it could be that many, many people are desperate for funds to pay the bills, and thus borrowing (instead of cutting spending) in the face of declining income.
Since we opine that we are in a Depression - one of the defining characteristics of which is declining income, we favour the second interpretation. If true, this bodes very ill for the profligate households, and not so good for the rest of us in the months ahead.
Given the high credit card delinquency rates lenders are suffering (5% at last report), much of this balance decline can probably be chalked up to charge-offs. This implies households are not (contrary to popular opinion) actually paying down their debts to any great degree. In the aggregate, non-defaulting households are actually only gradually reducing their debt level. Since we have direct knowledge that at least some people really are paying down their debts furiously, this means others are getting in deeper.
The tenacity of the credit card balances could offer alternate interpretations. It is possible that household finances are in OK shape, and that people are confident about their prospects for the future. On the other hand, it could be that many, many people are desperate for funds to pay the bills, and thus borrowing (instead of cutting spending) in the face of declining income.
Since we opine that we are in a Depression - one of the defining characteristics of which is declining income, we favour the second interpretation. If true, this bodes very ill for the profligate households, and not so good for the rest of us in the months ahead.
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Q&A on the FDIC's Prepayment Plan
We just noticed a piece the FDIC released, giving what it considered answers to frequently asked questions about the proposed prepayment of three years' worth of insurance premiums by banks. This prepayment would bring in an estimated - and probably desperately needed - $45 billion, so that the FDIC can keep its dog and pony show going a little while longer.
Please read the FDIC's prepayment FAQ first, as in the rest of this post we will provide actual answers to the listed questions. We will be writing the replies in the manner of an awkward FDIC employee injected with truth serum. Pretend, if you will, we stand with you in a darkened room. It is stuffy and hot. A sweating accountant is 'cuffed to a chair, blinded by an extremely bright light; his eyes are squinted nervously. A squeaking fan is over in a corner, next to some doughnuts; throw in a couple beefy guys with names like Moose or Rocco for good measure. You get the idea.
***
Question #0: Has things gotten this bad because the FDIC is incompetent, or because its leadership is corrupt?
The answer is, obviously, yes.
Question #1: Why is it preferable to prepay assessments rather than borrow from the Treasury?
Well, as revealed by a former FDIC chairman, the FDIC really doesn't have any money at all in the Deposit Insurance Fund; in fact, it can be argued that the DIF doesn't exist at all. The monies which the FDIC takes in for the DIF actually go onto account at the U.S. Treasury, whereupon the money automatically becomes part of the Federal Government's General Fund, and the FDIC gets a lovely I.O.U. But, if you want to pretend the DIF exists, no skin off my nose.
Anyway, prepayments are probably preferable because it is a back-door way of getting real, cash money out of the private sector and into the greedy hands of the U.S. Congress. God knows the need as much money as they can get, and this is a pretty quick way of getting it. Plus it has the perfect cover story: the FDIC needed to 'repair' the DIF, and it needed the prepayments to do so. The money goes into the Treasury where the FDIC can pretend it is on its balance sheet, and the Congress can pretend it hasn't already spent the money a gajillion times over. Sure, the prepayments are only about $45 billion, but it's real money, which is hard to come by these days.
Question #2: Isn’t this a short term solution predicated on a swift banking recovery?
Oh, you noticed?
Ow! Okay, okay!
Yes, this does assume a swift recovery, because banks are going to need all the cash they can get in order to stay afloat when their balance sheets take another nose-dive. That'll be especially true when the Alt-A mortgages start rolling over, because you know those house owners will default right and left. At that point banks will find themselves the proud owners of really overvalued property, as opposed to the merely overvalued stuff already on their books from the sub-prime fiasco. Even if they don't foreclose, the non-performing loans will be bad enough. They'll need cash to try and stop-up the leaks.
Another tidal wave that banks face is the commercial property catastrophe. You had better believe that strip-malls and mega-shopping-centres are on the ropes, and there is no way that consumption will ever recover enough, and quick enough, to rescue those outfits. So, they'll naturally go under, default, and presto the banks have more useless property or non-performing loans on their balance sheet. More leaks, which will need more cash.
Question #3: Would smaller banks be affected disproportionately by this action?
Tough call... probably not all at once, but in the medium term, it will definitely be bad for smaller banks. In theory, it will be worse for the big banks, like Wells Fargo or Bank of America, but those guys have a government guarantee to never run out of money. So, even if this prepayment hurts banks, the smaller banks will feel the pain more, because they don't have a hotline to [Treasury Secretary Tim] Geithner.
Sure, the FDIC could give some exemptions, let a few stressed banks of the hook, but between you and me that probably won't happen much. We need that money, perhaps Congress needs that money to fund something or other that shouldn't be happening, but is anyway. Even if the prepayments help kill a few weak banks, they were probably going to go sometime soon anyway, so it's no big deal
Question #4: Didn’t Congress raise the FDIC’s borrowing limit for just this scenario?
Sure they did, but the FDIC doesn't want to touch that line with a ten-foot pole. Why? Well, the big buzz is that the line is being saved for some 'emergency.' That emergency should be obvious: a sudden and unexpected implosion of, say, Wells Fargo, or Bank of America, or JP Morgan . Hell, maybe this $500 billion has Goldman [Sachs'] name on it, just in case they have some trouble refueling their yachts, or something.
At the same time, if the FDIC were to tap its Treasury credit line, it would have to start paying interest at the Treasury rate. That would mean the FDIC would have to start earmarking money coming in from regular [deposit insurance] premiums, which would be bad because the FDIC is cash-starved. We need every penny coming in to keep up operations, at least at some level, and to have to set aside money for Treasury interest would be dangerous... who knows what that interest rate could do? If it went up sharply, for whatever reason, the interest payments would take a bigger and bigger chunk out of incoming FDIC fund. Hell, interest could end up being more than incoming premiums!
Question #5: Wouldn’t this take much needed capital out of the system and constrict lending?
Hahahaha, lending? Who's lending? Nobody important is lending, you dumkopf! All the big banks are taking their free government money and using it to buy T-bills and other government debt, because that's viewed as an utterly safe investment. I suppose it is, in a way, because they're guaranteed to get paid the face value of their bonds and such. The question is, of course, how much will that buy at the end of the game?
As for capital, well, like I said that really doesn't matter to the big banks, at least not right now. Those banks can simply get a dump-truck of new money dumped into their vaults overnight, problem solved. It's the real banks out there, the smaller ones which tried to be responsible and maintain standards, those are the banks to get socked in the mouth by capital shortages. They probably won't get a bailout from the Treasury or the Fed[eral Reserve]. Instead, if they go insolvent, the FDIC will just close them down and sell them off to bigger, more irresponsible banks which have a Treasury or Fed credit line.
Question #6: How would the banks account for the prepayment?
Ah, here's where it becomes genius. Let's say that Wells Fargo has to cough up $1 billion in cold, hard cash and mail it off to Aunt Sheila [Bair, FDIC Chairwoman]. In the real world, that should show up as a large, one-time draw on liquid assets, like when you write a cheque for cheese doodles and beer at the Seven Eleven.
But hey, this isn't the real world. Instead, accounting law allows Wells Fargo to count that $1 billion as an asset. Cool, yeah? Wells Fargo would thus end up with a three-year 'asset,' which would 'depreciate' by the value of the bank's monthly premium payment. This is how we can claim that banks can handle this prepayment, because they can spread out the pain over three-plus years, when in reality most banks probably couldn't handle such a large outlay of cash.
Question #7: How would the FDIC account for the prepayment?
Well, suddenly we'll be about $45 billion richer, so of course we'll get extra cream-filled doughnuts that day. Beyond that, and at the same time, we'll pretend we only got that quarter's premiums, without the subsequent quarters' prepayment being acknowledged. As the quarters roll by, we'll then pretend that we just received that quarter's premiums, and so on, until three years go by and everything is back to normal.
Hahahaha, normal...
Anyway, it's like having our cake and eating it, too: we've got the money from the next three years, but we'll still count it as regular income over that period, instead of in one lump sum. Don't let that fool you, though, because the FDIC will count the entire $45 billion as being available for spending during the whole period, if the money actually lasts that long.
Question #8: Isn’t this the same as borrowing from the industry without charging interest?
Well, if my pulling a gun on you and demanding all your money is considered borrowing without interest, then yes, this is like borrowing without interest. But really, no, this isn't borrowing. The FDIC doesn't believe in 'borrowing.' Borrowing means the other party has the right to refuse, and Shelia [Bair] doesn't like hearing negatives. The FDIC says jump, and all the insured banks say how high.
Question #9: How many banks would be exempt from paying the assessment up front?
Who knows, probably only a handful. Those banks will be very weak indeed, and they probably should have been closed anyway. If anyone could get their hands on the list of exempted banks, they would've just found the list of the next banks to be failed in the future.
Question #10: If a bank’s total deposits or actual assessment rate decreases during the next three years, would the FDIC refund a portion of their prepaid assessment?
What, does this look like the March of Dimes?
Ack! That hurts, man! C'mon!
Honestly, no, okay? It's part of the deal of getting the insured banks to swallow a prepayment plan. Even if their assessment rate increases, they won't have to pay extra for the next three years. It's actually a pretty sweet deal for banks which are planning on expanding deposits: they pay out, then enjoy insurance on their new deposits for a lower cumulative cost. It's bad for shrinking banks, though, because they'll theoretically be paying extra even if their real assessment has gone down.
Of course, if by some miracle there are any leftover funds in three-years' time, the FDIC will return that to the bank or banks in question. Nice idea, right? Too bad there probably won't be any money left!
Question #11: When is the DIF expected to go negative?
Go negative, as in the future tense? Haha, try July of last year [2008]! Indy Mac was a kick in the pants, far more than we can admit publicly. Simply put, we bit off more than we could chew, and boy did that hurt us bad. Our original estimated cost was over $2 billion short of the actual cost [which was $10.7 billion]. We've been scraping bottom since then, trying to manage closures to keep costs to the DIF down.
Of course a couple times we were forced into action, like with Colonial Bank or Corus Bank. We were hoping that those banks could pull themselves together, but in the end the Comptroller [of the Currency] and Alabama's Banking Department pushed those pieces of crap on us. It was pretty lucky that we could scrape up the money needed [$4.5 billion for the two] in order to get them out the door. Wasn't pretty.
Question #12: When was the last time the insurance fund had a negative balance, and why?
During the [Savings and Loan] fiasco, before I was working at the FDIC. From what I've heard from people, though, the FSLIC [Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation] was trying to pull the exact same thing we are now: hold off on closures as long as possible, keep their costs down, and pray hard that financials could pull themselves together on their own.
That didn't turn out so well, and the FSLIC ended up blowing out so bad that the FDIC had to step in and take over. It was a real mess, as I understand it, and damned expensive. Kinda funny that the FDIC is doing the same mistake the FSLIC made, isn't it?
Question #13: If the DIF goes negative, does this mean that the FDIC will no longer be able to protect insured depositors?
In theory, yes. If the DIF comes up dry, then there's no more money to cover deposits if the sale of banks' assets doesn't cover the full amount of their insured deposits. However, the FDIC has some money squirrelled away which it could tap in a pinch, as well as that infamous $500 billion credit line which it could tap.
However, if the FDIC gets the prepayment to go through, it could be shooting itself in the foot. See, if we do blow through that $45 billion, that's it for three years on premiums. We could levy special assessments, but that would get unpopular really fast. We'd have to tap the Treasury for money, but it we don't have income, how can we pay the interest? It's a no-win scenario. Deposit insurance goes up in smoke, because the NCUA [National Credit Union Administration] doesn't have the resources to take up the slack. Depositors will be at the mercy of their bank's bad investing.
Realistically, though, I suspect that if the FDIC becomes undeniably, inescapably insolvent it will probably be absorbed by the Federal Reserve. It's the only institution big enough to handle the mandate of the FDIC, and it has the ability to simply print up money to pay out insured deposits, even if a bank's assets are completely worthless. That will probably create some serious moral hazard, because with the printing press guaranteeing all deposits banks will have no real reason to seriously invest in real assets.
Question #14: Has the FDIC ever required prepaid assessments or borrowed from the Treasury before?
Yes. There was a prepayment once for... I think it was just an extra quarter, nothing more. So this three-year prepayment is completely unprecedented. We've never done anything like it, and frankly it's because we're desperate for money, and lots of it. We're taking a big chance with the prepayment too, because it removes income flexibility for a very long time. Who knows what can happen in three years? I really don't know what Sheila [Bair] is thinking...
As for borrowing from the Treasury, no. The only borrowing the FDIC has done in the past was from, I think it was the Federal Financing Bank in the S&L crisis. Wasn't much money either, only about $15 billion, so the $500 billion max credit line is a really big deal, especially if it gets tapped. When - not if, when - the FDIC calls on its Treasury credit line, things are very bad and will be getting much worse. Just you wait.
Question #15: How much does the FDIC expect to spend on bank failures, and how much money would the proposed prepaid assessment raise?
Well, the prepayment will take in about $45 billion, like I said. As for the cost of bank failures, the number I've seen kicking around is $100 billion from this year till 2013, but that's just bull. There's no way that the cost will be so low. Heck, this year alone has been about $26 billion, so if that rate keeps up it'll be $130 billion by 2013. But I'll be willing to bet that things are going downhill soon, and fast. Why else would we want that prepayment, and such a big prepayment at that?
Look, we've already set aside over $50 billion in the DIF's Contingent Loss Reserve, and with the $45 billion theoretically incoming, we should have our $100 billion, right? Well, what happens if the next several years ends up being like Indy Mac writ large? What if, instead of $100 billion, it's more like $130 billion? That means $30 billion has to come from somewhere, perhaps the Treasury credit line. But what happens if that comes next year? What happens if the cost is actually $200 billion by 2013? The margins are razor thin right now, and with this prepayment thing in the works it's basically guaranteeing the FDIC is going down smoking.
I hope I can get a job when that happens... Hey! What are you doing with that needle? What is that stuff? Hey, answer me!
Please read the FDIC's prepayment FAQ first, as in the rest of this post we will provide actual answers to the listed questions. We will be writing the replies in the manner of an awkward FDIC employee injected with truth serum. Pretend, if you will, we stand with you in a darkened room. It is stuffy and hot. A sweating accountant is 'cuffed to a chair, blinded by an extremely bright light; his eyes are squinted nervously. A squeaking fan is over in a corner, next to some doughnuts; throw in a couple beefy guys with names like Moose or Rocco for good measure. You get the idea.
***
Question #0: Has things gotten this bad because the FDIC is incompetent, or because its leadership is corrupt?
The answer is, obviously, yes.
Question #1: Why is it preferable to prepay assessments rather than borrow from the Treasury?
Well, as revealed by a former FDIC chairman, the FDIC really doesn't have any money at all in the Deposit Insurance Fund; in fact, it can be argued that the DIF doesn't exist at all. The monies which the FDIC takes in for the DIF actually go onto account at the U.S. Treasury, whereupon the money automatically becomes part of the Federal Government's General Fund, and the FDIC gets a lovely I.O.U. But, if you want to pretend the DIF exists, no skin off my nose.
Anyway, prepayments are probably preferable because it is a back-door way of getting real, cash money out of the private sector and into the greedy hands of the U.S. Congress. God knows the need as much money as they can get, and this is a pretty quick way of getting it. Plus it has the perfect cover story: the FDIC needed to 'repair' the DIF, and it needed the prepayments to do so. The money goes into the Treasury where the FDIC can pretend it is on its balance sheet, and the Congress can pretend it hasn't already spent the money a gajillion times over. Sure, the prepayments are only about $45 billion, but it's real money, which is hard to come by these days.
Question #2: Isn’t this a short term solution predicated on a swift banking recovery?
Oh, you noticed?
Ow! Okay, okay!
Yes, this does assume a swift recovery, because banks are going to need all the cash they can get in order to stay afloat when their balance sheets take another nose-dive. That'll be especially true when the Alt-A mortgages start rolling over, because you know those house owners will default right and left. At that point banks will find themselves the proud owners of really overvalued property, as opposed to the merely overvalued stuff already on their books from the sub-prime fiasco. Even if they don't foreclose, the non-performing loans will be bad enough. They'll need cash to try and stop-up the leaks.
Another tidal wave that banks face is the commercial property catastrophe. You had better believe that strip-malls and mega-shopping-centres are on the ropes, and there is no way that consumption will ever recover enough, and quick enough, to rescue those outfits. So, they'll naturally go under, default, and presto the banks have more useless property or non-performing loans on their balance sheet. More leaks, which will need more cash.
Question #3: Would smaller banks be affected disproportionately by this action?
Tough call... probably not all at once, but in the medium term, it will definitely be bad for smaller banks. In theory, it will be worse for the big banks, like Wells Fargo or Bank of America, but those guys have a government guarantee to never run out of money. So, even if this prepayment hurts banks, the smaller banks will feel the pain more, because they don't have a hotline to [Treasury Secretary Tim] Geithner.
Sure, the FDIC could give some exemptions, let a few stressed banks of the hook, but between you and me that probably won't happen much. We need that money, perhaps Congress needs that money to fund something or other that shouldn't be happening, but is anyway. Even if the prepayments help kill a few weak banks, they were probably going to go sometime soon anyway, so it's no big deal
Question #4: Didn’t Congress raise the FDIC’s borrowing limit for just this scenario?
Sure they did, but the FDIC doesn't want to touch that line with a ten-foot pole. Why? Well, the big buzz is that the line is being saved for some 'emergency.' That emergency should be obvious: a sudden and unexpected implosion of, say, Wells Fargo, or Bank of America, or JP Morgan . Hell, maybe this $500 billion has Goldman [Sachs'] name on it, just in case they have some trouble refueling their yachts, or something.
At the same time, if the FDIC were to tap its Treasury credit line, it would have to start paying interest at the Treasury rate. That would mean the FDIC would have to start earmarking money coming in from regular [deposit insurance] premiums, which would be bad because the FDIC is cash-starved. We need every penny coming in to keep up operations, at least at some level, and to have to set aside money for Treasury interest would be dangerous... who knows what that interest rate could do? If it went up sharply, for whatever reason, the interest payments would take a bigger and bigger chunk out of incoming FDIC fund. Hell, interest could end up being more than incoming premiums!
Question #5: Wouldn’t this take much needed capital out of the system and constrict lending?
Hahahaha, lending? Who's lending? Nobody important is lending, you dumkopf! All the big banks are taking their free government money and using it to buy T-bills and other government debt, because that's viewed as an utterly safe investment. I suppose it is, in a way, because they're guaranteed to get paid the face value of their bonds and such. The question is, of course, how much will that buy at the end of the game?
As for capital, well, like I said that really doesn't matter to the big banks, at least not right now. Those banks can simply get a dump-truck of new money dumped into their vaults overnight, problem solved. It's the real banks out there, the smaller ones which tried to be responsible and maintain standards, those are the banks to get socked in the mouth by capital shortages. They probably won't get a bailout from the Treasury or the Fed[eral Reserve]. Instead, if they go insolvent, the FDIC will just close them down and sell them off to bigger, more irresponsible banks which have a Treasury or Fed credit line.
Question #6: How would the banks account for the prepayment?
Ah, here's where it becomes genius. Let's say that Wells Fargo has to cough up $1 billion in cold, hard cash and mail it off to Aunt Sheila [Bair, FDIC Chairwoman]. In the real world, that should show up as a large, one-time draw on liquid assets, like when you write a cheque for cheese doodles and beer at the Seven Eleven.
But hey, this isn't the real world. Instead, accounting law allows Wells Fargo to count that $1 billion as an asset. Cool, yeah? Wells Fargo would thus end up with a three-year 'asset,' which would 'depreciate' by the value of the bank's monthly premium payment. This is how we can claim that banks can handle this prepayment, because they can spread out the pain over three-plus years, when in reality most banks probably couldn't handle such a large outlay of cash.
Question #7: How would the FDIC account for the prepayment?
Well, suddenly we'll be about $45 billion richer, so of course we'll get extra cream-filled doughnuts that day. Beyond that, and at the same time, we'll pretend we only got that quarter's premiums, without the subsequent quarters' prepayment being acknowledged. As the quarters roll by, we'll then pretend that we just received that quarter's premiums, and so on, until three years go by and everything is back to normal.
Hahahaha, normal...
Anyway, it's like having our cake and eating it, too: we've got the money from the next three years, but we'll still count it as regular income over that period, instead of in one lump sum. Don't let that fool you, though, because the FDIC will count the entire $45 billion as being available for spending during the whole period, if the money actually lasts that long.
Question #8: Isn’t this the same as borrowing from the industry without charging interest?
Well, if my pulling a gun on you and demanding all your money is considered borrowing without interest, then yes, this is like borrowing without interest. But really, no, this isn't borrowing. The FDIC doesn't believe in 'borrowing.' Borrowing means the other party has the right to refuse, and Shelia [Bair] doesn't like hearing negatives. The FDIC says jump, and all the insured banks say how high.
Question #9: How many banks would be exempt from paying the assessment up front?
Who knows, probably only a handful. Those banks will be very weak indeed, and they probably should have been closed anyway. If anyone could get their hands on the list of exempted banks, they would've just found the list of the next banks to be failed in the future.
Question #10: If a bank’s total deposits or actual assessment rate decreases during the next three years, would the FDIC refund a portion of their prepaid assessment?
What, does this look like the March of Dimes?
Ack! That hurts, man! C'mon!
Honestly, no, okay? It's part of the deal of getting the insured banks to swallow a prepayment plan. Even if their assessment rate increases, they won't have to pay extra for the next three years. It's actually a pretty sweet deal for banks which are planning on expanding deposits: they pay out, then enjoy insurance on their new deposits for a lower cumulative cost. It's bad for shrinking banks, though, because they'll theoretically be paying extra even if their real assessment has gone down.
Of course, if by some miracle there are any leftover funds in three-years' time, the FDIC will return that to the bank or banks in question. Nice idea, right? Too bad there probably won't be any money left!
Question #11: When is the DIF expected to go negative?
Go negative, as in the future tense? Haha, try July of last year [2008]! Indy Mac was a kick in the pants, far more than we can admit publicly. Simply put, we bit off more than we could chew, and boy did that hurt us bad. Our original estimated cost was over $2 billion short of the actual cost [which was $10.7 billion]. We've been scraping bottom since then, trying to manage closures to keep costs to the DIF down.
Of course a couple times we were forced into action, like with Colonial Bank or Corus Bank. We were hoping that those banks could pull themselves together, but in the end the Comptroller [of the Currency] and Alabama's Banking Department pushed those pieces of crap on us. It was pretty lucky that we could scrape up the money needed [$4.5 billion for the two] in order to get them out the door. Wasn't pretty.
Question #12: When was the last time the insurance fund had a negative balance, and why?
During the [Savings and Loan] fiasco, before I was working at the FDIC. From what I've heard from people, though, the FSLIC [Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation] was trying to pull the exact same thing we are now: hold off on closures as long as possible, keep their costs down, and pray hard that financials could pull themselves together on their own.
That didn't turn out so well, and the FSLIC ended up blowing out so bad that the FDIC had to step in and take over. It was a real mess, as I understand it, and damned expensive. Kinda funny that the FDIC is doing the same mistake the FSLIC made, isn't it?
Question #13: If the DIF goes negative, does this mean that the FDIC will no longer be able to protect insured depositors?
In theory, yes. If the DIF comes up dry, then there's no more money to cover deposits if the sale of banks' assets doesn't cover the full amount of their insured deposits. However, the FDIC has some money squirrelled away which it could tap in a pinch, as well as that infamous $500 billion credit line which it could tap.
However, if the FDIC gets the prepayment to go through, it could be shooting itself in the foot. See, if we do blow through that $45 billion, that's it for three years on premiums. We could levy special assessments, but that would get unpopular really fast. We'd have to tap the Treasury for money, but it we don't have income, how can we pay the interest? It's a no-win scenario. Deposit insurance goes up in smoke, because the NCUA [National Credit Union Administration] doesn't have the resources to take up the slack. Depositors will be at the mercy of their bank's bad investing.
Realistically, though, I suspect that if the FDIC becomes undeniably, inescapably insolvent it will probably be absorbed by the Federal Reserve. It's the only institution big enough to handle the mandate of the FDIC, and it has the ability to simply print up money to pay out insured deposits, even if a bank's assets are completely worthless. That will probably create some serious moral hazard, because with the printing press guaranteeing all deposits banks will have no real reason to seriously invest in real assets.
Question #14: Has the FDIC ever required prepaid assessments or borrowed from the Treasury before?
Yes. There was a prepayment once for... I think it was just an extra quarter, nothing more. So this three-year prepayment is completely unprecedented. We've never done anything like it, and frankly it's because we're desperate for money, and lots of it. We're taking a big chance with the prepayment too, because it removes income flexibility for a very long time. Who knows what can happen in three years? I really don't know what Sheila [Bair] is thinking...
As for borrowing from the Treasury, no. The only borrowing the FDIC has done in the past was from, I think it was the Federal Financing Bank in the S&L crisis. Wasn't much money either, only about $15 billion, so the $500 billion max credit line is a really big deal, especially if it gets tapped. When - not if, when - the FDIC calls on its Treasury credit line, things are very bad and will be getting much worse. Just you wait.
Question #15: How much does the FDIC expect to spend on bank failures, and how much money would the proposed prepaid assessment raise?
Well, the prepayment will take in about $45 billion, like I said. As for the cost of bank failures, the number I've seen kicking around is $100 billion from this year till 2013, but that's just bull. There's no way that the cost will be so low. Heck, this year alone has been about $26 billion, so if that rate keeps up it'll be $130 billion by 2013. But I'll be willing to bet that things are going downhill soon, and fast. Why else would we want that prepayment, and such a big prepayment at that?
Look, we've already set aside over $50 billion in the DIF's Contingent Loss Reserve, and with the $45 billion theoretically incoming, we should have our $100 billion, right? Well, what happens if the next several years ends up being like Indy Mac writ large? What if, instead of $100 billion, it's more like $130 billion? That means $30 billion has to come from somewhere, perhaps the Treasury credit line. But what happens if that comes next year? What happens if the cost is actually $200 billion by 2013? The margins are razor thin right now, and with this prepayment thing in the works it's basically guaranteeing the FDIC is going down smoking.
I hope I can get a job when that happens... Hey! What are you doing with that needle? What is that stuff? Hey, answer me!
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